This all seems right if all the trades are known to be available ahead of time and we’re making all these decisions before Alice would be born. However, we can specify things slightly differently.
Presentists and necessitarians who have made trade 1 will make trade 2 if it’s offered after Alice is born, but then they can turn down trade 3 at that point, as trade 3 would mean killing Alice or an impossible world where she was never born. However, if they anticipate trade 2 being offered after Alice is born, then I think they shouldn’t make trade 1, since they know they’ll make trade 2 and end up in World 3 minus some money, which is worse than World 1 for presently existing people and necessary people before Alice is born.
HMVs would make trade 1 if they don’t anticipate trade 2/World 3 minus some money being an option, but end up being wrong about that.
However, if they anticipate trade 2 being offered after Alice is born, then I think they shouldn’t make trade 1, since they know they’ll make trade 2 and end up in World 3 minus some money, which is worse than World 1 for presently existing people and necessary people before Alice is born.
I think it’s pretty unreasonable for an ethical system to:
change its mind about whether something is good or bad, based only on time elapsing, without having learned anything new (say, you’re offered trade 2, and you know that Alice’s mother has just gone into labour, and now you want to call the hospital to find out if she’s given birth yet? or you made trade 2 ten years ago, and it was a mistake if Alice is 8 years old now, but not if she’s 12?)
as a consequence, act to deliberately frustrate its own future choices, so that it will be later unable to pick some option that would have seemed the best to it
I haven’t come up with much of an argument beyond incredulity, but I nevertheless find myself incredulous.
(I’m mindful that this comment is coming 2 years later and some things have happened in between. I came here by looking at the person-affecting forum wiki tag after feeling that not all of my reasons for rejecting such views were common knowledge.)
Only presentists have the problem in the first bullet with your specific example.
There’s a similar problem that necessitarians have if the identity of the extra person isn’t decided yet, i.e. before conception. However, they do get to learn something new, i.e. the identity. If a necessitarian knew the identity ahead of time, there would be no similar problem. (And you can modify the view to be insensitive to the identity of the child by matching counterparts across possible worlds.)
The problem in the second bullet, basically against burning bridges or “resolute choice”, doesn’t seem that big of a deal to me. You run into similar problems with Parfit’s hitchhiker and unbounded utility functions.
Maybe I can motivate this better? Say you want to have a child, but being a good parent (and ensuring high welfare for your child) seems like too much trouble and seems worse to you than not having kids, even though, conditional on having a child, it would be best.
Your options are:
No child.
Have a child, but be a meh parent. You’re better off than in 1, and the child has a net positive but just okay life.
Have a child, but work much harder to be a good parent. You’re worse off than in 2, but the child is much better off than in 2, and this outcome is better than 2 in a pairwise comparison.
In binary choices:
1 < 2, because 2 is better for you and no worse for your child (person-affecting).
2 < 3, impartially by assumption.
3 < 1, because 1 is better for you and no worse for your child (person-affecting).
With all three options available, I’d opt for 1, because 2 wouldn’t be impartially permissible if 3 is available, and I prefer 1 to 3. 2 is not really an option if 3 is available.
It seems okay for me to frustrate my own preference for 2 over 1 in order to avoid 3, which is even worse for me than 1. No one else is worse off for this (in a person-affecting way); the child doesn’t exist to be worse off, so has no grounds for complaint. So it seems to me to be entirely my own business.
This all seems right if all the trades are known to be available ahead of time and we’re making all these decisions before Alice would be born. However, we can specify things slightly differently.
Presentists and necessitarians who have made trade 1 will make trade 2 if it’s offered after Alice is born, but then they can turn down trade 3 at that point, as trade 3 would mean killing Alice or an impossible world where she was never born. However, if they anticipate trade 2 being offered after Alice is born, then I think they shouldn’t make trade 1, since they know they’ll make trade 2 and end up in World 3 minus some money, which is worse than World 1 for presently existing people and necessary people before Alice is born.
HMVs would make trade 1 if they don’t anticipate trade 2/World 3 minus some money being an option, but end up being wrong about that.
I think it’s pretty unreasonable for an ethical system to:
change its mind about whether something is good or bad, based only on time elapsing, without having learned anything new (say, you’re offered trade 2, and you know that Alice’s mother has just gone into labour, and now you want to call the hospital to find out if she’s given birth yet? or you made trade 2 ten years ago, and it was a mistake if Alice is 8 years old now, but not if she’s 12?)
as a consequence, act to deliberately frustrate its own future choices, so that it will be later unable to pick some option that would have seemed the best to it
I haven’t come up with much of an argument beyond incredulity, but I nevertheless find myself incredulous.
(I’m mindful that this comment is coming 2 years later and some things have happened in between. I came here by looking at the person-affecting forum wiki tag after feeling that not all of my reasons for rejecting such views were common knowledge.)
Only presentists have the problem in the first bullet with your specific example.
There’s a similar problem that necessitarians have if the identity of the extra person isn’t decided yet, i.e. before conception. However, they do get to learn something new, i.e. the identity. If a necessitarian knew the identity ahead of time, there would be no similar problem. (And you can modify the view to be insensitive to the identity of the child by matching counterparts across possible worlds.)
The problem in the second bullet, basically against burning bridges or “resolute choice”, doesn’t seem that big of a deal to me. You run into similar problems with Parfit’s hitchhiker and unbounded utility functions.
Maybe I can motivate this better? Say you want to have a child, but being a good parent (and ensuring high welfare for your child) seems like too much trouble and seems worse to you than not having kids, even though, conditional on having a child, it would be best.
Your options are:
No child.
Have a child, but be a meh parent. You’re better off than in 1, and the child has a net positive but just okay life.
Have a child, but work much harder to be a good parent. You’re worse off than in 2, but the child is much better off than in 2, and this outcome is better than 2 in a pairwise comparison.
In binary choices:
1 < 2, because 2 is better for you and no worse for your child (person-affecting).
2 < 3, impartially by assumption.
3 < 1, because 1 is better for you and no worse for your child (person-affecting).
With all three options available, I’d opt for 1, because 2 wouldn’t be impartially permissible if 3 is available, and I prefer 1 to 3. 2 is not really an option if 3 is available.
It seems okay for me to frustrate my own preference for 2 over 1 in order to avoid 3, which is even worse for me than 1. No one else is worse off for this (in a person-affecting way); the child doesn’t exist to be worse off, so has no grounds for complaint. So it seems to me to be entirely my own business.
Agreed