(Somewhat tangential to the post; just an insight into what metaethical fanaticismāor something similarāfeels like from the inside, for me.)
I feel like this post assumed people who are operating under a sort of metaethical fanaticism or a moral realism wager want moral realism to be true, or hope itās true, or something like that. For example, you write:
Bob: Maybe I was just hopeful, not confident.
And:
The assumption is that youād cling to the hope that irreducible normativity turns out to be meaningful, despite appearances to the contrary.
I think sometimes my metaethical fanaticism looks like that. And I imagine for some people thatās how it typically looks. But I think for me itās more often āwanting to be careful in case moral realism is trueā, rather than āhoping that moral realism is trueā. You could even say itās something like āconcerned that moral realism might be trueā.
That said, I do think my reaction to being fully convinced that moral realism is false would contain more āsense of disappointment at the universe turning out to feel more āempty/āmeaninglessāā than āsense of relief at the lifting of obligationsā. But I also think that, on this matter, Iām mostly driven by a strong (and perhaps misguided) sense that the stakes would be very high if moral realism is true, so I should do my best to do what would be good if that were the case.
I guess one could say that, for me, itās more about something like conscientiousness than about something like spirituality.
I think sometimes my metaethical fanaticism looks like that. And I imagine for some people thatās how it typically looks. But I think for me itās more often āwanting to be careful in case moral realism is trueā, rather than āhoping that moral realism is trueā. You could even say itās something like āconcerned that moral realism might be trueā.
Interesting! Yeah, that framing also makes sense to me.
(Somewhat tangential to the post; just an insight into what metaethical fanaticismāor something similarāfeels like from the inside, for me.)
I feel like this post assumed people who are operating under a sort of metaethical fanaticism or a moral realism wager want moral realism to be true, or hope itās true, or something like that. For example, you write:
And:
I think sometimes my metaethical fanaticism looks like that. And I imagine for some people thatās how it typically looks. But I think for me itās more often āwanting to be careful in case moral realism is trueā, rather than āhoping that moral realism is trueā. You could even say itās something like āconcerned that moral realism might be trueā.
That said, I do think my reaction to being fully convinced that moral realism is false would contain more āsense of disappointment at the universe turning out to feel more āempty/āmeaninglessāā than āsense of relief at the lifting of obligationsā. But I also think that, on this matter, Iām mostly driven by a strong (and perhaps misguided) sense that the stakes would be very high if moral realism is true, so I should do my best to do what would be good if that were the case.
I guess one could say that, for me, itās more about something like conscientiousness than about something like spirituality.
Interesting! Yeah, that framing also makes sense to me.