I am fairly cause agnostic to causes that have provable impact and don’t rely on highly contestable philosophical premises for their justification. I consider evidence of impact (making beliefs pay rent) to be central to that. There are lots of causes (for example—open borders, x-risk also) that I think may plausibly have a large impact but don’t have the evidence to show that my donations will pay rent in the way charities currently supported by GiveWell & GWWC do.
I don’t see how this is consistent with pledging to support the cause indefinitely. (I’m not objecting to GWWC being a poverty-focused community.)
It’s worth noting that your stance towards evidence appears to be unusual amongst modern philanthropists, and in particular the standard of “provable” seems both counterproductive and radical. I hope that this stance doesn’t become a standard part of what makes effective altruism distinctive.
I am glad that the open philanthropy project (formerly givewell labs) exists; given that foothold, I think that overreliance on measurement is a significantly less likely failure mode than it otherwise would be. Low epistemic standards and insufficient skepticism seem like more plausible failure modes, and I think we are on the same page concerning those issues. (I agree that more openness exacerbates these difficulties, though I am skeptical that an exclusive focus on poverty per se is too helpful.)
“It’s worth noting that your stance towards evidence appears to be unusual amongst modern philanthropists, and in particular the standard of “provable” seems both counterproductive and radical. I hope that this stance doesn’t become a standard part of what makes effective altruism distinctive.”
I think this stance towards evidence is pretty common in GiveWell donors (which far outnumber EAs) and I agree it’s not super common among general philanthropists (although pretty common in government health aid) circles but many EA concepts are not common among general philanthropists.
I am fairly cause agnostic to causes that have provable impact and don’t rely on highly contestable philosophical premises for their justification. I consider evidence of impact (making beliefs pay rent) to be central to that. There are lots of causes (for example—open borders, x-risk also) that I think may plausibly have a large impact but don’t have the evidence to show that my donations will pay rent in the way charities currently supported by GiveWell & GWWC do.
I don’t see how this is consistent with pledging to support the cause indefinitely. (I’m not objecting to GWWC being a poverty-focused community.)
It’s worth noting that your stance towards evidence appears to be unusual amongst modern philanthropists, and in particular the standard of “provable” seems both counterproductive and radical. I hope that this stance doesn’t become a standard part of what makes effective altruism distinctive.
I am glad that the open philanthropy project (formerly givewell labs) exists; given that foothold, I think that overreliance on measurement is a significantly less likely failure mode than it otherwise would be. Low epistemic standards and insufficient skepticism seem like more plausible failure modes, and I think we are on the same page concerning those issues. (I agree that more openness exacerbates these difficulties, though I am skeptical that an exclusive focus on poverty per se is too helpful.)
“It’s worth noting that your stance towards evidence appears to be unusual amongst modern philanthropists, and in particular the standard of “provable” seems both counterproductive and radical. I hope that this stance doesn’t become a standard part of what makes effective altruism distinctive.”
I think this stance towards evidence is pretty common in GiveWell donors (which far outnumber EAs) and I agree it’s not super common among general philanthropists (although pretty common in government health aid) circles but many EA concepts are not common among general philanthropists.