The way I’m using the terms, moral status and capacity for welfare are independent of realized welfare. Increasing realized welfare (e.g., through art/entertainment) doesn’t raise one’s capacity for welfare or moral status.
However, on some views, it does seem at least in principle possible to raise capacity for welfare through things like education. (I view your example of the intellectual stimulation of nonhuman animals as a type of education.) Educating a child might increase her capacity for certain objective goods, thereby increasing her capacity for welfare. On the other hand, it might be that educating the child simply makes it more likely that she will obtain those goods, thus raising her expected realized welfare rather than capacity for welfare. (Or perhaps education does both.) The answer depends on where we draw the line between potential and capacity, which naturally is going to be contentious. I’m hopeful that not much in practice hangs on this question, but I’m open to examples where it does.
The way I’m using the terms, moral status and capacity for welfare are independent of realized welfare. Increasing realized welfare (e.g., through art/entertainment) doesn’t raise one’s capacity for welfare or moral status.
Couldn’t it change the “proper subset of physically possible worlds” (or the kinds of sets of these) we use to define the welfare capacity of individuals of a given species? Where before art/entertainment might not have been included, now it is. Either we should have always included it and we were mistaken before for not doing so, since we just didn’t know that this was a possibility that should have been included, or the kinds of sets we could use did actually change.
The answer depends on where we draw the line between potential and capacity, which naturally is going to be contentious. I’m hopeful that not much in practice hangs on this question, but I’m open to examples where it does.
The normal development after conception seems like such an example. Obviously it matters for the abortion debate, but, for animals, I’ve heard the suggestion that juveniles of species with extremely high infant/juvenile mortality rates have little use for the capacity to suffer during this period of high mortality, so this would be a reason to not develop it until later, since it has energetic costs. This was based on Zach Freitas-Groff’s paper on wild animal suffering.
Hi Michael,
The way I’m using the terms, moral status and capacity for welfare are independent of realized welfare. Increasing realized welfare (e.g., through art/entertainment) doesn’t raise one’s capacity for welfare or moral status.
However, on some views, it does seem at least in principle possible to raise capacity for welfare through things like education. (I view your example of the intellectual stimulation of nonhuman animals as a type of education.) Educating a child might increase her capacity for certain objective goods, thereby increasing her capacity for welfare. On the other hand, it might be that educating the child simply makes it more likely that she will obtain those goods, thus raising her expected realized welfare rather than capacity for welfare. (Or perhaps education does both.) The answer depends on where we draw the line between potential and capacity, which naturally is going to be contentious. I’m hopeful that not much in practice hangs on this question, but I’m open to examples where it does.
Couldn’t it change the “proper subset of physically possible worlds” (or the kinds of sets of these) we use to define the welfare capacity of individuals of a given species? Where before art/entertainment might not have been included, now it is. Either we should have always included it and we were mistaken before for not doing so, since we just didn’t know that this was a possibility that should have been included, or the kinds of sets we could use did actually change.
The normal development after conception seems like such an example. Obviously it matters for the abortion debate, but, for animals, I’ve heard the suggestion that juveniles of species with extremely high infant/juvenile mortality rates have little use for the capacity to suffer during this period of high mortality, so this would be a reason to not develop it until later, since it has energetic costs. This was based on Zach Freitas-Groff’s paper on wild animal suffering.