My objection to it is that you can’t use it for decision-making because it depends on what the “default” is. For example, if you view x-risk reduction as preventing a move from “lots of happy people to no people” this view is super excited about x-risk reduction, but if you view x-risk reduction as a move from “no people to lots of happy people” this view doesn’t care.
That still seems somehow like a consequentialist critique though. Maybe that’s what it is and was intended to be. Or maybe I just don’t follow?
From a non-consequentialist point of view, whether a “no people to lots of happy people” move (like any other move) is good or not depends on other considerations, like the nature of the action, our duties or virtue. I guess what I want to say is that “going from state A to state B”-type thinking is evaluating world states in an outcome-oriented way, and that just seems like the wrong level of analysis for those other philosophies.
I totally agree this is a consequentialist critique. I don’t think that negates the validity of the critique.
From a non-consequentialist point of view, whether a “no people to lots of happy people” move (like any other move) is good or not depends on other considerations, like the nature of the action, our duties or virtue. I guess what I want to say is that “going from state A to state B”-type thinking is evaluating world states in an outcome-oriented way, and that just seems like the wrong level of analysis for those other philosophies.
Okay, but I still don’t know what the view says about x-risk reduction (the example in my previous comment)?
I don’t think that negates the validity of the critique.
Agreed—I didn’t mean to imply it was.
Okay, but I still don’t know what the view says about x-risk reduction (the example in my previous comment)?
By “the view”, do you mean the consequentialist person-affecting view you argued against, or one of the non-consequentialist person-affecting views I alluded to?
If the former, I have no idea.
If the latter, I guess it depends on the precise view. On the deontological view I find pretty plausible we have, roughly speaking, a duty to humanity, and that’d mean actions that reduce x-risk are good (and vice versa). (I think there are also other deontological reasons to reduce x-risk, but that’s the main one.) I guess I don’t see any way that changes depending on what the default is? I’ll stop here since I’m not sure this is even what you were asking about …
Oh, to be clear, my response to RedStateBlueState’s comment was considering a new still-consequentialist view, that wouldn’t take trade 3. None of the arguments in this post are meant to apply to e.g. deontological views. I’ve clarified this in my original response.
That still seems somehow like a consequentialist critique though. Maybe that’s what it is and was intended to be. Or maybe I just don’t follow?
From a non-consequentialist point of view, whether a “no people to lots of happy people” move (like any other move) is good or not depends on other considerations, like the nature of the action, our duties or virtue. I guess what I want to say is that “going from state A to state B”-type thinking is evaluating world states in an outcome-oriented way, and that just seems like the wrong level of analysis for those other philosophies.
From a consequentalist point of view, I agree.
I totally agree this is a consequentialist critique. I don’t think that negates the validity of the critique.
Okay, but I still don’t know what the view says about x-risk reduction (the example in my previous comment)?
Agreed—I didn’t mean to imply it was.
By “the view”, do you mean the consequentialist person-affecting view you argued against, or one of the non-consequentialist person-affecting views I alluded to?
If the former, I have no idea.
If the latter, I guess it depends on the precise view. On the deontological view I find pretty plausible we have, roughly speaking, a duty to humanity, and that’d mean actions that reduce x-risk are good (and vice versa). (I think there are also other deontological reasons to reduce x-risk, but that’s the main one.) I guess I don’t see any way that changes depending on what the default is? I’ll stop here since I’m not sure this is even what you were asking about …
Oh, to be clear, my response to RedStateBlueState’s comment was considering a new still-consequentialist view, that wouldn’t take trade 3. None of the arguments in this post are meant to apply to e.g. deontological views. I’ve clarified this in my original response.