Animal welfare bills are typically referred to legislatures’ agriculture committees, where the most anti-reform politicians reside.
[This is a US-focused comment; it’s been ~20 years since I took a comparative government class.]
Looking at this through the lens of incentives would suggest the task is fairly difficult due to incentives at the district and state levels, especially as they relate to logrolling.
The folks on the ag committees aren’t there because they hate animals; they generally have sought that committee assignment because ag interests are important to their constituents. In other words, it is particularly costly in political terms for these legislators to move legislation that is perceived as harming ag interests forward.
The US seems to have fewer cross-cutting cleavages than it used to. I would assume that people who care a lot about factory-farming issues, for whom a politician’s position might reasonably be expected to impact their vote, are disproportionately concentrated in large cities. They are disproportionately in the leftmost quintile of the U.S. political distribution. Meanwhile, ag-heavy districts tend to be more conservative, even when the seat is held by a Democrat. I suspect few voters most interested in animal-welfare issues are likely to vote for—or donate to—the types of politicians who currently represent ag-interested districts anyway (no matter what their votes are on animal-welfare legislation).
Therefore, there is usually little counterfactual upside (and a significant downside) for a number of critical legislators to support bills opposed by the ag industry. While money and organization play a part, I think the harder issue to address is the nature of US Congressional elections happening by district and state, and the geographic concentration of many interest groups.
Also, I focusing on the number of factory farmers would understate the ag interests in these districts. Just because someone doesn’t have kids doesn’t mean they do not factor in the importance of education for the overall welfare of their community. Likewise, one doesn’t have to be a factory farmer to realize that agricultural interests play a significant role in the economic welfare of their specific communities. So there is a wider group of people in the district who indirectly benefit from what helps ag interests.[1]
I think this also holds for a number of politicians not on the ag committees. In many cases, the margin of error for getting something through Congress is pretty low. Bipartisan cooperation is all too uncommon, and Senate rules give a minority faction significant powers to make passing legislation difficult and costly in terms of legislative resources. That means that each legislator’s individual vote can be important.
I also think that focusing on the majority’s support for reforms can understate the importance of logrolling / vote trading in legislatures. Because certain districts care a lot about ag interests, other politicians can and do appeal to those interests in logrolling trades. For example, if you’re a Democrat in a relatively conservative district/state, party leadership is going to ask you to cast some votes that are going to make your life more difficult. What is leadership going to offer you in exchange for that vote you cast on (e.g.) abortion that will irritate a decent number of the people who voted for you?
Ag issues are in a sense ideal trade objects for this kind of logrolling; they are low-cost for the rest of the party (because failure to push welfare bills is unlikely to have negative electoral consequences for anyone) but high-benefit for the receiving politician. That, of course, doesn’t mean that lobbying is futile. But I think it helps explain why it may be much less successful than polling numbers would suggest.
Of course, a given reform bill might not actually hurt the district’s broader economic interests—as opposed to those of big ag companies. But that may be a tough case to make legibly to the district’s voters.
Thanks Jason! You raise some really interesting points. I particularly like your logrolling point, which I think explains well the disproportionate power of reform opponents on ag policy. The decline of rural Democrats may be quite helpful here in getting the Democratic party onboard. But it won’t help with Republicans, where I agree that pro-reform suburban Republicans are likely going to keep trading away this issue to anti-reform rural Republicans.
[This is a US-focused comment; it’s been ~20 years since I took a comparative government class.]
Looking at this through the lens of incentives would suggest the task is fairly difficult due to incentives at the district and state levels, especially as they relate to logrolling.
The folks on the ag committees aren’t there because they hate animals; they generally have sought that committee assignment because ag interests are important to their constituents. In other words, it is particularly costly in political terms for these legislators to move legislation that is perceived as harming ag interests forward.
The US seems to have fewer cross-cutting cleavages than it used to. I would assume that people who care a lot about factory-farming issues, for whom a politician’s position might reasonably be expected to impact their vote, are disproportionately concentrated in large cities. They are disproportionately in the leftmost quintile of the U.S. political distribution. Meanwhile, ag-heavy districts tend to be more conservative, even when the seat is held by a Democrat. I suspect few voters most interested in animal-welfare issues are likely to vote for—or donate to—the types of politicians who currently represent ag-interested districts anyway (no matter what their votes are on animal-welfare legislation).
Therefore, there is usually little counterfactual upside (and a significant downside) for a number of critical legislators to support bills opposed by the ag industry. While money and organization play a part, I think the harder issue to address is the nature of US Congressional elections happening by district and state, and the geographic concentration of many interest groups.
Also, I focusing on the number of factory farmers would understate the ag interests in these districts. Just because someone doesn’t have kids doesn’t mean they do not factor in the importance of education for the overall welfare of their community. Likewise, one doesn’t have to be a factory farmer to realize that agricultural interests play a significant role in the economic welfare of their specific communities. So there is a wider group of people in the district who indirectly benefit from what helps ag interests.[1]
I think this also holds for a number of politicians not on the ag committees. In many cases, the margin of error for getting something through Congress is pretty low. Bipartisan cooperation is all too uncommon, and Senate rules give a minority faction significant powers to make passing legislation difficult and costly in terms of legislative resources. That means that each legislator’s individual vote can be important.
I also think that focusing on the majority’s support for reforms can understate the importance of logrolling / vote trading in legislatures. Because certain districts care a lot about ag interests, other politicians can and do appeal to those interests in logrolling trades. For example, if you’re a Democrat in a relatively conservative district/state, party leadership is going to ask you to cast some votes that are going to make your life more difficult. What is leadership going to offer you in exchange for that vote you cast on (e.g.) abortion that will irritate a decent number of the people who voted for you?
Ag issues are in a sense ideal trade objects for this kind of logrolling; they are low-cost for the rest of the party (because failure to push welfare bills is unlikely to have negative electoral consequences for anyone) but high-benefit for the receiving politician. That, of course, doesn’t mean that lobbying is futile. But I think it helps explain why it may be much less successful than polling numbers would suggest.
Of course, a given reform bill might not actually hurt the district’s broader economic interests—as opposed to those of big ag companies. But that may be a tough case to make legibly to the district’s voters.
Thanks Jason! You raise some really interesting points. I particularly like your logrolling point, which I think explains well the disproportionate power of reform opponents on ag policy. The decline of rural Democrats may be quite helpful here in getting the Democratic party onboard. But it won’t help with Republicans, where I agree that pro-reform suburban Republicans are likely going to keep trading away this issue to anti-reform rural Republicans.