I broadly agree, but maybe some further nuance could be added. One could oppose the “indifference framework” either because one thinks it’s inaccurate, or because one thinks it’s not a fruitful way of engaging with people who haven’t bought into the ideas of effective altruism. One might interpret you as saying that the indifference framework is indeed accurate but that we still shouldn’t use it, for the second, pragmatic reason. (I’m not sure if that’s what you actually mean; in any case, it’s an interesting interpretation which it’s useful to comment on.) I think the indifference framework may not be quite accurate, however. Take, for instance, this sentence:
The problem of indifference is not solvable merely by increasing emotions such as love or empathy, despite their importance in our everyday lives.
The way these words are normally used, a person who is highly loving or empathetic is not indifferent. Therefore, again using these words in their normal senses, the problem of indifference is in a sense solvable by increasing emotions such as love or empathy.
I guess an objection here would be that though such a person wouldn’t be generally indifferent, they would be indifferent towards the most important problems and the most important sources of suffering. If so, it may be a bit misleading to call them “indifferent”. But also, it’s not clear that they really are indifferent towards those problems. It may be that they don’t know about them (cf Aaron’s comment), or that other problems are more available in their mind, or that they fail to see that any resources spent on less important problems will lead to less resources towards the most important problems (i.e., a failure to fully grasp notions such as opportunity cost and prioritization).
Relatedly, many people who are not working towards solving the problems that effective altruists find the greatest put a lot of resources into projects which, from their point of view, are moral. This includes charitable giving, political engagement, etc. It doesn’t seem quite correct to me to call them “indifferent”.
To clarify my point (which did need clarification, thanks for pointing that out):
I disagree on (1) and think few people are truly indifferent to the suffering of other humans, even far-off strangers.
I somewhat agree on (2) and think many people are mostly or entirely indifferent to the suffering of farm animals.
I broadly agree on (3) and (4); I think most people are indifferent to “future people” (in the sense of “people who could be alive a thousand years from now”, not “the children you may have someday”), as well as the suffering of wild animals, though the latter may be closer to “instinctive justification to avoid intrusive/horrible thoughts”, which only masquerades as indifference.
I certainly wouldn’t use “indifferent” as an indiscriminate term to describe the view of an average person about mortality, especially since I’d guess that most people are involved in some form of altruistic activity that they care about.
I think the indifference framework can be useful when thinking on a population level (e.g. few voters care about issue X, so the electorate can be said to be “indifferent” in a practical sense), but not on an individual level (almost anyone is capable of caring about EA-aligned causes if they are presented in the right way to reach that specific person).
I broadly agree, but maybe some further nuance could be added. One could oppose the “indifference framework” either because one thinks it’s inaccurate, or because one thinks it’s not a fruitful way of engaging with people who haven’t bought into the ideas of effective altruism. One might interpret you as saying that the indifference framework is indeed accurate but that we still shouldn’t use it, for the second, pragmatic reason. (I’m not sure if that’s what you actually mean; in any case, it’s an interesting interpretation which it’s useful to comment on.) I think the indifference framework may not be quite accurate, however. Take, for instance, this sentence:
The way these words are normally used, a person who is highly loving or empathetic is not indifferent. Therefore, again using these words in their normal senses, the problem of indifference is in a sense solvable by increasing emotions such as love or empathy.
I guess an objection here would be that though such a person wouldn’t be generally indifferent, they would be indifferent towards the most important problems and the most important sources of suffering. If so, it may be a bit misleading to call them “indifferent”. But also, it’s not clear that they really are indifferent towards those problems. It may be that they don’t know about them (cf Aaron’s comment), or that other problems are more available in their mind, or that they fail to see that any resources spent on less important problems will lead to less resources towards the most important problems (i.e., a failure to fully grasp notions such as opportunity cost and prioritization).
Relatedly, many people who are not working towards solving the problems that effective altruists find the greatest put a lot of resources into projects which, from their point of view, are moral. This includes charitable giving, political engagement, etc. It doesn’t seem quite correct to me to call them “indifferent”.
To clarify my point (which did need clarification, thanks for pointing that out):
I disagree on (1) and think few people are truly indifferent to the suffering of other humans, even far-off strangers.
I somewhat agree on (2) and think many people are mostly or entirely indifferent to the suffering of farm animals.
I broadly agree on (3) and (4); I think most people are indifferent to “future people” (in the sense of “people who could be alive a thousand years from now”, not “the children you may have someday”), as well as the suffering of wild animals, though the latter may be closer to “instinctive justification to avoid intrusive/horrible thoughts”, which only masquerades as indifference.
I certainly wouldn’t use “indifferent” as an indiscriminate term to describe the view of an average person about mortality, especially since I’d guess that most people are involved in some form of altruistic activity that they care about.
I think the indifference framework can be useful when thinking on a population level (e.g. few voters care about issue X, so the electorate can be said to be “indifferent” in a practical sense), but not on an individual level (almost anyone is capable of caring about EA-aligned causes if they are presented in the right way to reach that specific person).