I believe weāre in agreement that the official definition of veganism is vague as you also use words like āambiguityā or āunclearā while describing it. In my comment Iām stating that vagueness of that definition isnāt that much of a problem.
Iām also curious why do you think animal tested ingredient consumption is first-order harm whereas crop deaths are a second-order harm. I can see how tractors crushing animals might be accidental instead of intentional. But when I compare pesticides to animal testing, both of them seem to be instances of intentionally exposing animals to harmful chemicals to improve product quality.
You may be slightly mistaken about what I am stating: the ambiguity is in the official definition even if it a sensible sounding one whereas the conventional definition is well-defined (āno first-order consumptionā) but arbitrary. The problem arises not so much from arbitrariness in and of itself, but rather demanding strict adherence to (and unwarranted focus on) something that isnāt well-justified to begin with. That leads to all sorts of contradictions.
On the second point, I agree that the distinctions between the two examples are somewhat arbitrary. One may argue that perhaps animal-testing in many instances is unnecessary (turns out several are based on methods and assumptions that have been around for a century and have persisted more out of inertia despite no clear evaluation of their effectiveness) but conventional agriculture depends on pesticides but I wouldnāt find that argument very convincing.
I believe weāre in agreement that the official definition of veganism is vague as you also use words like āambiguityā or āunclearā while describing it. In my comment Iām stating that vagueness of that definition isnāt that much of a problem.
Iām also curious why do you think animal tested ingredient consumption is first-order harm whereas crop deaths are a second-order harm. I can see how tractors crushing animals might be accidental instead of intentional. But when I compare pesticides to animal testing, both of them seem to be instances of intentionally exposing animals to harmful chemicals to improve product quality.
You may be slightly mistaken about what I am stating: the ambiguity is in the official definition even if it a sensible sounding one whereas the conventional definition is well-defined (āno first-order consumptionā) but arbitrary. The problem arises not so much from arbitrariness in and of itself, but rather demanding strict adherence to (and unwarranted focus on) something that isnāt well-justified to begin with. That leads to all sorts of contradictions.
On the second point, I agree that the distinctions between the two examples are somewhat arbitrary. One may argue that perhaps animal-testing in many instances is unnecessary (turns out several are based on methods and assumptions that have been around for a century and have persisted more out of inertia despite no clear evaluation of their effectiveness) but conventional agriculture depends on pesticides but I wouldnāt find that argument very convincing.