My objection to it is that you canāt use it for decision-making because it depends on what the ādefaultā is. For example, if you view x-risk reduction as preventing a move from ālots of happy people to no peopleā this view is super excited about x-risk reduction, but if you view x-risk reduction as a move from āno people to lots of happy peopleā this view doesnāt care.
That still seems somehow like a consequentialist critique though. Maybe thatās what it is and was intended to be. Or maybe I just donāt follow?
From a non-consequentialist point of view, whether a āno people to lots of happy peopleā move (like any other move) is good or not depends on other considerations, like the nature of the action, our duties or virtue. I guess what I want to say is that āgoing from state A to state Bā-type thinking is evaluating world states in an outcome-oriented way, and that just seems like the wrong level of analysis for those other philosophies.
I totally agree this is a consequentialist critique. I donāt think that negates the validity of the critique.
From a non-consequentialist point of view, whether a āno people to lots of happy peopleā move (like any other move) is good or not depends on other considerations, like the nature of the action, our duties or virtue. I guess what I want to say is that āgoing from state A to state Bā-type thinking is evaluating world states in an outcome-oriented way, and that just seems like the wrong level of analysis for those other philosophies.
Okay, but I still donāt know what the view says about x-risk reduction (the example in my previous comment)?
I donāt think that negates the validity of the critique.
AgreedāI didnāt mean to imply it was.
Okay, but I still donāt know what the view says about x-risk reduction (the example in my previous comment)?
By āthe viewā, do you mean the consequentialist person-affecting view you argued against, or one of the non-consequentialist person-affecting views I alluded to?
If the former, I have no idea.
If the latter, I guess it depends on the precise view. On the deontological view I find pretty plausible we have, roughly speaking, a duty to humanity, and thatād mean actions that reduce x-risk are good (and vice versa). (I think there are also other deontological reasons to reduce x-risk, but thatās the main one.) I guess I donāt see any way that changes depending on what the default is? Iāll stop here since Iām not sure this is even what you were asking about ā¦
Oh, to be clear, my response to RedStateBlueStateās comment was considering a new still-consequentialist view, that wouldnāt take trade 3. None of the arguments in this post are meant to apply to e.g. deontological views. Iāve clarified this in my original response.
That still seems somehow like a consequentialist critique though. Maybe thatās what it is and was intended to be. Or maybe I just donāt follow?
From a non-consequentialist point of view, whether a āno people to lots of happy peopleā move (like any other move) is good or not depends on other considerations, like the nature of the action, our duties or virtue. I guess what I want to say is that āgoing from state A to state Bā-type thinking is evaluating world states in an outcome-oriented way, and that just seems like the wrong level of analysis for those other philosophies.
From a consequentalist point of view, I agree.
I totally agree this is a consequentialist critique. I donāt think that negates the validity of the critique.
Okay, but I still donāt know what the view says about x-risk reduction (the example in my previous comment)?
AgreedāI didnāt mean to imply it was.
By āthe viewā, do you mean the consequentialist person-affecting view you argued against, or one of the non-consequentialist person-affecting views I alluded to?
If the former, I have no idea.
If the latter, I guess it depends on the precise view. On the deontological view I find pretty plausible we have, roughly speaking, a duty to humanity, and thatād mean actions that reduce x-risk are good (and vice versa). (I think there are also other deontological reasons to reduce x-risk, but thatās the main one.) I guess I donāt see any way that changes depending on what the default is? Iāll stop here since Iām not sure this is even what you were asking about ā¦
Oh, to be clear, my response to RedStateBlueStateās comment was considering a new still-consequentialist view, that wouldnāt take trade 3. None of the arguments in this post are meant to apply to e.g. deontological views. Iāve clarified this in my original response.