I also feel that “naturalistic moral realism” doesn’t really “capture” what I want from moral realism. So in that sense I think I’d share your view that the distinction between anti-realism and moral naturalism seems loose, and that the latter might be better thought of as anti-realism. (I also think that what I want from “realism” is probably some sort of weird spooky thing that I’d normally reject a desire for on reductionist grounds, so to that extent I’m inclined to agree with much of what you’re writing.)
That makes sense.
I also feel that “naturalistic moral realism” doesn’t really “capture” what I want from moral realism. So in that sense I think I’d share your view that the distinction between anti-realism and moral naturalism seems loose, and that the latter might be better thought of as anti-realism. (I also think that what I want from “realism” is probably some sort of weird spooky thing that I’d normally reject a desire for on reductionist grounds, so to that extent I’m inclined to agree with much of what you’re writing.)