The universe/multiverse may be very large and (in the fullness of time) may contain a vast number of beings that we should care about and that we (and other civilizations similar to us) may be able to help in some way by using our cosmic endowment wisely. So person-affecting views seem to prescribe the standard maxipok strategy (see also The Precipice by Toby Ord).
[EDIT: by “we should care” I mean something like “we would care if we knew all the facts and had a lot of time to reflect”.]
I think you might not have clocked the OP’s comment that the morally relevant being as just those that exist whatever we do, which would presumably rule out concerns for lives in the far future.*
*Pedantry: there could actually be future aliens who exist whatever we do now. Suppose some aliens will turn up on Earth in 1 million years and we’ve had no interaction with them. They will be ‘necessary’ from our perspective and thus the type of person-affecting view stated would conclude such people matter.**
**Further pedantry: if our actions changed their children, which they presumably would, it would just be the first generation of extraterrestrial visitors who mattered morally on this view.
It doesn’t seem like mere pedantry if it requires substantial revision of the view to retain the same action recommendations. Symmetric person-affecting total utilitarianism does look to be dominated by these sorts of possibilities of large stocks of necessary beings without some other change. I’m curious what your take on the issues raised in that post is.
I think you might not have clocked the OP’s comment that the morally relevant being as just those that exist whatever we do, which would presumably rule out concerns for lives in the far future.*
What I tried to say is that the spacetime of the universe(s) may contain a vast number of sentient beings regardless of what we do. Therefore, achieving existential security and having something like a Long Reflection may allow us to help a vast number of sentient beings (including ones outside our future light cone).
**Further pedantry: if our actions changed their children, which they presumably would, it would just be the first generation of extraterrestrial visitors who mattered morally on this view.
I think we’re not interpreting the person-affecting view described in the OP in the same way. The way I understand the view (and the OP is welcome to correct me if I’m wrong) it entails we ought to improve the well-being of the extraterrestrial visitors’ children (regardless of whether our actions changed them / caused their existence).
oh wow, this made me updated towards caring about people in the future even if the person-affecting view is true (because we might not change their existence if they are both in the future *and* in a far away location)
Hey there!
The universe/multiverse may be very large and (in the fullness of time) may contain a vast number of beings that we should care about and that we (and other civilizations similar to us) may be able to help in some way by using our cosmic endowment wisely. So person-affecting views seem to prescribe the standard maxipok strategy (see also The Precipice by Toby Ord).
[EDIT: by “we should care” I mean something like “we would care if we knew all the facts and had a lot of time to reflect”.]
I think you might not have clocked the OP’s comment that the morally relevant being as just those that exist whatever we do, which would presumably rule out concerns for lives in the far future.*
*Pedantry: there could actually be future aliens who exist whatever we do now. Suppose some aliens will turn up on Earth in 1 million years and we’ve had no interaction with them. They will be ‘necessary’ from our perspective and thus the type of person-affecting view stated would conclude such people matter.**
**Further pedantry: if our actions changed their children, which they presumably would, it would just be the first generation of extraterrestrial visitors who mattered morally on this view.
It doesn’t seem like mere pedantry if it requires substantial revision of the view to retain the same action recommendations. Symmetric person-affecting total utilitarianism does look to be dominated by these sorts of possibilities of large stocks of necessary beings without some other change. I’m curious what your take on the issues raised in that post is.
What I tried to say is that the spacetime of the universe(s) may contain a vast number of sentient beings regardless of what we do. Therefore, achieving existential security and having something like a Long Reflection may allow us to help a vast number of sentient beings (including ones outside our future light cone).
I think we’re not interpreting the person-affecting view described in the OP in the same way. The way I understand the view (and the OP is welcome to correct me if I’m wrong) it entails we ought to improve the well-being of the extraterrestrial visitors’ children (regardless of whether our actions changed them / caused their existence).
oh wow, this made me updated towards caring about people in the future even if the person-affecting view is true (because we might not change their existence if they are both in the future *and* in a far away location)