Minor matter: Do you see a reason to prefer the term âwelfare subjectâ and âmoral standingâ to âmoral patientâ and âmoral patienthoodâ? For example, are the former terms more popular in the philosophical literature?
I see five potential perks of the latter pair of terms:
Their relationship to each other is obvious from the terms themselves (whereas with âwelfare subjectâ and âmoral standingâ, youâd have to explain to someone new to the topic that thereâs a relationship between those terms)
Their relationship with âmoral agentâ/ââmoral agencyâ seems more obvious from the terms themselves.
Compared to âmoral standingâ, âmoral patientâ seems less likely to end up getting confused with âmoral statusâ
âmoral patientâ doesnât have to take a stand on whether welfare is the only thing thatâs non-instrumentally morally good (or whether itâs non-instrumentally morally good at all), whereas focusing on whether something is a âwelfare subjectâ could arguably be seen as implying that.
Although in practice EAs probably will be focusing on welfare as the only non-instrumentally morally good thing, and Iâm ok with that myself.
I feel a vague sense that âwelfareâ (and thus âwelfare subjectâ) might sound to some people like itâs focusing on a hedonistic view of wellbeing, rather than on a desire-fulfilment or objective list view. But I could very well be wrong about that.
First, to clarify, strictly speaking welfare subject is not meant to be synonymous with moral patient. Some people believe that things that lack moral standing can still be welfare subjects. You might think, for example, that plants arenât sentient and so donât have moral standing, but nevertheless there are things that are non-instrumentally good for plants, so plants can be welfare subjects. (I donât hold this view, but some do.)
Otherwise, Iâm mostly sympathetic to your points. I donât object to talk of âmoral patienthood.â âMoral standingâ appears to be more popular in the literature, but maybe thatâs a terminological mistake.
Minor matter: Do you see a reason to prefer the term âwelfare subjectâ and âmoral standingâ to âmoral patientâ and âmoral patienthoodâ? For example, are the former terms more popular in the philosophical literature?
I see five potential perks of the latter pair of terms:
Their relationship to each other is obvious from the terms themselves (whereas with âwelfare subjectâ and âmoral standingâ, youâd have to explain to someone new to the topic that thereâs a relationship between those terms)
Their relationship with âmoral agentâ/ââmoral agencyâ seems more obvious from the terms themselves.
Compared to âmoral standingâ, âmoral patientâ seems less likely to end up getting confused with âmoral statusâ
âmoral patientâ doesnât have to take a stand on whether welfare is the only thing thatâs non-instrumentally morally good (or whether itâs non-instrumentally morally good at all), whereas focusing on whether something is a âwelfare subjectâ could arguably be seen as implying that.
Although in practice EAs probably will be focusing on welfare as the only non-instrumentally morally good thing, and Iâm ok with that myself.
I feel a vague sense that âwelfareâ (and thus âwelfare subjectâ) might sound to some people like itâs focusing on a hedonistic view of wellbeing, rather than on a desire-fulfilment or objective list view. But I could very well be wrong about that.
Hi Michael,
First, to clarify, strictly speaking welfare subject is not meant to be synonymous with moral patient. Some people believe that things that lack moral standing can still be welfare subjects. You might think, for example, that plants arenât sentient and so donât have moral standing, but nevertheless there are things that are non-instrumentally good for plants, so plants can be welfare subjects. (I donât hold this view, but some do.)
Otherwise, Iâm mostly sympathetic to your points. I donât object to talk of âmoral patienthood.â âMoral standingâ appears to be more popular in the literature, but maybe thatâs a terminological mistake.
Thanks for that clarification and that answer!