My counter-assumption here is that where humans display anxiety, fear or self-protective behavior, both the behaviors themselves and the corresponding experience are likely to be more intense or bigger sized than a pig, chicken or shrimp that exhibits these behaviors[8].
What do you have in mind by “more intense or bigger sized”?
FWIW, here’s how I would probably think about it:
Do humans react with more urgency, desperation or in more extreme ways?
I would guess it would be similar across all mammals and birds, but it’s hard to say for shrimp. I would actually just check the proxy for “panic-like behavior”, which is present in pigs and chickens, but unknown in shrimp. I think “panic-like behavior” is one of the most important proxies here, because it’s the best evidence about the capacity for disabling and maybe excruciating pain/suffering.[1]
Do humans have a greater diversity of responses, or more flexible responses in anxiety, fear and self-protective behavior?
Yes, but, in my view, this probably tracks intelligence and not how much an animal cares. I wouldn’t say young children suffer less because of less flexible responses, say. Young children have the capacity to develop more responses and more flexible responses than other animals, though, and maybe that could matter, but I’m personally skeptical.
Still, there’s a third possibility: it might track the extent to which we can say an animal can care about anything at all, under a graded view of consciousness, which could favour humans more (more here).
Disabling. Pain at this level takes priority over most bids for behavioral execution and prevents most forms of enjoyment or positive welfare. Pain is continuously distressing. Individuals affected by harms in this category often change their activity levels drastically (the degree of disruption in the ability of an organism to function optimally should not be confused with the overt expression of pain behaviors, which is less likely in prey species). Inattention and unresponsiveness to milder forms of pain or other ongoing stimuli and surroundings is likely to be observed. Relief often requires higher drug dosages or more powerful drugs. The term Disabling refers to the disability caused by ‘pain’, not to any structural disability.
Excruciating. All conditions and events associated with extreme levels of pain that are not normally tolerated even if only for a few seconds. In humans, it would mark the threshold of pain under which many people choose to take their lives rather than endure the pain. This is the case, for example, of scalding and severe burning events. Behavioral patterns associated with experiences in this category may include loud screaming, involuntary shaking, extreme muscle tension, or extreme restlessness. Another criterion is the manifestation of behaviors that individuals would strongly refrain from displaying under normal circumstances, as they threaten body integrity (e.g. running into hazardous areas or exposing oneself to sources of danger, such as predators, as a result of pain or of attempts to alleviate it). The attribution of conditions to this level must therefore be done cautiously. Concealment of pain is not possible.
Thanks Michael for your response and suggested framework—I really respect your history of thinking deeply about this issue, and I’m sure you understand it far better than me. I read some of your posts and @trammell’s post to try and inform myself about this issue and I confess that my understanding is partial at best.
When I say “intense or bigger sized” I’m talking about the experience, not the behaviour which may or may not approximate/indicate the experience. I might be thinking more along the lines of your “gradations in moral weight”, or Trammell’s “Experience size” concept.
Regardless of the framework I do believe that animals’ experience when a similar behaviour to a human is displaced, is likely less “intense or bigger sized” than a human and so there could possibly be some kind of discount applied. I also acknowledge like you and RP that there’s a smallish chance that some or all animals might be experiencing more.
Ah sorry, I should have read more carefully. You were clearly referring to the intensity or size of the experience, not of the behaviour. 4 hours of sleep and commenting before going to the airport. :P
I wrote more about experience size in the comments on trammell’s post.
What do you have in mind by “more intense or bigger sized”?
FWIW, here’s how I would probably think about it:
Do humans react with more urgency, desperation or in more extreme ways?
I would guess it would be similar across all mammals and birds, but it’s hard to say for shrimp. I would actually just check the proxy for “panic-like behavior”, which is present in pigs and chickens, but unknown in shrimp. I think “panic-like behavior” is one of the most important proxies here, because it’s the best evidence about the capacity for disabling and maybe excruciating pain/suffering.[1]
Do humans have a greater diversity of responses, or more flexible responses in anxiety, fear and self-protective behavior?
Yes, but, in my view, this probably tracks intelligence and not how much an animal cares. I wouldn’t say young children suffer less because of less flexible responses, say. Young children have the capacity to develop more responses and more flexible responses than other animals, though, and maybe that could matter, but I’m personally skeptical.
Still, there’s a third possibility: it might track the extent to which we can say an animal can care about anything at all, under a graded view of consciousness, which could favour humans more (more here).
Thanks Michael for your response and suggested framework—I really respect your history of thinking deeply about this issue, and I’m sure you understand it far better than me. I read some of your posts and @trammell’s post to try and inform myself about this issue and I confess that my understanding is partial at best.
When I say “intense or bigger sized” I’m talking about the experience, not the behaviour which may or may not approximate/indicate the experience. I might be thinking more along the lines of your “gradations in moral weight”, or Trammell’s “Experience size” concept.
Regardless of the framework I do believe that animals’ experience when a similar behaviour to a human is displaced, is likely less “intense or bigger sized” than a human and so there could possibly be some kind of discount applied. I also acknowledge like you and RP that there’s a smallish chance that some or all animals might be experiencing more.
Ah sorry, I should have read more carefully. You were clearly referring to the intensity or size of the experience, not of the behaviour. 4 hours of sleep and commenting before going to the airport. :P
I wrote more about experience size in the comments on trammell’s post.
Glad to see you found my post thought-provoking, but let me emphasize that my own understanding is also partial at best, to put it mildly!
I also left a comment related to neuron counts and things similar to experience size in point 2 here.