I admit I’m getting confused. I think you’ve moved into arguing that going vegan has low relative value or may not even make sense for a maximising consequentialist. In my thought experiment I was trying to be agnostic on these points and simply draw a parallel between eating mentally-challenged humans and animals.
If you want to say that going vegan doesn’t make consequentialist sense for ‘reason X’ that is fine. I’m just saying that you then also have to say “if I imagine myself in a world where it is mentally-challenged humans instead of animals, I would not stop eating the humans for the same reason X”. If you can say and mean this sentence (I expect many people can) then this thought experiment should not have an affect on your choices. To clarify I don’t really judge such people—they would be acting in a morally-consistent way which I think is one of the most important things in ethics.
I’m just saying that you then also have to say “if I imagine myself in a world where it is mentally-challenged humans instead of animals, I would not stop eating the humans for the same reason X.”
I agree with that. Some of your earlier comments seemed like they were setting up a slightly different argument.
Someone can have the following position: (1) They would continue to eat humans in the thought experiment world where one’s psychological dispositions treat it as not a big deal (e.g., because it’s normalized in that world and has become a habit) (2) They wouldn’t eat humans in the thought experiment world if they retained their psychological dispositions / reactive attitudes from the actual world – in that case, they’d finds the scenario abhorrent (3) When they think about (1) and (2), they don’t feel compelled to modify their dispositions / reactive attitudes toward not eating non-human animals (because of opportunity costs and because consequentialism doesn’t have the concept of “appropriate reactions” – or, at least, the consequentialist concept for “appropriate reactions” is more nuanced)
I think you were arguing against (3) at one point, while I and other commenters were arguing in favor of (3).
I admit I’m getting confused. I think you’ve moved into arguing that going vegan has low relative value or may not even make sense for a maximising consequentialist. In my thought experiment I was trying to be agnostic on these points and simply draw a parallel between eating mentally-challenged humans and animals.
If you want to say that going vegan doesn’t make consequentialist sense for ‘reason X’ that is fine. I’m just saying that you then also have to say “if I imagine myself in a world where it is mentally-challenged humans instead of animals, I would not stop eating the humans for the same reason X”. If you can say and mean this sentence (I expect many people can) then this thought experiment should not have an affect on your choices. To clarify I don’t really judge such people—they would be acting in a morally-consistent way which I think is one of the most important things in ethics.
I agree with that. Some of your earlier comments seemed like they were setting up a slightly different argument.
Someone can have the following position:
(1) They would continue to eat humans in the thought experiment world where one’s psychological dispositions treat it as not a big deal (e.g., because it’s normalized in that world and has become a habit)
(2) They wouldn’t eat humans in the thought experiment world if they retained their psychological dispositions / reactive attitudes from the actual world – in that case, they’d finds the scenario abhorrent
(3) When they think about (1) and (2), they don’t feel compelled to modify their dispositions / reactive attitudes toward not eating non-human animals (because of opportunity costs and because consequentialism doesn’t have the concept of “appropriate reactions” – or, at least, the consequentialist concept for “appropriate reactions” is more nuanced)
I think you were arguing against (3) at one point, while I and other commenters were arguing in favor of (3).