I didn’t read your post in detail, but I think these kinds of discussions often miss considerations around fine-grained vs coarse decision criteria.
It’s really hard to try to minimise animal deaths in whatever you do
It’s also really hard to stick by ‘I try to drive as little as possible, especially when it’s raining, except in emergencies where considering whether to drive would cost precious time and worsen the outcome, or when, by refusing to drive, I would cause reputational harm to utilitarians by seeming too weird, or...’
It’s (comparatively) really easy to stick by the rule ‘I don’t eat animal products.’
Sure, there are edge cases/confusing things e.g. cross-contamination, but there’s a whole community of vegans who have thought about those cases, and have generally converged on some sensible-ish ways to handle them.
I think, in our moral decision-making, we should usually strive to find not-always-optimal-but-decent, relatively-easy-to-follow criteria, like:
Thanks for the comment. I suspect there are a couple of distinct elements that have been conflated in your arguments that I will try to disentangle.
As far as practical considerations in the context of personal changes to limit harm towards animals go, I not only agree with you that first-order veganism is sensible, it is also one of the key reasons why I am a 99% first-order vegan. Forget animals, I am just being kind to myself and eliminating decision fatigue by following a simple rule that says : animal products, no go. It just makes things so much more convenient and I would certainly recommend that to others too.
However, practical strategies, mental tricks and hacks should not be mistaken for ethical principles. I am sure you will agree that the latter requires reasoning and justification not subjected to the whims of mental hacks. If the community reifies those practical steps as a core component of the ethical baseline to be considered an adequate supporter/defender of animal welfare, then it is clearly drifting away from the primary considerations that brought it together in the first place.
Actually, I meant that as a matter of practical ethics, we may be better off in our attempts to do good if we use what you call ‘mental hacks.’
For example, utilitarians have near-universally acknowledged that if we think in terms of heuristics and rules of thumb, we’ll more reliably maximise utility than by trying to use the decision criterion, ‘do what maximises utility.’ See e.g. this page or any of the literature on two-level utilitarianism.
Is there any empirical evidence to back up the claim that following the conventional definition of veganism leads to greater overall harm reduction rather than thinking in more consequential terms ?
Also, unless I am mistaken, the utilitarian argument for rule-of-thumb applies in a context where we are either faced with an inability to determine the right course of action (owing to uncertainties in estimates of potential outcomes, say) or when the decision that emerges from such a calculation runs strongly counter to common sense.
I don’t believe either is the case with the definition of veganism. It is not common-sensical to avoid products with trace elements of animal ingredients for example.
I didn’t read your post in detail, but I think these kinds of discussions often miss considerations around fine-grained vs coarse decision criteria.
It’s really hard to try to minimise animal deaths in whatever you do
It’s also really hard to stick by ‘I try to drive as little as possible, especially when it’s raining, except in emergencies where considering whether to drive would cost precious time and worsen the outcome, or when, by refusing to drive, I would cause reputational harm to utilitarians by seeming too weird, or...’
It’s (comparatively) really easy to stick by the rule ‘I don’t eat animal products.’
Sure, there are edge cases/confusing things e.g. cross-contamination, but there’s a whole community of vegans who have thought about those cases, and have generally converged on some sensible-ish ways to handle them.
I think, in our moral decision-making, we should usually strive to find not-always-optimal-but-decent, relatively-easy-to-follow criteria, like:
Be kind
Be honest
Don’t eat animal products
Donate ~10%
Thanks for the comment. I suspect there are a couple of distinct elements that have been conflated in your arguments that I will try to disentangle.
As far as practical considerations in the context of personal changes to limit harm towards animals go, I not only agree with you that first-order veganism is sensible, it is also one of the key reasons why I am a 99% first-order vegan. Forget animals, I am just being kind to myself and eliminating decision fatigue by following a simple rule that says : animal products, no go. It just makes things so much more convenient and I would certainly recommend that to others too.
However, practical strategies, mental tricks and hacks should not be mistaken for ethical principles. I am sure you will agree that the latter requires reasoning and justification not subjected to the whims of mental hacks. If the community reifies those practical steps as a core component of the ethical baseline to be considered an adequate supporter/defender of animal welfare, then it is clearly drifting away from the primary considerations that brought it together in the first place.
Actually, I meant that as a matter of practical ethics, we may be better off in our attempts to do good if we use what you call ‘mental hacks.’
For example, utilitarians have near-universally acknowledged that if we think in terms of heuristics and rules of thumb, we’ll more reliably maximise utility than by trying to use the decision criterion, ‘do what maximises utility.’ See e.g. this page or any of the literature on two-level utilitarianism.
Is there any empirical evidence to back up the claim that following the conventional definition of veganism leads to greater overall harm reduction rather than thinking in more consequential terms ? Also, unless I am mistaken, the utilitarian argument for rule-of-thumb applies in a context where we are either faced with an inability to determine the right course of action (owing to uncertainties in estimates of potential outcomes, say) or when the decision that emerges from such a calculation runs strongly counter to common sense.
I don’t believe either is the case with the definition of veganism. It is not common-sensical to avoid products with trace elements of animal ingredients for example.