Minor matter: Do you see a reason to prefer the term “welfare subject” and “moral standing” to “moral patient” and “moral patienthood”? For example, are the former terms more popular in the philosophical literature?
I see five potential perks of the latter pair of terms:
Their relationship to each other is obvious from the terms themselves (whereas with “welfare subject” and “moral standing”, you’d have to explain to someone new to the topic that there’s a relationship between those terms)
Their relationship with “moral agent”/”moral agency” seems more obvious from the terms themselves.
Compared to “moral standing”, “moral patient” seems less likely to end up getting confused with “moral status”
“moral patient” doesn’t have to take a stand on whether welfare is the only thing that’s non-instrumentally morally good (or whether it’s non-instrumentally morally good at all), whereas focusing on whether something is a “welfare subject” could arguably be seen as implying that.
Although in practice EAs probably will be focusing on welfare as the only non-instrumentally morally good thing, and I’m ok with that myself.
I feel a vague sense that “welfare” (and thus “welfare subject”) might sound to some people like it’s focusing on a hedonistic view of wellbeing, rather than on a desire-fulfilment or objective list view. But I could very well be wrong about that.
First, to clarify, strictly speaking welfare subject is not meant to be synonymous with moral patient. Some people believe that things that lack moral standing can still be welfare subjects. You might think, for example, that plants aren’t sentient and so don’t have moral standing, but nevertheless there are things that are non-instrumentally good for plants, so plants can be welfare subjects. (I don’t hold this view, but some do.)
Otherwise, I’m mostly sympathetic to your points. I don’t object to talk of ‘moral patienthood.’ ‘Moral standing’ appears to be more popular in the literature, but maybe that’s a terminological mistake.
Minor matter: Do you see a reason to prefer the term “welfare subject” and “moral standing” to “moral patient” and “moral patienthood”? For example, are the former terms more popular in the philosophical literature?
I see five potential perks of the latter pair of terms:
Their relationship to each other is obvious from the terms themselves (whereas with “welfare subject” and “moral standing”, you’d have to explain to someone new to the topic that there’s a relationship between those terms)
Their relationship with “moral agent”/”moral agency” seems more obvious from the terms themselves.
Compared to “moral standing”, “moral patient” seems less likely to end up getting confused with “moral status”
“moral patient” doesn’t have to take a stand on whether welfare is the only thing that’s non-instrumentally morally good (or whether it’s non-instrumentally morally good at all), whereas focusing on whether something is a “welfare subject” could arguably be seen as implying that.
Although in practice EAs probably will be focusing on welfare as the only non-instrumentally morally good thing, and I’m ok with that myself.
I feel a vague sense that “welfare” (and thus “welfare subject”) might sound to some people like it’s focusing on a hedonistic view of wellbeing, rather than on a desire-fulfilment or objective list view. But I could very well be wrong about that.
Hi Michael,
First, to clarify, strictly speaking welfare subject is not meant to be synonymous with moral patient. Some people believe that things that lack moral standing can still be welfare subjects. You might think, for example, that plants aren’t sentient and so don’t have moral standing, but nevertheless there are things that are non-instrumentally good for plants, so plants can be welfare subjects. (I don’t hold this view, but some do.)
Otherwise, I’m mostly sympathetic to your points. I don’t object to talk of ‘moral patienthood.’ ‘Moral standing’ appears to be more popular in the literature, but maybe that’s a terminological mistake.
Thanks for that clarification and that answer!