I agree with your clarifications and apologize for having misunderstood your consideration regarding the possibilities of moral evolution in the future.
My idea of “virtue ethics” is based on the consideration that the most valuable aspect of moral conduct is the motivating “intention” of the agent. The difference between “altruism” and “prosociality” lies precisely in this. It is possible for a virtuous person, well-intentioned in the sense of charity, benevolence, and altruistic action, to make a consequentialist miscalculation, but they will always be willing to be corrected.
In any of the texts on consequentialist ethics we know, we find examples and dilemmas that question the appropriateness of consequentialism.
Last year, thousands of African immigrants arrived in small boats to the Canary Islands (European Union). It is estimated that around ten thousand perished at sea in the attempt. CONSEQUENTIALIST SOLUTION: From now on, the Spanish navy will sink any immigrant ship that approaches the coast with cannon fire. After having murdered a thousand poor immigrants, terror will prevent any more ships from leaving the African coast: NINE THOUSAND LIVES WILL BE SAVED (the greatest good for the greatest number).
The question would be: does every consequentialist position on altruism lead to the moral improvement of society? I think not.
A “virtue” approach, on the other hand, is unequivocal as long as the model of virtue is consistently altruistic. If I am virtuous, I will also try to do “the greatest good for the greatest number,” but I will not overlook the fact that the fundamental objective is to spread a virtuous lifestyle as a cultural model. The main task, therefore, is to define the model of virtue and its viability as an alternative for cultural change.
Of course, I am not claiming that the Amish are a model of virtue. They are superstitious, traditionalist, and even suspected of serious cases of sexual abuse among them. But it is undeniable that their system of controlling aggressive behavior is an example of what can be achieved with cultural changes. Even more surprising when we know that their social system is based on small family farms and that there is economic inequality among them: the most common social environment for neighborly feuds, disputes, and brawls.
Brainwashing? Aren’t we conditioned from childhood to be competitive, “assertive,” to develop “self-respect,” and personal independence?
All moral development begins with the emotional consideration of mutual relationships. The success of moral virtue consists in the emotional internalization of the abstract principles of morality. Historically, this has been achieved primarily through religious mechanisms (all secular liberalism is inherited from the Reformed Christianity of the nations of Northern Europe), but such mechanisms can be reinterpreted and adapted to a secular approach to altruism. The selection of psychological strategies to reach this goal would be achieved through a process of trial and error. We can draw on something from the Amish, something from the spiritual exercises of ancient times, something from cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy… even from Stanislavsky’s “method acting.”
In any case, no one is working today to develop a coherent altruistic virtue that could serve as a model for cultural change.
At least the objective idea of “effective altruism” is being worked on, albeit from the limited perspective of consequentialism. And this is a relatively recent movement… one that didn’t exist before. Until recently, the only secular approach to social improvement was socialism: establishing social justice through legal coercion (and from there to “the end justifies the means” was only a short step...).
Thank for hearing me. Now that I see your approach is not as hard-line as it seemed to be, I largely agree with your concerns and hopes for the future. I think many of the texts that discuss consequentialism generally do so by straw-manning a very short-term, limited view of consequentialism, and so I’m not surprised that texts you’ve read on the subject have given you this impression of it.
Playing out those situations for longer or involving more variables generally aligns utilitarianism with our more liberal moral intuitions. For instance the “solution” to the illegal immigration problem omits the entire point of seeking refuge from a country to begin with, that those refugees are hoping for a better life, solving the problem of illegal immigration bars all those people from seeking a better life, intuitively we know this reduces their well-being, and so part of what is so wrong about the solution is this unspoken part of it, which is quantifiable in utilitarian terms.
It’s also important to consider why anti-immigration proponents want to keep those people out—out of a fear that those others don’t share our values, and so “protecting our values” which is seen as a virtue by many (not me), plays a role in this unsavoury situation.
But as I say in the post, this playing out of the calculus to cover every possibility is not feasible in general, so virtues, or behavioural rules of thumb that generally result in positive outcomes is more practicable. And as I said in the comment, virtue ethics is also a better way to judge character.
