I also feel that ānaturalistic moral realismā doesnāt really ācaptureā what I want from moral realism. So in that sense I think Iād share your view that the distinction between anti-realism and moral naturalism seems loose, and that the latter might be better thought of as anti-realism. (I also think that what I want from ārealismā is probably some sort of weird spooky thing that Iād normally reject a desire for on reductionist grounds, so to that extent Iām inclined to agree with much of what youāre writing.)
That makes sense.
I also feel that ānaturalistic moral realismā doesnāt really ācaptureā what I want from moral realism. So in that sense I think Iād share your view that the distinction between anti-realism and moral naturalism seems loose, and that the latter might be better thought of as anti-realism. (I also think that what I want from ārealismā is probably some sort of weird spooky thing that Iād normally reject a desire for on reductionist grounds, so to that extent Iām inclined to agree with much of what youāre writing.)