Thanks a lot for writing this up! I confess I’d had a crack at Meacham’s paper some time ago and couldn’t really work out what was going on, so this is helpful. One comment.
I don’t think the view implies what you say it implies in the Your Reaction part. We have only two choices and all those people who exist in one outcome (i.e. the future people) have their welfare ignored on this view—they couldn’t have been better off. So we just focus on the current people—who do exist in both “bomb” and “not-bomb”. Their lives go better in “not-bomb”. Hence, the view says we shouldn’t blow up the world, not—as you claim—that we should. Did I miss something?
Deleted my previous comment because I got the explanation wrong.
In “not bomb” there will be various people who go on to exist in the future. In “bomb” these people won’t exist and so will be given wellbeing level 0. So all you need is for one future person in the “not bomb” world to have negative welfare and there is harm. If you bomb everyone then there will be no one that can be harmed in the future.
This is why world 2 is better than world 1 here (see ‘central illustration of HMV’ section):
It’s quite possible I’ve got this wrong again and should only talk about population ethics when I’ve got enough time to think about it carefully!
Right. So, looking at how HMW was specified up top—parts II and III—then people who exist in only one of two outcomes count for zero even if they have negative well-being in the world where they exist. That what how I interpreted the view as working in my comment.
One could specify a different view on which creating net-negative lives, even if they couldn’t have had a higher level of welfare, is bad, rather than neutral. This would need a fourth condition.
(My understanding is that people who like HMVs tend to think that creating uniquely exist negative lives is bad, rather than neutral, as that captures that procreative asymmetry.
II. Harm is done to a subject in a world if and only if she exists in that world and her welfare there is lower than her welfare in an alternate world.
III. In worlds where a subject doesn’t exist, we treat her welfare as if it is equal to 0 (but again, she cannot be harmed in that world).
Given this:
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have negative wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then they have been harmed.
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have positive wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then there is no harm to anyone.
So creating net negative lives is bad under Meacham’s view.
It’s possible I’m getting something wrong, but this is how I’m reading it. I find thinking of ‘counting for zero’ confusing so I’m framing it differently.
Ah, I see. No, you’ve got it right. I’d somehow misread it and the view works the way I had thought it was supposed to: non-existence as zero is not-existence can be compared to existence in terms of welfare levels.
Thanks a lot for writing this up! I confess I’d had a crack at Meacham’s paper some time ago and couldn’t really work out what was going on, so this is helpful. One comment.
I don’t think the view implies what you say it implies in the Your Reaction part. We have only two choices and all those people who exist in one outcome (i.e. the future people) have their welfare ignored on this view—they couldn’t have been better off. So we just focus on the current people—who do exist in both “bomb” and “not-bomb”. Their lives go better in “not-bomb”. Hence, the view says we shouldn’t blow up the world, not—as you claim—that we should. Did I miss something?
Deleted my previous comment because I got the explanation wrong.
In “not bomb” there will be various people who go on to exist in the future. In “bomb” these people won’t exist and so will be given wellbeing level 0. So all you need is for one future person in the “not bomb” world to have negative welfare and there is harm. If you bomb everyone then there will be no one that can be harmed in the future.
This is why world 2 is better than world 1 here (see ‘central illustration of HMV’ section):
It’s quite possible I’ve got this wrong again and should only talk about population ethics when I’ve got enough time to think about it carefully!
Right. So, looking at how HMW was specified up top—parts II and III—then people who exist in only one of two outcomes count for zero even if they have negative well-being in the world where they exist. That what how I interpreted the view as working in my comment.
One could specify a different view on which creating net-negative lives, even if they couldn’t have had a higher level of welfare, is bad, rather than neutral. This would need a fourth condition.
(My understanding is that people who like HMVs tend to think that creating uniquely exist negative lives is bad, rather than neutral, as that captures that procreative asymmetry.
Given this:
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have negative wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then they have been harmed.
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have positive wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then there is no harm to anyone.
So creating net negative lives is bad under Meacham’s view.
It’s possible I’m getting something wrong, but this is how I’m reading it. I find thinking of ‘counting for zero’ confusing so I’m framing it differently.
Ah, I see. No, you’ve got it right. I’d somehow misread it and the view works the way I had thought it was supposed to: non-existence as zero is not-existence can be compared to existence in terms of welfare levels.