(The following is aimed mostly at people who don’t see a problem with the OP).
The problem in population ethics are usually phrased as impossibility theorems: Desirable and intuitive properties for which we know we can’t have all of them (here the statement of an older one, see also Arrhenius 2000 for a longer exposition).
Thank you both for your comments. Let’s consider an example.
Suppose you are tasked with ethical decision-making and part of a moderately sized population on a moderately sized island. Moreover the current population size is exactly at the minimally viable population size to maintain sufficient genetic diversity to sustain itself into the future. It is also exactly at the carrying capacity, such that growth in population will be followed by scarcity and population decline, after which the population will be below the minimally viable population size. There is no expectation of additional lands or technologies (to effectively increase the carrying capacity) in the foreseeable future.
Would it in this case be ethical to advocate for a change in the population size? And if the question of population ethics can be answered in this particular case, the statement that the question of population ethics cannot be answered in general must I think be false(?).
Moreover, my argument has an if-then structure and conditions on a belief in (strong) longtermism. If you believe in (strong) longtermism, you care about the future, so it seems to me the answer to my above question should then be no; in order to have a sustainable population size, and safeguard the potential in the future.
For example in this way, I state that (strong) longtermism restricts the space of permissible positions in population ethics, with those positions remaining that minimize the risk to the potential in the future. This could still be multiple or even many permissible positions, such that the issue is not quite resolved yet. But to a (strong) longtermist it would be resolved in the sense that the different options would not be relevant to decision-making, as they would care only for and prioritize the potential in the future (such that they are indifferent between these multiple permissible positions).
To think about possible worlds, as philosophers do, is then valuable in a developed state of many options, as it helps to triage among them. In my example here—a state and actual world (within a thought experiment, ironically) of few (or even not multiple ethical) options—this is however not the case.
The fact that there exists an optimal population size for improving the future does not solve population ethics, because population ethics influences what “improving the future” means.
If, say, you are an average utilitarian, then a very small population, experiencing an extremely high standard of living and in no danger of losing it, is a good outcome. A total utilitarian may disagree, and think that there should be much more emphasis on expanding and creating/ensuring more good lives. The optimal population size today and next year could easily shift depending on which future you’re aiming for.
So you haven’t solved population ethics in the indefinite future (which still matters), and that influences it today (where most philosophers would agree it’s less relevant).This is not a solution, and I hope I’ve explained why.
Thank you for your comment and for your explanation!
I agree that if you know what improving the future means (to you), and if that future matters to you, then you have an optimal population size to aim at. Granted that if improving the future means something different to you[1], then the optimal population size to aim at will be different. And if you’re time-inconsistent in what improving the future means to you, you are then time-inconsistent in the optimal population size to aim at. But that supports the consistency, not the inconsistency, of the if-then statement/relationship.
In my paraphrase/agreement above, I added “if that future matters to you”. And herein I add the longtermism. I’m, indeed, not solving population ethics per se. I’m saying that for a (strong) longtermist the problem reduces to “what is now the optimal population size (for me)?”. (Still a significant and substantial empirical question.)
A tangential other point your last paragraph reminded me of: at end of the future, so to say, and knowingly so, longtermism would no longer make sense, and these above implications for a resolution of population ethics would thus neither.
I also liked your comment that most philosophers would ‘not worry too much’ about population ethics ‘in the short-term’. As that was I guess part of my aims. I added a subtitle with a footnote with what I additionally learned from our exchange and the previous comments.
I studied philosophy—but I don’t get the argument. Furthermore, I don’t think there’s any such X such that X resolves population ethics.
Agreed.
(The following is aimed mostly at people who don’t see a problem with the OP).
The problem in population ethics are usually phrased as impossibility theorems: Desirable and intuitive properties for which we know we can’t have all of them (here the statement of an older one, see also Arrhenius 2000 for a longer exposition).
Thank you both for your comments. Let’s consider an example.
Suppose you are tasked with ethical decision-making and part of a moderately sized population on a moderately sized island. Moreover the current population size is exactly at the minimally viable population size to maintain sufficient genetic diversity to sustain itself into the future. It is also exactly at the carrying capacity, such that growth in population will be followed by scarcity and population decline, after which the population will be below the minimally viable population size. There is no expectation of additional lands or technologies (to effectively increase the carrying capacity) in the foreseeable future.
Would it in this case be ethical to advocate for a change in the population size? And if the question of population ethics can be answered in this particular case, the statement that the question of population ethics cannot be answered in general must I think be false(?).
Moreover, my argument has an if-then structure and conditions on a belief in (strong) longtermism. If you believe in (strong) longtermism, you care about the future, so it seems to me the answer to my above question should then be no; in order to have a sustainable population size, and safeguard the potential in the future.
For example in this way, I state that (strong) longtermism restricts the space of permissible positions in population ethics, with those positions remaining that minimize the risk to the potential in the future. This could still be multiple or even many permissible positions, such that the issue is not quite resolved yet. But to a (strong) longtermist it would be resolved in the sense that the different options would not be relevant to decision-making, as they would care only for and prioritize the potential in the future (such that they are indifferent between these multiple permissible positions).
To think about possible worlds, as philosophers do, is then valuable in a developed state of many options, as it helps to triage among them. In my example here—a state and actual world (within a thought experiment, ironically) of few (or even not multiple ethical) options—this is however not the case.
The fact that there exists an optimal population size for improving the future does not solve population ethics, because population ethics influences what “improving the future” means.
If, say, you are an average utilitarian, then a very small population, experiencing an extremely high standard of living and in no danger of losing it, is a good outcome. A total utilitarian may disagree, and think that there should be much more emphasis on expanding and creating/ensuring more good lives. The optimal population size today and next year could easily shift depending on which future you’re aiming for.
So you haven’t solved population ethics in the indefinite future (which still matters), and that influences it today (where most philosophers would agree it’s less relevant).This is not a solution, and I hope I’ve explained why.
Thank you for your comment and for your explanation!
I agree that if you know what improving the future means (to you), and if that future matters to you, then you have an optimal population size to aim at. Granted that if improving the future means something different to you[1], then the optimal population size to aim at will be different. And if you’re time-inconsistent in what improving the future means to you, you are then time-inconsistent in the optimal population size to aim at. But that supports the consistency, not the inconsistency, of the if-then statement/relationship.
In my paraphrase/agreement above, I added “if that future matters to you”. And herein I add the longtermism. I’m, indeed, not solving population ethics per se. I’m saying that for a (strong) longtermist the problem reduces to “what is now the optimal population size (for me)?”. (Still a significant and substantial empirical question.)
A tangential other point your last paragraph reminded me of: at end of the future, so to say, and knowingly so, longtermism would no longer make sense, and these above implications for a resolution of population ethics would thus neither.
A more general question, of ethics?
I also liked your comment that most philosophers would ‘not worry too much’ about population ethics ‘in the short-term’. As that was I guess part of my aims. I added a subtitle with a footnote with what I additionally learned from our exchange and the previous comments.