Thanks for the comment! Very interesting points indeed!
While I do agree that non-utilitarian theories “don’t say” as much as utilitarian theories about positive duties, high priority duties in particular, I partly disagree that non-utilitarian theories “can’t say” much about positive duties or prioritisation.
Instruments like the golden rule or virtues like mercy and compassion may point to similar duties as “moderate” utilitarian theories point out.
To be honest, I was also very sympathetic to utilitarianism overall (saving drowning children from ponds—of course!), but recent “calculus” that point to (exclusive) massive shifts toward invertebrate welfare made me question whether this is a reasonable framework. As the authors of the Moral Weight Project rightly pointed out, they are just the messengers, these are just the results of applying utilitarianism. While I did find the project very insightful, my conclusion was that maybe utilitarianism needs to be questioned.
Lastly, while I understand that utilitarianism takes “human nature” into utility calculus, I don’t think this explains the whole picture. As I tried to explain, this can only function as an “excuse” not a “reason” for action (or inaction). Under utilitarianism (with “human nature” adjustments), people might be “excused” for not dedicating their entire life for invertebrates, but alternative life or career choices of these people cannot be found “reasonable”. I think alternatives can be reasonable (at least equally reasonable as the option of dedication to invertebrate welfare), and these need not be excuses. But these reasons are not to be found in utilitarianism.
Thanks for the comment! Very interesting points indeed!
While I do agree that non-utilitarian theories “don’t say” as much as utilitarian theories about positive duties, high priority duties in particular, I partly disagree that non-utilitarian theories “can’t say” much about positive duties or prioritisation.
Instruments like the golden rule or virtues like mercy and compassion may point to similar duties as “moderate” utilitarian theories point out.
To be honest, I was also very sympathetic to utilitarianism overall (saving drowning children from ponds—of course!), but recent “calculus” that point to (exclusive) massive shifts toward invertebrate welfare made me question whether this is a reasonable framework. As the authors of the Moral Weight Project rightly pointed out, they are just the messengers, these are just the results of applying utilitarianism. While I did find the project very insightful, my conclusion was that maybe utilitarianism needs to be questioned.
Lastly, while I understand that utilitarianism takes “human nature” into utility calculus, I don’t think this explains the whole picture. As I tried to explain, this can only function as an “excuse” not a “reason” for action (or inaction). Under utilitarianism (with “human nature” adjustments), people might be “excused” for not dedicating their entire life for invertebrates, but alternative life or career choices of these people cannot be found “reasonable”. I think alternatives can be reasonable (at least equally reasonable as the option of dedication to invertebrate welfare), and these need not be excuses. But these reasons are not to be found in utilitarianism.