It seems like you’re conflating the following two views:
Utilitarianism.net has an obligation to present views other than total symmetric utilitarianism in a sympathetic light.
Utilitarianism.net has an obligation not to present views other than total symmetric utilitarianism in an uncharitable and dismissive light.
I would claim #2, not #1, and presumably so would Michael. The quote about nihilism etc. is objectionable because it’s not just unsympathetic to such views, it’s condescending. Clearly many people who have reflected carefully about ethics think these alternatives are worth taking seriously, and it’s controversial to claim that “humane values” necessitate wanting to create happy beings de novo even at some (serious) opportunity cost to suffering. “Nihilistic” also connotes something stronger than denying positive value.
It seems to me that you’re conflating process and substance. Philosophical charity is a process virtue, and one that I believe our article exemplifies. (Again, the exploration of value blur offers a charitable development of the view in question.) You just don’t like that our substantive verdict on the view is very negative. And that’s fine, you don’t have to like it. But I want to be clear that this normative disagreement isn’t evidence of any philosophical defect on our part. (And I should flag that Michael’s process objections, e.g. complaining that we didn’t preface every normative claim with the tedious disclaimer “in our opinion”, reveals a lack of familiarity with standard norms for writing academic philosophy.)
“Clearly many people who have reflected carefully about ethics think these alternatives are worth taking seriously, and it’s controversial to claim...”
This sociological claim isn’t philosophically relevant. There’s nothing inherently objectionable about concluding that some people have been mistaken in their belief that a certain view is worth taking seriously. There’s also nothing inherently objectionable about making claims that are controversial. (Every interesting philosophical claim is controversial.)
What you’re implicitly demanding is that we refrain from doing philosophy (which involves taking positions, including ones that others might dislike or find controversial), and instead merely report on others’ arguments and opinions in a NPOV fashion. That’s a fine norm for wikipedia, but I don’t think it’s a reasonable demand to make of all philosophers in all places, and IMO it would make utilitarianism.net worse (and something I, personally, would be much less interested in creating and contributing to) if we were to try to implement it there.
As a process matter, I’m all in favour of letting a thousand flowers bloom. If you don’t like our philosophical POV, feel free to make your own resource that presents things from a POV you find more congenial! And certainly if we’re making philosophical errors, or overlooking important counterarguments, I’m happy to have any of that drawn to my attention. But I don’t really find it valuable to just hear that some people don’t like our conclusions (that pretty much goes without saying). And I confess I find it very frustrating when people try to turn that substantive disagreement into a process complaint, as though it were somehow intrinsically illegitimate to disagree about which views are serious contenders to be true.
But I want to be clear that this normative disagreement isn’t evidence of any philosophical defect on our part.
Oh I absolutely agree with this. My objections to that quote have no bearing on how legitimate your view is, and I never claimed as much. What I find objectionable is that by using such dismissive language about the view you disagree with, not merely critical language, you’re causing harm to population ethics discourse. Ideally readers will form their views on this topic based on their merits and intuitions, not based on claims that views are “too divorced from humane values to be worth taking seriously.”
complaining that we didn’t preface every normative claim with the tedious disclaimer “in our opinion”
Personally I don’t think you need to do this.
This sociological claim isn’t philosophically relevant. There’s nothing inherently objectionable about concluding that some people have been mistaken in their belief that a certain view is worth taking seriously. There’s also nothing inherently objectionable about making claims that are controversial.
Again, I didn’t claim that your dismissiveness bears on the merit of your view. The objectionable thing is that you’re confounding readers’ perceptions of the views with labels like “[not] worth taking seriously.” The fact that many people do take this view seriously suggests that that kind of label is uncharitable. (I suppose I’m not opposed in principle to being dismissive to views that are decently popular—I would have that response to the view that animals don’t matter morally, for example. But what bothers me about this case is partly that your argument for why it’s not worth taking seriously is pretty unsatisfactory.)
I’m certainly not calling for you to pass no judgments whatsoever on philosophical views, and “merely report on others’ arguments,” and I don’t think a reasonable reading of my comment would lead you to believe that.
