On timelines, I think itâs worth separating out export controls on different items:
Controls on AI chips themselves start having effects on AI systems within a year or so probably (say 6-12 months to procure and install the chips, and 6-18 months to develop/âtrain/âpost-train a model with them), or even sooner for deployment/âinference, i.e. 1-2 years or so.
Controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) take longer to have an impact as you say, but I think not that long. SMIC (and therefore future Ascend GPUs) is clearly limited by the 2019 ban on EUV photolithography, and I would say this was apparent as early as 2023. So I think SME controls instituted now would start having an effect on chip production in the late 2020s already, and on AI systems 1-2 years after that.
Most other relevant products (e.g., HBM and EDA software) probably fall between those two in terms of how quickly controls affect downstream AI systems.
So that means policy changes in 2025 could start affecting Chinese AI models in 2027 (for chips) and around 2030 (for SME) already, which seems relevant to even short-timeline worlds. For example, Daniel Kokotajloâs median for superhuman coders is now 2029, and IIUC Eli Liflandâs median is in the (early?) 2030s.
But I would go further to say that export controls now can substantially affect compute access well into the 2030s or even the 2040s. You write that
the technical barriers [to Chinese indigenization of leading-edge chip fabrication] are higher today, but not so high that intense Chinese investment canât dent it over the course of a decade. SMEE is investing in laser-induced discharge plasma tech, with rumored trial production as soon as the end of this year. SMIC is using DUV more efficiently for (lower-yield, but still effective) chip production. Thereâs also work on Nanoimprint lithography, immersion lithography, packaging, etc. And that wonât affect market shares, until it does.
I wonât have time to go into great detail here, but I have researched this a fair amount and I think you are too bullish on Chinese leading-edge chip fabrication. To be clear, China can and will certainly produce AI chips, and these are decent AI chips. But they will likely produce those chips less cost-efficiently and at lower volumes due to having worse equipment, and they will have worse performance than TSMC-fabbed chips due to using older-generation processes. The lack of EUV machines, which will likely last at least another five years and plausibly well into the 2030s, alone is a very significant constraint.
On SMEE and SMIC in particularâyou write:
SMEE is investing in laser-induced discharge plasma tech, with rumored trial production as soon as the end of this year.
SMEE was established 23 years ago to produce indigenous lithography, and 23 years later it still has essentially no market share, and it still has not produced an immersion DUV machine, let alone an EUV machine, which is far more difficult. I would not be surprised if, when the indigenous Chinese immersion DUV machine does finally arrive, it is a SiCarrier (or subsidiary) product and not an SMEE product.
SMIC is using DUV more efficiently for (lower-yield, but still effective) chip production.
In what sense do you mean SMIC is using DUV more efficiently? It is using immersion DUV multi-patterning (with ASML machines) to compensate for its lack of EUV machines. But as you note this means worse yield and lower throughput. I donât see any sense in which SMIC is using DUV more efficiently; itâs just using it more, in order to get around a constraint that TSMC doesnât have. In any case, multi-patterning with immersion DUV can only take you so far; thereâs likely a hard stop around whatâs vaguely called 2 nm or 1.4 nm process nodes, even if you do multi-patterning perfectly. (For reference, TSMC is starting mass production on its â2 nmâ process this year.)
Thanks for this responseâI am not an expert on chip production, and your response on fabrication is clearly better informed than mine.
However, âPolicy changes in 2025 could start affecting Chinese AI models in 2027 (for chips) and around 2030 (for SME) already.â
I now agree with thisâand I was told in other comments that I didnât sufficiently distinguish between these two, so thanks for clarifying that. But 2030 for starting to help get more chips is long timelines, and the people you cite with 2029-2030 timelines expect it to be playing out already then, so starting to get more chips then seems irrelevant in those worlds.
On timelines, I think itâs worth separating out export controls on different items:
Controls on AI chips themselves start having effects on AI systems within a year or so probably (say 6-12 months to procure and install the chips, and 6-18 months to develop/âtrain/âpost-train a model with them), or even sooner for deployment/âinference, i.e. 1-2 years or so.
Controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) take longer to have an impact as you say, but I think not that long. SMIC (and therefore future Ascend GPUs) is clearly limited by the 2019 ban on EUV photolithography, and I would say this was apparent as early as 2023. So I think SME controls instituted now would start having an effect on chip production in the late 2020s already, and on AI systems 1-2 years after that.
Most other relevant products (e.g., HBM and EDA software) probably fall between those two in terms of how quickly controls affect downstream AI systems.
So that means policy changes in 2025 could start affecting Chinese AI models in 2027 (for chips) and around 2030 (for SME) already, which seems relevant to even short-timeline worlds. For example, Daniel Kokotajloâs median for superhuman coders is now 2029, and IIUC Eli Liflandâs median is in the (early?) 2030s.
But I would go further to say that export controls now can substantially affect compute access well into the 2030s or even the 2040s. You write that
I wonât have time to go into great detail here, but I have researched this a fair amount and I think you are too bullish on Chinese leading-edge chip fabrication. To be clear, China can and will certainly produce AI chips, and these are decent AI chips. But they will likely produce those chips less cost-efficiently and at lower volumes due to having worse equipment, and they will have worse performance than TSMC-fabbed chips due to using older-generation processes. The lack of EUV machines, which will likely last at least another five years and plausibly well into the 2030s, alone is a very significant constraint.
On SMEE and SMIC in particularâyou write:
SMEE was established 23 years ago to produce indigenous lithography, and 23 years later it still has essentially no market share, and it still has not produced an immersion DUV machine, let alone an EUV machine, which is far more difficult. I would not be surprised if, when the indigenous Chinese immersion DUV machine does finally arrive, it is a SiCarrier (or subsidiary) product and not an SMEE product.
In what sense do you mean SMIC is using DUV more efficiently? It is using immersion DUV multi-patterning (with ASML machines) to compensate for its lack of EUV machines. But as you note this means worse yield and lower throughput. I donât see any sense in which SMIC is using DUV more efficiently; itâs just using it more, in order to get around a constraint that TSMC doesnât have. In any case, multi-patterning with immersion DUV can only take you so far; thereâs likely a hard stop around whatâs vaguely called 2 nm or 1.4 nm process nodes, even if you do multi-patterning perfectly. (For reference, TSMC is starting mass production on its â2 nmâ process this year.)
Thanks for this responseâI am not an expert on chip production, and your response on fabrication is clearly better informed than mine.
However, âPolicy changes in 2025 could start affecting Chinese AI models in 2027 (for chips) and around 2030 (for SME) already.â
I now agree with thisâand I was told in other comments that I didnât sufficiently distinguish between these two, so thanks for clarifying that. But 2030 for starting to help get more chips is long timelines, and the people you cite with 2029-2030 timelines expect it to be playing out already then, so starting to get more chips then seems irrelevant in those worlds.