I’m just saying that you then also have to say “if I imagine myself in a world where it is mentally-challenged humans instead of animals, I would not stop eating the humans for the same reason X.”
I agree with that. Some of your earlier comments seemed like they were setting up a slightly different argument.
Someone can have the following position: (1) They would continue to eat humans in the thought experiment world where one’s psychological dispositions treat it as not a big deal (e.g., because it’s normalized in that world and has become a habit) (2) They wouldn’t eat humans in the thought experiment world if they retained their psychological dispositions / reactive attitudes from the actual world – in that case, they’d finds the scenario abhorrent (3) When they think about (1) and (2), they don’t feel compelled to modify their dispositions / reactive attitudes toward not eating non-human animals (because of opportunity costs and because consequentialism doesn’t have the concept of “appropriate reactions” – or, at least, the consequentialist concept for “appropriate reactions” is more nuanced)
I think you were arguing against (3) at one point, while I and other commenters were arguing in favor of (3).
I agree with that. Some of your earlier comments seemed like they were setting up a slightly different argument.
Someone can have the following position:
(1) They would continue to eat humans in the thought experiment world where one’s psychological dispositions treat it as not a big deal (e.g., because it’s normalized in that world and has become a habit)
(2) They wouldn’t eat humans in the thought experiment world if they retained their psychological dispositions / reactive attitudes from the actual world – in that case, they’d finds the scenario abhorrent
(3) When they think about (1) and (2), they don’t feel compelled to modify their dispositions / reactive attitudes toward not eating non-human animals (because of opportunity costs and because consequentialism doesn’t have the concept of “appropriate reactions” – or, at least, the consequentialist concept for “appropriate reactions” is more nuanced)
I think you were arguing against (3) at one point, while I and other commenters were arguing in favor of (3).