I think EA has some major problems especially when it gets into long-termism, and measuring extreme threats that are extremely unlikely against sure threats that are measurably bad.
For instance the “solution” to the illegal immigration problem omits the entire point of seeking refuge from a country to begin with, that those refugees are hoping for a better life
I’m one of those who think that the problem of the enormous wealth inequality between rich and very poor countries—especially those in sub-Saharan Africa—is the current equivalent of what the fight against slavery was in the 18th and 19th centuries. It’s an outrage that there are still people dying of hunger or malnutrition.
That said, many alarmists about “uncontrolled” immigration can also build up consequentialist arguments. I’ve read that they say that what the inmigrants invest in paying for their dangerous, more or less clandestine journeys to rich countries should be invested in their own countries to prosper economically in their own lands. So if we make it difficult for them to experience dangerous, expensive, and unprofitable “uncontrolled” emigration (it is said that most limit themselves to subsisting precariously in the rich countries where they arrive undocumented), we would be doing them a favor (consequentialism).
I think EA has some major problems especially when it gets into long-termism, and measuring extreme threats that are extremely unlikely against sure threats that are measurably bad.
If we start from the certain fact that moral evolution has existed, exists, and must continue to exist, the best consequentialist and long-termist calculation is to promote moral evolution. Improving moral behavior within the framework of cultural evolution would lead us to a “virtue ethics” that provides the best results in all areas that can be affected by the intentional, organized, and massive action of a humanity that has evolved morally in the sense of empathy, benevolence, rationality, and altruism (as effective as possible).
Attempts to improve moral behavior in an intelligent and organized way go back a long way: the monasticism invented by Buddhists, the “spiritual exercises” of the Stoics or Epicureans (there is a famous book by Pierre Hadot on this). Today we have many more resources in this regard.
Sigmund Freud, who was by no means a fool, thought that socialism would not improve human life because changing economic structures would not change moral nature. However, he himself admitted that there were psychological resources through which the most pressing human instincts (including the libido) could be manipulated to generate something resembling “holy love.”
The best consequentialism is one that rationally analyzes the reality of the factors involved in any issue deemed a priority. If the priority is altruism, moral judgment must take into account the reality of the moral agent, which is human nature (the human being, the “cultural animal”).
I agree with your clarifications and apologize for having misunderstood your consideration regarding the possibilities of moral evolution in the future.
My idea of “virtue ethics” is based on the consideration that the most valuable aspect of moral conduct is the motivating “intention” of the agent. The difference between “altruism” and “prosociality” lies precisely in this. It is possible for a virtuous person, well-intentioned in the sense of charity, benevolence, and altruistic action, to make a consequentialist miscalculation, but they will always be willing to be corrected.
In any of the texts on consequentialist ethics we know, we find examples and dilemmas that question the appropriateness of consequentialism.
Last year, thousands of African immigrants arrived in small boats to the Canary Islands (European Union). It is estimated that around ten thousand perished at sea in the attempt. CONSEQUENTIALIST SOLUTION: From now on, the Spanish navy will sink any immigrant ship that approaches the coast with cannon fire. After having murdered a thousand poor immigrants, terror will prevent any more ships from leaving the African coast: NINE THOUSAND LIVES WILL BE SAVED (the greatest good for the greatest number).
The question would be: does every consequentialist position on altruism lead to the moral improvement of society? I think not.
A “virtue” approach, on the other hand, is unequivocal as long as the model of virtue is consistently altruistic. If I am virtuous, I will also try to do “the greatest good for the greatest number,” but I will not overlook the fact that the fundamental objective is to spread a virtuous lifestyle as a cultural model. The main task, therefore, is to define the model of virtue and its viability as an alternative for cultural change.
Of course, I am not claiming that the Amish are a model of virtue. They are superstitious, traditionalist, and even suspected of serious cases of sexual abuse among them. But it is undeniable that their system of controlling aggressive behavior is an example of what can be achieved with cultural changes. Even more surprising when we know that their social system is based on small family farms and that there is economic inequality among them: the most common social environment for neighborly feuds, disputes, and brawls.
Brainwashing? Aren’t we conditioned from childhood to be competitive, “assertive,” to develop “self-respect,” and personal independence?
