Thanks for your response. Just to clarify, part of my concern is with the possible disrespect inherent in regarding the avoidance of unwanted pregnancies as a “possible serious negative externality”. I don’t think that’s a good (or respectful) way to think about it, and accordingly I don’t think the “steakhouse” analogy works (because, to be clear, the moral reasons we have to defer to individual women about the desirability of them personallybecoming pregnant have no analogue in the steak case—individuals do not have the moral authority to determine whether them personally eating meat is morally good or bad).
Of course, you might disagree about whether respect for individual women calls for this kind of deference or granting of moral authority over whether it’s good or bad for them personally to become pregnant. But I think it’s sufficiently credible that you should give it significant weight in moral uncertainty. And that means that there’s a significant moral risk to the kind of argument that you’re putting forward here, which involves depriving them of that moral authority.
(Note that there is no such risk to the alternative many are urging here, of supporting pro-fertility policies in a way that’s fully co-operative with—rather than potentially adversarial towards—the wishes and choices of individual women.)
I don’t think the “steakhouse” analogy works (because, to be clear, the moral reasons we have to defer to individual women about the desirability of them personallybecoming pregnant have no analogue in the steak case—individuals do not have the moral authority to determine whether them personally eating meat is morally good or bad).
The two situations seem pretty analogous to me. In both cases there is some prima facie plausible personal autonomy case on one side (it certainly seems plausible people have the right to choose what food they eat!) and a prima facie harm to third parties on the other (with debate about whether those third parties are morally relevant). In both cases the person has some moral authority (to decide if eating meat is good for them) but not complete (they can’t decide if eating meat is bad for the animals).
There’s no prima facie harm from contraception. There’s a possible foregone benefit, but one it would be arguably illicit to obtain by treating the provider as a mere means.
A better analogy would be to stop supporting medical treatment for car accident victims, because if we let them die we could use their organs to save more others.
You’re not talking about averting negative externalities, but about promoting exploitation of others without their consent. I don’t think EA should countenance such reasoning.
Sorry, I think we may have been talking past each other. I was referring to abortion, which presumably you would agree does have a prima facie harm, and hence is comparable to the steakhouse situation.
Yes, that’s right—thanks for clarifying. (For context, note that upthread Ariel wrote: “If abortion were wrong only because embryos could have personhood, then you’d be absolutely correct that we should donate more to family planning charities which reduce the number of abortions rather than less. However...” So our dispute was about whether preventing unwanted pregnancies should count as a “possible negative externality”.)
Thanks for your response. Just to clarify, part of my concern is with the possible disrespect inherent in regarding the avoidance of unwanted pregnancies as a “possible serious negative externality”. I don’t think that’s a good (or respectful) way to think about it, and accordingly I don’t think the “steakhouse” analogy works (because, to be clear, the moral reasons we have to defer to individual women about the desirability of them personally becoming pregnant have no analogue in the steak case—individuals do not have the moral authority to determine whether them personally eating meat is morally good or bad).
Of course, you might disagree about whether respect for individual women calls for this kind of deference or granting of moral authority over whether it’s good or bad for them personally to become pregnant. But I think it’s sufficiently credible that you should give it significant weight in moral uncertainty. And that means that there’s a significant moral risk to the kind of argument that you’re putting forward here, which involves depriving them of that moral authority.
(Note that there is no such risk to the alternative many are urging here, of supporting pro-fertility policies in a way that’s fully co-operative with—rather than potentially adversarial towards—the wishes and choices of individual women.)
The two situations seem pretty analogous to me. In both cases there is some prima facie plausible personal autonomy case on one side (it certainly seems plausible people have the right to choose what food they eat!) and a prima facie harm to third parties on the other (with debate about whether those third parties are morally relevant). In both cases the person has some moral authority (to decide if eating meat is good for them) but not complete (they can’t decide if eating meat is bad for the animals).
There’s no prima facie harm from contraception. There’s a possible foregone benefit, but one it would be arguably illicit to obtain by treating the provider as a mere means.
A better analogy would be to stop supporting medical treatment for car accident victims, because if we let them die we could use their organs to save more others.
You’re not talking about averting negative externalities, but about promoting exploitation of others without their consent. I don’t think EA should countenance such reasoning.
Sorry, I think we may have been talking past each other. I was referring to abortion, which presumably you would agree does have a prima facie harm, and hence is comparable to the steakhouse situation.
Yes, that’s right—thanks for clarifying. (For context, note that upthread Ariel wrote: “If abortion were wrong only because embryos could have personhood, then you’d be absolutely correct that we should donate more to family planning charities which reduce the number of abortions rather than less. However...” So our dispute was about whether preventing unwanted pregnancies should count as a “possible negative externality”.)