My view is that giving explicit, quantitative credences plus stating the supporting evidence is typically better than giving explicit, quantitative credences without stating the supporting evidence (at least if we ignore time costs, information hazards, etc.), which is in turn typically better than giving qualitative probability statements (e.g., āpretty sureā) without stating the supporting evidence, and often better than just saying nothing.
Does this match your view?
In other words, are you essentially just arguing that āproviding supporting arguments is a net benefitā?
I ask because I had the impression that you were arguing that itās bad for people to give explicit, quantitative credences if they arenāt also giving their supporting evidence (and that itād be better for them to, in such cases, either use qualitative statements or just say nothing). Upon re-reading the thread, I got the sense that others may have gotten that impression too, but also I donāt see you explicitly make that argument.
But I do think itās a mistake to update your credence based off someone elseās credence without knowing their argument and without knowing whether theyāre calibrated. We typically donāt know the latter, so I donāt know why people are giving credences without supporting arguments. Itās fine to have a credence without evidence, but why are people publicising such credences?
I do think itās a mistake to update your credence based off someone elseās credence without knowing their argument and without knowing whether theyāre calibrated.
Iād agree with a modified version of your claim, along the following lines: āYou should update more based on someoneās credence if you have more reason to believe their credence will track the truth, e.g. by knowing theyāve got good evidence (even if you havenāt actually seen the evidence) or knowing theyāre well-calibrated. Thereāll be some cases where you have so little reason to believe their credence will track the truth that, for practical purposes, itās essentiallynot worth updating.ā
But your claim at least sounds like itās instead that some people are calibrated while others arenāt (a binary distinction), and when people arenāt calibrated, you really shouldnāt update based on their credences at all (at least if you havenāt seen their arguments).
I think calibration increases in a quantitative, continuous way, rather than switching from off to on. So I think we should just update on credences more the more calibrated the person theyāre from is.
My view is that giving explicit, quantitative credences plus stating the supporting evidence is typically better than giving explicit, quantitative credences without stating the supporting evidence (at least if we ignore time costs, information hazards, etc.), which is in turn typically better than giving qualitative probability statements (e.g., āpretty sureā) without stating the supporting evidence, and often better than just saying nothing.
Does this match your view?
In other words, are you essentially just arguing that āproviding supporting arguments is a net benefitā?
I ask because I had the impression that you were arguing that itās bad for people to give explicit, quantitative credences if they arenāt also giving their supporting evidence (and that itād be better for them to, in such cases, either use qualitative statements or just say nothing). Upon re-reading the thread, I got the sense that others may have gotten that impression too, but also I donāt see you explicitly make that argument.
Basically, yeah.
But I do think itās a mistake to update your credence based off someone elseās credence without knowing their argument and without knowing whether theyāre calibrated. We typically donāt know the latter, so I donāt know why people are giving credences without supporting arguments. Itās fine to have a credence without evidence, but why are people publicising such credences?
Iād agree with a modified version of your claim, along the following lines: āYou should update more based on someoneās credence if you have more reason to believe their credence will track the truth, e.g. by knowing theyāve got good evidence (even if you havenāt actually seen the evidence) or knowing theyāre well-calibrated. Thereāll be some cases where you have so little reason to believe their credence will track the truth that, for practical purposes, itās essentially not worth updating.ā
But your claim at least sounds like itās instead that some people are calibrated while others arenāt (a binary distinction), and when people arenāt calibrated, you really shouldnāt update based on their credences at all (at least if you havenāt seen their arguments).
I think calibration increases in a quantitative, continuous way, rather than switching from off to on. So I think we should just update on credences more the more calibrated the person theyāre from is.
Does that sound right to you?