We want to circumscribe the set of possible worlds so that it includes all and only normal variation in the welfare values of species-typical animals.[13]
(...)
Admittedly, filling in the details of this relativization will be complex. Itās not at all clear how to define ānormal variationā or āspecies-typical animal.ā I set aside that difficulty for now.
If meant statistically, it could be that ānormalā still happens to be pretty circumstantial. Most nonhuman animals, for example, probably donāt get much intellectual stimulation without humans, but some actually do through things like puzzles and games. Iām guessing you would want to count that in normal, because itās practical possibility today? But then would that mean that before we started giving animals puzzles and games, they had less moral status? This feels very different from enhancement.
And if we define moral status this way, it could be that human moral status has been increasing over time, too, due to environmental/āsocial factors, like art and entertainment.
It could be that human moral status is actually decreasing or will decrease, because humans suffer less in modern times and will continue to suffer less and less in the future, without much increase to our peaks of happiness, because of the priority we give to suffering and its causes.
The way Iām using the terms, moral status and capacity for welfare are independent of realized welfare. Increasing realized welfare (e.g., through art/āentertainment) doesnāt raise oneās capacity for welfare or moral status.
However, on some views, it does seem at least in principle possible to raise capacity for welfare through things like education. (I view your example of the intellectual stimulation of nonhuman animals as a type of education.) Educating a child might increase her capacity for certain objective goods, thereby increasing her capacity for welfare. On the other hand, it might be that educating the child simply makes it more likely that she will obtain those goods, thus raising her expected realized welfare rather than capacity for welfare. (Or perhaps education does both.) The answer depends on where we draw the line between potential and capacity, which naturally is going to be contentious. Iām hopeful that not much in practice hangs on this question, but Iām open to examples where it does.
The way Iām using the terms, moral status and capacity for welfare are independent of realized welfare. Increasing realized welfare (e.g., through art/āentertainment) doesnāt raise oneās capacity for welfare or moral status.
Couldnāt it change the āproper subset of physically possible worldsā (or the kinds of sets of these) we use to define the welfare capacity of individuals of a given species? Where before art/āentertainment might not have been included, now it is. Either we should have always included it and we were mistaken before for not doing so, since we just didnāt know that this was a possibility that should have been included, or the kinds of sets we could use did actually change.
The answer depends on where we draw the line between potential and capacity, which naturally is going to be contentious. Iām hopeful that not much in practice hangs on this question, but Iām open to examples where it does.
The normal development after conception seems like such an example. Obviously it matters for the abortion debate, but, for animals, Iāve heard the suggestion that juveniles of species with extremely high infant/ājuvenile mortality rates have little use for the capacity to suffer during this period of high mortality, so this would be a reason to not develop it until later, since it has energetic costs. This was based on Zach Freitas-Groffās paper on wild animal suffering.
If meant statistically, it could be that ānormalā still happens to be pretty circumstantial. Most nonhuman animals, for example, probably donāt get much intellectual stimulation without humans, but some actually do through things like puzzles and games. Iām guessing you would want to count that in normal, because itās practical possibility today? But then would that mean that before we started giving animals puzzles and games, they had less moral status? This feels very different from enhancement.
And if we define moral status this way, it could be that human moral status has been increasing over time, too, due to environmental/āsocial factors, like art and entertainment.
It could be that human moral status is actually decreasing or will decrease, because humans suffer less in modern times and will continue to suffer less and less in the future, without much increase to our peaks of happiness, because of the priority we give to suffering and its causes.
Hi Michael,
The way Iām using the terms, moral status and capacity for welfare are independent of realized welfare. Increasing realized welfare (e.g., through art/āentertainment) doesnāt raise oneās capacity for welfare or moral status.
However, on some views, it does seem at least in principle possible to raise capacity for welfare through things like education. (I view your example of the intellectual stimulation of nonhuman animals as a type of education.) Educating a child might increase her capacity for certain objective goods, thereby increasing her capacity for welfare. On the other hand, it might be that educating the child simply makes it more likely that she will obtain those goods, thus raising her expected realized welfare rather than capacity for welfare. (Or perhaps education does both.) The answer depends on where we draw the line between potential and capacity, which naturally is going to be contentious. Iām hopeful that not much in practice hangs on this question, but Iām open to examples where it does.
Couldnāt it change the āproper subset of physically possible worldsā (or the kinds of sets of these) we use to define the welfare capacity of individuals of a given species? Where before art/āentertainment might not have been included, now it is. Either we should have always included it and we were mistaken before for not doing so, since we just didnāt know that this was a possibility that should have been included, or the kinds of sets we could use did actually change.
The normal development after conception seems like such an example. Obviously it matters for the abortion debate, but, for animals, Iāve heard the suggestion that juveniles of species with extremely high infant/ājuvenile mortality rates have little use for the capacity to suffer during this period of high mortality, so this would be a reason to not develop it until later, since it has energetic costs. This was based on Zach Freitas-Groffās paper on wild animal suffering.