Under your framework, if one supposes hurtful, disabling and excruciating pain are a, b and c times as intense as annoying pain in humans, should the same apply to other species? Or could the intensity ratios vary across species? My understanding is that the ratios are supposed to be constant across species.
Hi Vasco, thatās a good question, but I do not think we can say with certainty that the ratio is preserved across species. The ratio may differ across species for a number of reasons, such as species-specific differences in the subjective perception of time. In fact, the relationship between the aversiveness of pain and its intensity may itself change dynamically for a āsameā species, depending on the duration of the experience. If on the one hand itās true that the ācriteriaā defining each intensity category is universal (the same for all species), we cannot know for sure whether Excruciating pain in a shrimp is the same as Excruciating pain in a human being.
Thanks for the reply, Cynthia! If I understand correctly, even if it was known with certainty that:
1 h of disabling pain in humans was 10 times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, 1 h of disabling pain in shrimps could be more/āless than 10 times as bas as 1 h of hurtful pain in shrimps? I think you are implying it could indeed be more/āless than 10 times as bad.
1 h of disabling pain in humans was 10 times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, 10 h of disabling pain in humans could be more/āless than 10 times as bad as 10 h of hurtful pain in humans? I think you are implying it could indeed be more/āless than 10 times as bad.
Hi Vasco, thanks for this follow up. I believe we cannot rule out the possibilities you mentioned. That is, the answer could be yes to both questions. Even with humans, there is high variability in preference for intense but short aversiveness, as compared to moderate but longer aversion.
One solution we have been adopting lately is to simply āadd upā times in the different categories (with no weighting or conversion). Since the āboundaries between intensity categoriesā are acknowledged to be uncertain (i.e., we assign probabilities to each intensity category), adding up the time spent in different intensities follows naturally from this uncertainty. For instance, hours in Hurtful, Disabling, and Excruciating pain can be added together to report total time in āmoderate to intense pain,ā or hours in Disabling, and Excruciating pain can be added together to report total time in āintense painā.
In the Welfare Footprint framework, pain intensities are defined as absolute measures, meaning that one hour of Excruciating pain in humans is assumed to be hedonically equivalent to one hour of Excruciating pain in shrimps, if shrimps were capable of experiencing Excruciating pain. This approach treats pain intensities as fixed, anchoring them to human experience rather than scaling them based on a speciesā welfare range, to ensure comparability across species.
Coming back to the 1st situation I presented, if 1 h of disabling pain in humans was 10 times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, I think 1 h of disabling pain in shrimps should also be 10 times as bas as 1 h of hurtful pain in shrimps.
Even with humans, there is high variability in preference for intense but short aversiveness, as compared to moderate but longer aversion.
There may be a misunderstanding. In the 2nd situation I presented, the experiences being compared have the same duration. If 1 h of disabling pain in humans was x times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, I think N h of disabling pain in humans should also be x times as bad as N h of hurtful pain in humans. I believe the badness of a painful experience with a given intensity is proportional to its duration.
Nevermind. I have been using your estimates for the time in pain as if they do not account for any considerations relevant for interspecies welfare comparisons. However, the sentence below made me think no adjustments were needed to compare your estimates for the time humans and shrimp spend in excruciating pain. So I mistakenly inferred you were accounting for considerations relevant for interspecies welfare comparisons. However, as you say in the same paragraph, you āhold this assumption as temporary until better evidence allows for a more accurate placement of each experience on an absolute scaleā.
In the Welfare Footprint framework, pain intensities are defined as absolute measures, meaning that one hour of Excruciating pain in humans is assumed to be hedonically equivalent to one hour of Excruciating pain in shrimps, if shrimps were capable of experiencing Excruciating pain.
Hi Cynthia,
Under your framework, if one supposes hurtful, disabling and excruciating pain are a, b and c times as intense as annoying pain in humans, should the same apply to other species? Or could the intensity ratios vary across species? My understanding is that the ratios are supposed to be constant across species.
Hi Vasco, thatās a good question, but I do not think we can say with certainty that the ratio is preserved across species. The ratio may differ across species for a number of reasons, such as species-specific differences in the subjective perception of time. In fact, the relationship between the aversiveness of pain and its intensity may itself change dynamically for a āsameā species, depending on the duration of the experience. If on the one hand itās true that the ācriteriaā defining each intensity category is universal (the same for all species), we cannot know for sure whether Excruciating pain in a shrimp is the same as Excruciating pain in a human being.
Thanks for the reply, Cynthia! If I understand correctly, even if it was known with certainty that:
1 h of disabling pain in humans was 10 times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, 1 h of disabling pain in shrimps could be more/āless than 10 times as bas as 1 h of hurtful pain in shrimps? I think you are implying it could indeed be more/āless than 10 times as bad.
1 h of disabling pain in humans was 10 times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, 10 h of disabling pain in humans could be more/āless than 10 times as bad as 10 h of hurtful pain in humans? I think you are implying it could indeed be more/āless than 10 times as bad.
Hi Vasco, thanks for this follow up. I believe we cannot rule out the possibilities you mentioned. That is, the answer could be yes to both questions. Even with humans, there is high variability in preference for intense but short aversiveness, as compared to moderate but longer aversion.
One solution we have been adopting lately is to simply āadd upā times in the different categories (with no weighting or conversion). Since the āboundaries between intensity categoriesā are acknowledged to be uncertain (i.e., we assign probabilities to each intensity category), adding up the time spent in different intensities follows naturally from this uncertainty. For instance, hours in Hurtful, Disabling, and Excruciating pain can be added together to report total time in āmoderate to intense pain,ā or hours in Disabling, and Excruciating pain can be added together to report total time in āintense painā.
Thanks for clarifying, Cynthia!
Hi Cynthia.
This seems in tension with what you and @Wladimir J. Alonso say here.
Coming back to the 1st situation I presented, if 1 h of disabling pain in humans was 10 times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, I think 1 h of disabling pain in shrimps should also be 10 times as bas as 1 h of hurtful pain in shrimps.
There may be a misunderstanding. In the 2nd situation I presented, the experiences being compared have the same duration. If 1 h of disabling pain in humans was x times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, I think N h of disabling pain in humans should also be x times as bad as N h of hurtful pain in humans. I believe the badness of a painful experience with a given intensity is proportional to its duration.
Nevermind. I have been using your estimates for the time in pain as if they do not account for any considerations relevant for interspecies welfare comparisons. However, the sentence below made me think no adjustments were needed to compare your estimates for the time humans and shrimp spend in excruciating pain. So I mistakenly inferred you were accounting for considerations relevant for interspecies welfare comparisons. However, as you say in the same paragraph, you āhold this assumption as temporary until better evidence allows for a more accurate placement of each experience on an absolute scaleā.