All moral development begins with the emotional consideration of mutual relationships. The success of moral virtue consists in the emotional internalization of the abstract principles of morality. Historically, this has been achieved primarily through religious mechanisms (all secular liberalism is inherited from the Reformed Christianity of the nations of Northern Europe), but such mechanisms can be reinterpreted and adapted to a secular approach to altruism. The selection of psychological strategies to reach this goal would be achieved through a process of trial and error. We can draw on something from the Amish, something from the spiritual exercises of ancient times, something from cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy… even from Stanislavsky’s “method acting.”
In any case, no one is working today to develop a coherent altruistic virtue that could serve as a model for cultural change.
At least the objective idea of “effective altruism” is being worked on, albeit from the limited perspective of consequentialism. And this is a relatively recent movement… one that didn’t exist before. Until recently, the only secular approach to social improvement was socialism: establishing social justice through legal coercion (and from there to “the end justifies the means” was only a short step...).
Thank for hearing me. Now that I see your approach is not as hard-line as it seemed to be, I largely agree with your concerns and hopes for the future. I think many of the texts that discuss consequentialism generally do so by straw-manning a very short-term, limited view of consequentialism, and so I’m not surprised that texts you’ve read on the subject have given you this impression of it.
Playing out those situations for longer or involving more variables generally aligns utilitarianism with our more liberal moral intuitions. For instance the “solution” to the illegal immigration problem omits the entire point of seeking refuge from a country to begin with, that those refugees are hoping for a better life, solving the problem of illegal immigration bars all those people from seeking a better life, intuitively we know this reduces their well-being, and so part of what is so wrong about the solution is this unspoken part of it, which is quantifiable in utilitarian terms.
It’s also important to consider why anti-immigration proponents want to keep those people out—out of a fear that those others don’t share our values, and so “protecting our values” which is seen as a virtue by many (not me), plays a role in this unsavoury situation.
But as I say in the post, this playing out of the calculus to cover every possibility is not feasible in general, so virtues, or behavioural rules of thumb that generally result in positive outcomes is more practicable. And as I said in the comment, virtue ethics is also a better way to judge character.
I think EA has some major problems especially when it gets into long-termism, and measuring extreme threats that are extremely unlikely against sure threats that are measurably bad.
I’m one of those who think that the problem of the enormous wealth inequality between rich and very poor countries—especially those in sub-Saharan Africa—is the current equivalent of what the fight against slavery was in the 18th and 19th centuries. It’s an outrage that there are still people dying of hunger or malnutrition.
That said, many alarmists about “uncontrolled” immigration can also build up consequentialist arguments. I’ve read that they say that what the inmigrants invest in paying for their dangerous, more or less clandestine journeys to rich countries should be invested in their own countries to prosper economically in their own lands. So if we make it difficult for them to experience dangerous, expensive, and unprofitable “uncontrolled” emigration (it is said that most limit themselves to subsisting precariously in the rich countries where they arrive undocumented), we would be doing them a favor (consequentialism).
If we start from the certain fact that moral evolution has existed, exists, and must continue to exist, the best consequentialist and long-termist calculation is to promote moral evolution. Improving moral behavior within the framework of cultural evolution would lead us to a “virtue ethics” that provides the best results in all areas that can be affected by the intentional, organized, and massive action of a humanity that has evolved morally in the sense of empathy, benevolence, rationality, and altruism (as effective as possible).
Attempts to improve moral behavior in an intelligent and organized way go back a long way: the monasticism invented by Buddhists, the “spiritual exercises” of the Stoics or Epicureans (there is a famous book by Pierre Hadot on this). Today we have many more resources in this regard.
Sigmund Freud, who was by no means a fool, thought that socialism would not improve human life because changing economic structures would not change moral nature. However, he himself admitted that there were psychological resources through which the most pressing human instincts (including the libido) could be manipulated to generate something resembling “holy love.”
The best consequentialism is one that rationally analyzes the reality of the factors involved in any issue deemed a priority. If the priority is altruism, moral judgment must take into account the reality of the moral agent, which is human nature (the human being, the “cultural animal”).