Thanks for the clarification. Claim (iii) with “unlikely” rather than “extremely unlikely” is a tenable view, and the specifics, of course, depend on other ways we can affect the far future. Do you think it’s fair to put the modified (iii) claim in the same category as...
(v) That improving human welfare with interventions like antimalaria nets, deworming pills, or cash transfers seems “unlikely” to be the best way of meeting the goal of making the long-term future flourish.
I take it you do put these in the same category as you say you are (vi) not making the claim:
That improving human welfare is a better instrumental sub-goal for improving the long-term future than improving animal welfare.
But you also claim (vii) “In contrast, we do not have similarly strong reasons to think “improve human welfare” is definitely not the best approach.” There seems to clearly be a tension between (vi) and (vii).
I would put (iii) in roughly the same category as (v), though I think it’s more unlikely in case of (iii) than (v).
There isn’t really a tension between (vi) and (vii), although I can see why you might think there was. It’s a distinction about our subjective probability distributions for how good the different causes are.
The way I see it, we are currently probing a space and know relatively little about it. We want to know global features—which things are better than others, and which are best. Often we are better at distinguishing local features—how to compare between relatively similar matters.
I think the arguments we’ve discussed show reasonably conclusively that animal welfare isn’t the best instrumental goal—because we can see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better. This doesn’t tell us how to compare the things in this vicinity with the things in the vicinity of human welfare improvements. The contrast with human welfare interventions was firstly supposed to show how indirect effects matter, and second supposed to make clear that there was something unusual going on in the vicinity of the animal welfare interventions. It wasn’t meant to make a direct claim about how to compare the two.
“I think the arguments we’ve discussed show reasonably conclusively that animal welfare isn’t the best instrumental goal—because we can see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better.”
It seems the “improving animal welfare” interventions could very well be the best ways to improve those values. I think that’s a key point where we disagree. I’d be interested in hearing what you think are better alternatives at some point.
If there are clearly better options for proxies related to “improving animal welfare,” but not clearly better options for proxies related to “improving human welfare,” then “improving animal welfare” could still be the better option of the two. Analogy: if we have two car races with five separate cars each, the worst car in one race could still be better than all five in the other.
Did you read the first part of the post, on meanings of cause? I don’t disagree that that could be the best intervention cluster. But I think if we’re pursuing it, it should be for the right reasons—this will help us to make the correct decisions when new evidence comes to light.
I entirely agree that improving animal welfare could still beat improving human welfare. That’s exactly what I was saying in (vi).
I don’t “see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better.” That’s where I was asking for better alternative subgoals to reaching value improvements.
I think we practically understand each other’s points now though. Thanks for the discussion and clarification.
Thanks for the clarification. Claim (iii) with “unlikely” rather than “extremely unlikely” is a tenable view, and the specifics, of course, depend on other ways we can affect the far future. Do you think it’s fair to put the modified (iii) claim in the same category as...
(v) That improving human welfare with interventions like antimalaria nets, deworming pills, or cash transfers seems “unlikely” to be the best way of meeting the goal of making the long-term future flourish.
I take it you do put these in the same category as you say you are (vi) not making the claim: That improving human welfare is a better instrumental sub-goal for improving the long-term future than improving animal welfare.
But you also claim (vii) “In contrast, we do not have similarly strong reasons to think “improve human welfare” is definitely not the best approach.” There seems to clearly be a tension between (vi) and (vii).
Could you resolve it?
I would put (iii) in roughly the same category as (v), though I think it’s more unlikely in case of (iii) than (v).
There isn’t really a tension between (vi) and (vii), although I can see why you might think there was. It’s a distinction about our subjective probability distributions for how good the different causes are.
The way I see it, we are currently probing a space and know relatively little about it. We want to know global features—which things are better than others, and which are best. Often we are better at distinguishing local features—how to compare between relatively similar matters.
I think the arguments we’ve discussed show reasonably conclusively that animal welfare isn’t the best instrumental goal—because we can see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better. This doesn’t tell us how to compare the things in this vicinity with the things in the vicinity of human welfare improvements. The contrast with human welfare interventions was firstly supposed to show how indirect effects matter, and second supposed to make clear that there was something unusual going on in the vicinity of the animal welfare interventions. It wasn’t meant to make a direct claim about how to compare the two.
“I think the arguments we’ve discussed show reasonably conclusively that animal welfare isn’t the best instrumental goal—because we can see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better.”
It seems the “improving animal welfare” interventions could very well be the best ways to improve those values. I think that’s a key point where we disagree. I’d be interested in hearing what you think are better alternatives at some point.
If there are clearly better options for proxies related to “improving animal welfare,” but not clearly better options for proxies related to “improving human welfare,” then “improving animal welfare” could still be the better option of the two. Analogy: if we have two car races with five separate cars each, the worst car in one race could still be better than all five in the other.
Did you read the first part of the post, on meanings of cause? I don’t disagree that that could be the best intervention cluster. But I think if we’re pursuing it, it should be for the right reasons—this will help us to make the correct decisions when new evidence comes to light.
I entirely agree that improving animal welfare could still beat improving human welfare. That’s exactly what I was saying in (vi).
I don’t “see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better.” That’s where I was asking for better alternative subgoals to reaching value improvements.
I think we practically understand each other’s points now though. Thanks for the discussion and clarification.