And certainly if we’re making philosophical errors, or overlooking important counterarguments, I’m happy to have any of that drawn to my attention.
Indeed, I gave substantive feedback on the Population Ethics page a few months back, and hope you and your coauthors take it into account. :)
It seems like you’re conflating the following two views:
Utilitarianism.net has an obligation to present views other than total symmetric utilitarianism in a sympathetic light.
Utilitarianism.net has an obligation not to present views other than total symmetric utilitarianism in an uncharitable and dismissive light.
I would claim #2, not #1, and presumably so would Michael. The quote about nihilism etc. is objectionable because it’s not just unsympathetic to such views, it’s condescending. Clearly many people who have reflected carefully about ethics think these alternatives are worth taking seriously, and it’s controversial to claim that “humane values” necessitate wanting to create happy beings de novo even at some (serious) opportunity cost to suffering. “Nihilistic” also connotes something stronger than denying positive value.
It seems to me that you’re conflating process and substance. Philosophical charity is a process virtue, and one that I believe our article exemplifies. (Again, the exploration of value blur offers a charitable development of the view in question.) You just don’t like that our substantive verdict on the view is very negative. And that’s fine, you don’t have to like it. But I want to be clear that this normative disagreement isn’t evidence of any philosophical defect on our part. (And I should flag that Michael’s process objections, e.g. complaining that we didn’t preface every normative claim with the tedious disclaimer “in our opinion”, reveals a lack of familiarity with standard norms for writing academic philosophy.)
This sociological claim isn’t philosophically relevant. There’s nothing inherently objectionable about concluding that some people have been mistaken in their belief that a certain view is worth taking seriously. There’s also nothing inherently objectionable about making claims that are controversial. (Every interesting philosophical claim is controversial.)
What you’re implicitly demanding is that we refrain from doing philosophy (which involves taking positions, including ones that others might dislike or find controversial), and instead merely report on others’ arguments and opinions in a NPOV fashion. That’s a fine norm for wikipedia, but I don’t think it’s a reasonable demand to make of all philosophers in all places, and IMO it would make utilitarianism.net worse (and something I, personally, would be much less interested in creating and contributing to) if we were to try to implement it there.
As a process matter, I’m all in favour of letting a thousand flowers bloom. If you don’t like our philosophical POV, feel free to make your own resource that presents things from a POV you find more congenial! And certainly if we’re making philosophical errors, or overlooking important counterarguments, I’m happy to have any of that drawn to my attention. But I don’t really find it valuable to just hear that some people don’t like our conclusions (that pretty much goes without saying). And I confess I find it very frustrating when people try to turn that substantive disagreement into a process complaint, as though it were somehow intrinsically illegitimate to disagree about which views are serious contenders to be true.
Oh I absolutely agree with this. My objections to that quote have no bearing on how legitimate your view is, and I never claimed as much. What I find objectionable is that by using such dismissive language about the view you disagree with, not merely critical language, you’re causing harm to population ethics discourse. Ideally readers will form their views on this topic based on their merits and intuitions, not based on claims that views are “too divorced from humane values to be worth taking seriously.”
Personally I don’t think you need to do this.
Again, I didn’t claim that your dismissiveness bears on the merit of your view. The objectionable thing is that you’re confounding readers’ perceptions of the views with labels like “[not] worth taking seriously.” The fact that many people do take this view seriously suggests that that kind of label is uncharitable. (I suppose I’m not opposed in principle to being dismissive to views that are decently popular—I would have that response to the view that animals don’t matter morally, for example. But what bothers me about this case is partly that your argument for why it’s not worth taking seriously is pretty unsatisfactory.)
I’m certainly not calling for you to pass no judgments whatsoever on philosophical views, and “merely report on others’ arguments,” and I don’t think a reasonable reading of my comment would lead you to believe that.
Indeed, I gave substantive feedback on the Population Ethics page a few months back, and hope you and your coauthors take it into account. :)