Thank you for writing this, it was an interesting read.
Common sense morality is great. As Sidgwick argued, it’s actually a good approximation of utilitarianism: a utilitarian does want a world in which people do not steal or kill, and in which humans (being humans) look after their family and friends.
However, common sense morality is also a bit incoherent and contradictory, and (as you demonstrate) it has very little to say about how to prioritize when it comes to our positive duties toward other sentient beings. In my view (and in Sidgwick’s), utilitarianism best resolves these contradictions and guides us when it comes to prioritization.
I don’t think common sense morality has much to say about prioritization, because it barely asks us to do anything for others in the first place. It is, after all, relatively comfortable with thousands of children dying of preventable diseases each day, and with the suffering of billions of factory farmed animals each year. If you think these things require urgent action, all it has to say is “that’s fine, you do you”.
So I don’t think the common sense moralist can, on the one hand, say that we aren’t obligated to help other sentient beings, and then presume to tell those of us who do believe we are obligated to help other sentient beings how we should go about this. In other words, I don’t think that utilitarian conclusions about prioritization do go against common sense morality, because common sense morality has little to say about prioritization.
I’m not saying anything novel here. Indeed, you acknowledge this point when you say: “it is true that incommensurability of values does not provide immediate tools to weigh in different values. For example, how should we prioritize funding or reform efforts between health, education or housing?”
I don’t think the problem that common sense morality has with prioritization can be “explained away”, despite your attempt to do so. Ethics is about asking how we ought to live, and if an ethical theory cannot provide answers to this question, it should be discarded. And I disagree that utilitarians are ourselves guilty of “explaining away” when we “moderate” our conclusions. In fact, utilitarians are obligated to take human nature (including our own) into account, so considerations about burnout and human emotion when it comes to donations and careers aren’t merely “secondary considerations” but an integral part of applying utilitarianism in a sophisticated way.
Thanks for the comment! Very interesting points indeed!
While I do agree that non-utilitarian theories “don’t say” as much as utilitarian theories about positive duties, high priority duties in particular, I partly disagree that non-utilitarian theories “can’t say” much about positive duties or prioritisation.
Instruments like the golden rule or virtues like mercy and compassion may point to similar duties as “moderate” utilitarian theories point out.
To be honest, I was also very sympathetic to utilitarianism overall (saving drowning children from ponds—of course!), but recent “calculus” that point to (exclusive) massive shifts toward invertebrate welfare made me question whether this is a reasonable framework. As the authors of the Moral Weight Project rightly pointed out, they are just the messengers, these are just the results of applying utilitarianism. While I did find the project very insightful, my conclusion was that maybe utilitarianism needs to be questioned.
Lastly, while I understand that utilitarianism takes “human nature” into utility calculus, I don’t think this explains the whole picture. As I tried to explain, this can only function as an “excuse” not a “reason” for action (or inaction). Under utilitarianism (with “human nature” adjustments), people might be “excused” for not dedicating their entire life for invertebrates, but alternative life or career choices of these people cannot be found “reasonable”. I think alternatives can be reasonable (at least equally reasonable as the option of dedication to invertebrate welfare), and these need not be excuses. But these reasons are not to be found in utilitarianism.
Thank you for writing this, it was an interesting read.
Common sense morality is great. As Sidgwick argued, it’s actually a good approximation of utilitarianism: a utilitarian does want a world in which people do not steal or kill, and in which humans (being humans) look after their family and friends.
However, common sense morality is also a bit incoherent and contradictory, and (as you demonstrate) it has very little to say about how to prioritize when it comes to our positive duties toward other sentient beings. In my view (and in Sidgwick’s), utilitarianism best resolves these contradictions and guides us when it comes to prioritization.
I don’t think common sense morality has much to say about prioritization, because it barely asks us to do anything for others in the first place. It is, after all, relatively comfortable with thousands of children dying of preventable diseases each day, and with the suffering of billions of factory farmed animals each year. If you think these things require urgent action, all it has to say is “that’s fine, you do you”.
So I don’t think the common sense moralist can, on the one hand, say that we aren’t obligated to help other sentient beings, and then presume to tell those of us who do believe we are obligated to help other sentient beings how we should go about this. In other words, I don’t think that utilitarian conclusions about prioritization do go against common sense morality, because common sense morality has little to say about prioritization.
I’m not saying anything novel here. Indeed, you acknowledge this point when you say: “it is true that incommensurability of values does not provide immediate tools to weigh in different values. For example, how should we prioritize funding or reform efforts between health, education or housing?”
I don’t think the problem that common sense morality has with prioritization can be “explained away”, despite your attempt to do so. Ethics is about asking how we ought to live, and if an ethical theory cannot provide answers to this question, it should be discarded. And I disagree that utilitarians are ourselves guilty of “explaining away” when we “moderate” our conclusions. In fact, utilitarians are obligated to take human nature (including our own) into account, so considerations about burnout and human emotion when it comes to donations and careers aren’t merely “secondary considerations” but an integral part of applying utilitarianism in a sophisticated way.
Thanks for the comment! Very interesting points indeed!
While I do agree that non-utilitarian theories “don’t say” as much as utilitarian theories about positive duties, high priority duties in particular, I partly disagree that non-utilitarian theories “can’t say” much about positive duties or prioritisation.
Instruments like the golden rule or virtues like mercy and compassion may point to similar duties as “moderate” utilitarian theories point out.
To be honest, I was also very sympathetic to utilitarianism overall (saving drowning children from ponds—of course!), but recent “calculus” that point to (exclusive) massive shifts toward invertebrate welfare made me question whether this is a reasonable framework. As the authors of the Moral Weight Project rightly pointed out, they are just the messengers, these are just the results of applying utilitarianism. While I did find the project very insightful, my conclusion was that maybe utilitarianism needs to be questioned.
Lastly, while I understand that utilitarianism takes “human nature” into utility calculus, I don’t think this explains the whole picture. As I tried to explain, this can only function as an “excuse” not a “reason” for action (or inaction). Under utilitarianism (with “human nature” adjustments), people might be “excused” for not dedicating their entire life for invertebrates, but alternative life or career choices of these people cannot be found “reasonable”. I think alternatives can be reasonable (at least equally reasonable as the option of dedication to invertebrate welfare), and these need not be excuses. But these reasons are not to be found in utilitarianism.