Masrani seems to take (some of) Greaves and MacAskillās examples and tentative views about what strong longtermism might indicate one should prioritise as a logically necessary consequence of the moral view itself. In particular, Masrani seems to assume that longtermism necessarily focuses solely on existential risk reduction. But this is actually incorrect.
E.g., Masrani writes: āThis assumption is why longtermism states it is always better to work on x-risks than anything else one might want to do to improve the short-term.ā
But in reality, what strong longtermism would say one should prioritise depends on various empirical features of the world, as well as aspects of oneās philosophical views other than strong longtermism itself (e.g., oneās views on population ethics).
Masrani also seems to have not noticed that Greaves and MacAskillās paper itself notes some things other than existential risk reduction which could be priorities under a strong longtermist perspective, and which could align more with the sort of things GiveWell supports.
Masrani seems to take (some of) Greaves and MacAskillās examples and tentative views about what strong longtermism might indicate one should prioritise as a logically necessary consequence of the moral view itself. In particular, Masrani seems to assume that longtermism necessarily focuses solely on existential risk reduction. But this is actually incorrect.
E.g., Masrani writes: āThis assumption is why longtermism states it is always better to work on x-risks than anything else one might want to do to improve the short-term.ā
But in reality, what strong longtermism would say one should prioritise depends on various empirical features of the world, as well as aspects of oneās philosophical views other than strong longtermism itself (e.g., oneās views on population ethics).
I think the main two contenders for alternative longtermist priorities are (1) trajectory changes other than existential risks and (2) speeding up development/āprogress.
Masrani also seems to have not noticed that Greaves and MacAskillās paper itself notes some things other than existential risk reduction which could be priorities under a strong longtermist perspective, and which could align more with the sort of things GiveWell supports.
E.g., speeding up progress.