I majored in cognitive science with a particular focus on decision-making and persuasion, and I love seeing posts that discuss framing and public messaging.
I think that your framing here describes the world pretty accurately. But when I actually talk about EA with non-EA people who Iâd like to become interested, I donât use an âindifferenceâ framework. That would certainly be better than a âhatredâ framework, but I still want to avoid making people feel like Iâm accusing them of indifference to suffering.
Instead, I use an âunawarenessâ framework. Rather than âmost people are indifferent to these problemsâ, I say something like âmost people arenât fully aware of the extent of the problems, or do know about the problems but arenât sure how to address them; instead, they stick to working on things they feel they understand betterâ.
In my experience, this naturally provokes questions about the extent of problems or how to address them, since ânot being awareâ is morally neutral and not shameful to alleviate (while âindifferenceâ is a bad thing most people wonât want to admit feeling).
I broadly agree, but maybe some further nuance could be added. One could oppose the âindifference frameworkâ either because one thinks itâs inaccurate, or because one thinks itâs not a fruitful way of engaging with people who havenât bought into the ideas of effective altruism. One might interpret you as saying that the indifference framework is indeed accurate but that we still shouldnât use it, for the second, pragmatic reason. (Iâm not sure if thatâs what you actually mean; in any case, itâs an interesting interpretation which itâs useful to comment on.) I think the indifference framework may not be quite accurate, however. Take, for instance, this sentence:
The problem of indifference is not solvable merely by increasing emotions such as love or empathy, despite their importance in our everyday lives.
The way these words are normally used, a person who is highly loving or empathetic is not indifferent. Therefore, again using these words in their normal senses, the problem of indifference is in a sense solvable by increasing emotions such as love or empathy.
I guess an objection here would be that though such a person wouldnât be generally indifferent, they would be indifferent towards the most important problems and the most important sources of suffering. If so, it may be a bit misleading to call them âindifferentâ. But also, itâs not clear that they really are indifferent towards those problems. It may be that they donât know about them (cf Aaronâs comment), or that other problems are more available in their mind, or that they fail to see that any resources spent on less important problems will lead to less resources towards the most important problems (i.e., a failure to fully grasp notions such as opportunity cost and prioritization).
Relatedly, many people who are not working towards solving the problems that effective altruists find the greatest put a lot of resources into projects which, from their point of view, are moral. This includes charitable giving, political engagement, etc. It doesnât seem quite correct to me to call them âindifferentâ.
To clarify my point (which did need clarification, thanks for pointing that out):
I disagree on (1) and think few people are truly indifferent to the suffering of other humans, even far-off strangers.
I somewhat agree on (2) and think many people are mostly or entirely indifferent to the suffering of farm animals.
I broadly agree on (3) and (4); I think most people are indifferent to âfuture peopleâ (in the sense of âpeople who could be alive a thousand years from nowâ, not âthe children you may have somedayâ), as well as the suffering of wild animals, though the latter may be closer to âinstinctive justification to avoid intrusive/âhorrible thoughtsâ, which only masquerades as indifference.
I certainly wouldnât use âindifferentâ as an indiscriminate term to describe the view of an average person about mortality, especially since Iâd guess that most people are involved in some form of altruistic activity that they care about.
I think the indifference framework can be useful when thinking on a population level (e.g. few voters care about issue X, so the electorate can be said to be âindifferentâ in a practical sense), but not on an individual level (almost anyone is capable of caring about EA-aligned causes if they are presented in the right way to reach that specific person).
Instead, I use an âunawarenessâ framework. Rather than âmost people are indifferent to these problemsâ, I say something like âmost people arenât fully aware of the extent of the problems, or do know about the problems but arenât sure how to address them; instead, they stick to working on things they feel they understand betterâ.
