I totally agree this is a consequentialist critique. I don’t think that negates the validity of the critique.
From a non-consequentialist point of view, whether a “no people to lots of happy people” move (like any other move) is good or not depends on other considerations, like the nature of the action, our duties or virtue. I guess what I want to say is that “going from state A to state B”-type thinking is evaluating world states in an outcome-oriented way, and that just seems like the wrong level of analysis for those other philosophies.
Okay, but I still don’t know what the view says about x-risk reduction (the example in my previous comment)?
I don’t think that negates the validity of the critique.
Agreed—I didn’t mean to imply it was.
Okay, but I still don’t know what the view says about x-risk reduction (the example in my previous comment)?
By “the view”, do you mean the consequentialist person-affecting view you argued against, or one of the non-consequentialist person-affecting views I alluded to?
If the former, I have no idea.
If the latter, I guess it depends on the precise view. On the deontological view I find pretty plausible we have, roughly speaking, a duty to humanity, and that’d mean actions that reduce x-risk are good (and vice versa). (I think there are also other deontological reasons to reduce x-risk, but that’s the main one.) I guess I don’t see any way that changes depending on what the default is? I’ll stop here since I’m not sure this is even what you were asking about …
Oh, to be clear, my response to RedStateBlueState’s comment was considering a new still-consequentialist view, that wouldn’t take trade 3. None of the arguments in this post are meant to apply to e.g. deontological views. I’ve clarified this in my original response.
I totally agree this is a consequentialist critique. I don’t think that negates the validity of the critique.
Okay, but I still don’t know what the view says about x-risk reduction (the example in my previous comment)?
Agreed—I didn’t mean to imply it was.
By “the view”, do you mean the consequentialist person-affecting view you argued against, or one of the non-consequentialist person-affecting views I alluded to?
If the former, I have no idea.
If the latter, I guess it depends on the precise view. On the deontological view I find pretty plausible we have, roughly speaking, a duty to humanity, and that’d mean actions that reduce x-risk are good (and vice versa). (I think there are also other deontological reasons to reduce x-risk, but that’s the main one.) I guess I don’t see any way that changes depending on what the default is? I’ll stop here since I’m not sure this is even what you were asking about …
Oh, to be clear, my response to RedStateBlueState’s comment was considering a new still-consequentialist view, that wouldn’t take trade 3. None of the arguments in this post are meant to apply to e.g. deontological views. I’ve clarified this in my original response.