Does the following statement of the slogan seem to you to capture the anti-realist position: “Reality doesn’t come with objectively correct labels. Humans create labels and draw categories, and how they do this will be determined by physical reality, but there’s no separate criteria determining how humans should do this; there’s nothing more/other than how they will do this.”
Yeah, that sounds right! It carries more information than my crude proposal.
As you suggest, moral naturalists might agree that reality (obviously) doesn’t carry labels. They might argue that in a way, it kind of screams out at you where you can put the labels. And the anti-realist position is that there’s more ambiguity than “it just screams out at you.”
While the distinction between anti-realism and non-naturalism seems relatively clearcut, I think the distinction between anti-realism and naturalism is a bit loose. This is also reflected in Luke Muehlhauser’s Pluralistic Moral Reductionism post. Luke left it open whether to count PMR as realism or anti-realism. By contrast, my terminological choice has been to count it as anti-realism.
I also feel that “naturalistic moral realism” doesn’t really “capture” what I want from moral realism. So in that sense I think I’d share your view that the distinction between anti-realism and moral naturalism seems loose, and that the latter might be better thought of as anti-realism. (I also think that what I want from “realism” is probably some sort of weird spooky thing that I’d normally reject a desire for on reductionist grounds, so to that extent I’m inclined to agree with much of what you’re writing.)
Yeah, that sounds right! It carries more information than my crude proposal.
As you suggest, moral naturalists might agree that reality (obviously) doesn’t carry labels. They might argue that in a way, it kind of screams out at you where you can put the labels. And the anti-realist position is that there’s more ambiguity than “it just screams out at you.”
While the distinction between anti-realism and non-naturalism seems relatively clearcut, I think the distinction between anti-realism and naturalism is a bit loose. This is also reflected in Luke Muehlhauser’s Pluralistic Moral Reductionism post. Luke left it open whether to count PMR as realism or anti-realism. By contrast, my terminological choice has been to count it as anti-realism.
That makes sense.
I also feel that “naturalistic moral realism” doesn’t really “capture” what I want from moral realism. So in that sense I think I’d share your view that the distinction between anti-realism and moral naturalism seems loose, and that the latter might be better thought of as anti-realism. (I also think that what I want from “realism” is probably some sort of weird spooky thing that I’d normally reject a desire for on reductionist grounds, so to that extent I’m inclined to agree with much of what you’re writing.)