I would guess that similarly this is why âwokeâ as caught on as a popular way of talking about those who âwake upâ to the problems around them that they were previously ignorant of and âasleep toâ: itâs a framing that letâs you feel good about becoming aware of and doing more about various issues in the world without having to feel too bad about having not done things about them in the past, so you arenât as much on the defensive when someone tries to âshake you awakeâ to those problems.
I majored in cognitive science with a particular focus on decision-making and persuasion, and I love seeing posts that discuss framing and public messaging.
I think that your framing here describes the world pretty accurately. But when I actually talk about EA with non-EA people who Iâd like to become interested, I donât use an âindifferenceâ framework. That would certainly be better than a âhatredâ framework, but I still want to avoid making people feel like Iâm accusing them of indifference to suffering.
Instead, I use an âunawarenessâ framework. Rather than âmost people are indifferent to these problemsâ, I say something like âmost people arenât fully aware of the extent of the problems, or do know about the problems but arenât sure how to address them; instead, they stick to working on things they feel they understand betterâ.
In my experience, this naturally provokes questions about the extent of problems or how to address them, since ânot being awareâ is morally neutral and not shameful to alleviate (while âindifferenceâ is a bad thing most people wonât want to admit feeling).
I broadly agree, but maybe some further nuance could be added. One could oppose the âindifference frameworkâ either because one thinks itâs inaccurate, or because one thinks itâs not a fruitful way of engaging with people who havenât bought into the ideas of effective altruism. One might interpret you as saying that the indifference framework is indeed accurate but that we still shouldnât use it, for the second, pragmatic reason. (Iâm not sure if thatâs what you actually mean; in any case, itâs an interesting interpretation which itâs useful to comment on.) I think the indifference framework may not be quite accurate, however. Take, for instance, this sentence:
The way these words are normally used, a person who is highly loving or empathetic is not indifferent. Therefore, again using these words in their normal senses, the problem of indifference is in a sense solvable by increasing emotions such as love or empathy.
I guess an objection here would be that though such a person wouldnât be generally indifferent, they would be indifferent towards the most important problems and the most important sources of suffering. If so, it may be a bit misleading to call them âindifferentâ. But also, itâs not clear that they really are indifferent towards those problems. It may be that they donât know about them (cf Aaronâs comment), or that other problems are more available in their mind, or that they fail to see that any resources spent on less important problems will lead to less resources towards the most important problems (i.e., a failure to fully grasp notions such as opportunity cost and prioritization).
Relatedly, many people who are not working towards solving the problems that effective altruists find the greatest put a lot of resources into projects which, from their point of view, are moral. This includes charitable giving, political engagement, etc. It doesnât seem quite correct to me to call them âindifferentâ.
To clarify my point (which did need clarification, thanks for pointing that out):
I disagree on (1) and think few people are truly indifferent to the suffering of other humans, even far-off strangers.
I somewhat agree on (2) and think many people are mostly or entirely indifferent to the suffering of farm animals.
I broadly agree on (3) and (4); I think most people are indifferent to âfuture peopleâ (in the sense of âpeople who could be alive a thousand years from nowâ, not âthe children you may have somedayâ), as well as the suffering of wild animals, though the latter may be closer to âinstinctive justification to avoid intrusive/âhorrible thoughtsâ, which only masquerades as indifference.
I certainly wouldnât use âindifferentâ as an indiscriminate term to describe the view of an average person about mortality, especially since Iâd guess that most people are involved in some form of altruistic activity that they care about.
I think the indifference framework can be useful when thinking on a population level (e.g. few voters care about issue X, so the electorate can be said to be âindifferentâ in a practical sense), but not on an individual level (almost anyone is capable of caring about EA-aligned causes if they are presented in the right way to reach that specific person).
I would guess that similarly this is why âwokeâ as caught on as a popular way of talking about those who âwake upâ to the problems around them that they were previously ignorant of and âasleep toâ: itâs a framing that letâs you feel good about becoming aware of and doing more about various issues in the world without having to feel too bad about having not done things about them in the past, so you arenât as much on the defensive when someone tries to âshake you awakeâ to those problems.