The fact that there exists an optimal population size for improving the future does not solve population ethics, because population ethics influences what “improving the future” means.
If, say, you are an average utilitarian, then a very small population, experiencing an extremely high standard of living and in no danger of losing it, is a good outcome. A total utilitarian may disagree, and think that there should be much more emphasis on expanding and creating/ensuring more good lives. The optimal population size today and next year could easily shift depending on which future you’re aiming for.
So you haven’t solved population ethics in the indefinite future (which still matters), and that influences it today (where most philosophers would agree it’s less relevant).This is not a solution, and I hope I’ve explained why.
Thank you for your comment and for your explanation!
I agree that if you know what improving the future means (to you), and if that future matters to you, then you have an optimal population size to aim at. Granted that if improving the future means something different to you[1], then the optimal population size to aim at will be different. And if you’re time-inconsistent in what improving the future means to you, you are then time-inconsistent in the optimal population size to aim at. But that supports the consistency, not the inconsistency, of the if-then statement/relationship.
In my paraphrase/agreement above, I added “if that future matters to you”. And herein I add the longtermism. I’m, indeed, not solving population ethics per se. I’m saying that for a (strong) longtermist the problem reduces to “what is now the optimal population size (for me)?”. (Still a significant and substantial empirical question.)
A tangential other point your last paragraph reminded me of: at end of the future, so to say, and knowingly so, longtermism would no longer make sense, and these above implications for a resolution of population ethics would thus neither.
I also liked your comment that most philosophers would ‘not worry too much’ about population ethics ‘in the short-term’. As that was I guess part of my aims. I added a subtitle with a footnote with what I additionally learned from our exchange and the previous comments.
The fact that there exists an optimal population size for improving the future does not solve population ethics, because population ethics influences what “improving the future” means.
If, say, you are an average utilitarian, then a very small population, experiencing an extremely high standard of living and in no danger of losing it, is a good outcome. A total utilitarian may disagree, and think that there should be much more emphasis on expanding and creating/ensuring more good lives. The optimal population size today and next year could easily shift depending on which future you’re aiming for.
So you haven’t solved population ethics in the indefinite future (which still matters), and that influences it today (where most philosophers would agree it’s less relevant).This is not a solution, and I hope I’ve explained why.
Thank you for your comment and for your explanation!
I agree that if you know what improving the future means (to you), and if that future matters to you, then you have an optimal population size to aim at. Granted that if improving the future means something different to you[1], then the optimal population size to aim at will be different. And if you’re time-inconsistent in what improving the future means to you, you are then time-inconsistent in the optimal population size to aim at. But that supports the consistency, not the inconsistency, of the if-then statement/relationship.
In my paraphrase/agreement above, I added “if that future matters to you”. And herein I add the longtermism. I’m, indeed, not solving population ethics per se. I’m saying that for a (strong) longtermist the problem reduces to “what is now the optimal population size (for me)?”. (Still a significant and substantial empirical question.)
A tangential other point your last paragraph reminded me of: at end of the future, so to say, and knowingly so, longtermism would no longer make sense, and these above implications for a resolution of population ethics would thus neither.
A more general question, of ethics?
I also liked your comment that most philosophers would ‘not worry too much’ about population ethics ‘in the short-term’. As that was I guess part of my aims. I added a subtitle with a footnote with what I additionally learned from our exchange and the previous comments.