It seems to me that youāre conflating process and substance. Philosophical charity is a process virtue, and one that I believe our article exemplifies. (Again, the exploration of value blur offers a charitable development of the view in question.) You just donāt like that our substantive verdict on the view is very negative. And thatās fine, you donāt have to like it. But I want to be clear that this normative disagreement isnāt evidence of any philosophical defect on our part. (And I should flag that Michaelās process objections, e.g. complaining that we didnāt preface every normative claim with the tedious disclaimer āin our opinionā, reveals a lack of familiarity with standard norms for writing academic philosophy.)
āClearly many people who have reflected carefully about ethics think these alternatives are worth taking seriously, and itās controversial to claim...ā
This sociological claim isnāt philosophically relevant. Thereās nothing inherently objectionable about concluding that some people have been mistaken in their belief that a certain view is worth taking seriously. Thereās also nothing inherently objectionable about making claims that are controversial. (Every interesting philosophical claim is controversial.)
What youāre implicitly demanding is that we refrain from doing philosophy (which involves taking positions, including ones that others might dislike or find controversial), and instead merely report on othersā arguments and opinions in a NPOV fashion. Thatās a fine norm for wikipedia, but I donāt think itās a reasonable demand to make of all philosophers in all places, and IMO it would make utilitarianism.net worse (and something I, personally, would be much less interested in creating and contributing to) if we were to try to implement it there.
As a process matter, Iām all in favour of letting a thousand flowers bloom. If you donāt like our philosophical POV, feel free to make your own resource that presents things from a POV you find more congenial! And certainly if weāre making philosophical errors, or overlooking important counterarguments, Iām happy to have any of that drawn to my attention. But I donāt really find it valuable to just hear that some people donāt like our conclusions (that pretty much goes without saying). And I confess I find it very frustrating when people try to turn that substantive disagreement into a process complaint, as though it were somehow intrinsically illegitimate to disagree about which views are serious contenders to be true.
But I want to be clear that this normative disagreement isnāt evidence of any philosophical defect on our part.
Oh I absolutely agree with this. My objections to that quote have no bearing on how legitimate your view is, and I never claimed as much. What I find objectionable is that by using such dismissive language about the view you disagree with, not merely critical language, youāre causing harm to population ethics discourse. Ideally readers will form their views on this topic based on their merits and intuitions, not based on claims that views are ātoo divorced from humane values to be worth taking seriously.ā
complaining that we didnāt preface every normative claim with the tedious disclaimer āin our opinionā
Personally I donāt think you need to do this.
This sociological claim isnāt philosophically relevant. Thereās nothing inherently objectionable about concluding that some people have been mistaken in their belief that a certain view is worth taking seriously. Thereās also nothing inherently objectionable about making claims that are controversial.
Again, I didnāt claim that your dismissiveness bears on the merit of your view. The objectionable thing is that youāre confounding readersā perceptions of the views with labels like ā[not] worth taking seriously.ā The fact that many people do take this view seriously suggests that that kind of label is uncharitable. (I suppose Iām not opposed in principle to being dismissive to views that are decently popularāI would have that response to the view that animals donāt matter morally, for example. But what bothers me about this case is partly that your argument for why itās not worth taking seriously is pretty unsatisfactory.)
Iām certainly not calling for you to pass no judgments whatsoever on philosophical views, and āmerely report on othersā arguments,ā and I donāt think a reasonable reading of my comment would lead you to believe that.
And certainly if weāre making philosophical errors, or overlooking important counterarguments, Iām happy to have any of that drawn to my attention.
Indeed, I gave substantive feedback on the Population Ethics page a few months back, and hope you and your coauthors take it into account. :)
It seems to me that youāre conflating process and substance. Philosophical charity is a process virtue, and one that I believe our article exemplifies. (Again, the exploration of value blur offers a charitable development of the view in question.) You just donāt like that our substantive verdict on the view is very negative. And thatās fine, you donāt have to like it. But I want to be clear that this normative disagreement isnāt evidence of any philosophical defect on our part. (And I should flag that Michaelās process objections, e.g. complaining that we didnāt preface every normative claim with the tedious disclaimer āin our opinionā, reveals a lack of familiarity with standard norms for writing academic philosophy.)
This sociological claim isnāt philosophically relevant. Thereās nothing inherently objectionable about concluding that some people have been mistaken in their belief that a certain view is worth taking seriously. Thereās also nothing inherently objectionable about making claims that are controversial. (Every interesting philosophical claim is controversial.)
What youāre implicitly demanding is that we refrain from doing philosophy (which involves taking positions, including ones that others might dislike or find controversial), and instead merely report on othersā arguments and opinions in a NPOV fashion. Thatās a fine norm for wikipedia, but I donāt think itās a reasonable demand to make of all philosophers in all places, and IMO it would make utilitarianism.net worse (and something I, personally, would be much less interested in creating and contributing to) if we were to try to implement it there.
As a process matter, Iām all in favour of letting a thousand flowers bloom. If you donāt like our philosophical POV, feel free to make your own resource that presents things from a POV you find more congenial! And certainly if weāre making philosophical errors, or overlooking important counterarguments, Iām happy to have any of that drawn to my attention. But I donāt really find it valuable to just hear that some people donāt like our conclusions (that pretty much goes without saying). And I confess I find it very frustrating when people try to turn that substantive disagreement into a process complaint, as though it were somehow intrinsically illegitimate to disagree about which views are serious contenders to be true.
Oh I absolutely agree with this. My objections to that quote have no bearing on how legitimate your view is, and I never claimed as much. What I find objectionable is that by using such dismissive language about the view you disagree with, not merely critical language, youāre causing harm to population ethics discourse. Ideally readers will form their views on this topic based on their merits and intuitions, not based on claims that views are ātoo divorced from humane values to be worth taking seriously.ā
Personally I donāt think you need to do this.
Again, I didnāt claim that your dismissiveness bears on the merit of your view. The objectionable thing is that youāre confounding readersā perceptions of the views with labels like ā[not] worth taking seriously.ā The fact that many people do take this view seriously suggests that that kind of label is uncharitable. (I suppose Iām not opposed in principle to being dismissive to views that are decently popularāI would have that response to the view that animals donāt matter morally, for example. But what bothers me about this case is partly that your argument for why itās not worth taking seriously is pretty unsatisfactory.)
Iām certainly not calling for you to pass no judgments whatsoever on philosophical views, and āmerely report on othersā arguments,ā and I donāt think a reasonable reading of my comment would lead you to believe that.
Indeed, I gave substantive feedback on the Population Ethics page a few months back, and hope you and your coauthors take it into account. :)