I think most people (I would say over 99 percent outside of EA) would consider avoiding saving the lives of the poorest and most disadvantaged humans because they might make animals suffer, while rich countries continue to cause most animal suffering a “conventionally highly immoral and norm-breaking action.”, thus meeting your second criteria.
I also think most people (although perhaps not over 95 percent) would consider this pursuing utilitarianism through ruthless means.
To perhaps labour the point, the idea saving the lives of really poor people is a good thing, is a pretty strong conventional norm, even if most people don’t take that seriously enough to do much about it.
Stopping doing something is still an action.
So for me at least this meets your criteria for naive utilitarianism.
I’d distinguish here between actions and reasons for action. The action is not conventionally immoral, but the reason for action is. I think this is probably a significant distinction, though how it is significant doesn’t feel very clear to me.
I don’t understand this distinction really, but I’m not great at the nuances of moral philosophy. Which action do you not think is “conventionally immoral?”
Thanks yes that’s an interesting one. I understand the situation now and maybe it does matter to some degree, although like you I cant understand how it to what degree.
I think if you ask people a question like “do you think it’s immoral to stop giving to global health charities because they may peoples lives they may harm animals” then almost everyone would consider that conventionally immoral.
If you ask people “do you think it’s immoral to choose not stop giving to charities which save peoples lives” that might slip through as not immoral yes, but only because people would automatically assume other reasons for not taking that action.
In any case though, I think what I mostly object to isn’t the claim that if you endorse Vasco’s reasoning because you are a utilitarian that counts as “naive”, but rather the use of the “naive utilitarian” label to imply that his reasoning:
a) is distinctively utilitarian rather than being compatible with a variety of moral views
b) commits you to being prepared to use violence/deception.
I think most people (I would say over 99 percent outside of EA) would consider avoiding saving the lives of the poorest and most disadvantaged humans because they might make animals suffer, while rich countries continue to cause most animal suffering a “conventionally highly immoral and norm-breaking action.”, thus meeting your second criteria.
I also think most people (although perhaps not over 95 percent) would consider this pursuing utilitarianism through ruthless means.
To perhaps labour the point, the idea saving the lives of really poor people is a good thing, is a pretty strong conventional norm, even if most people don’t take that seriously enough to do much about it.
Stopping doing something is still an action.
So for me at least this meets your criteria for naive utilitarianism.
I’d distinguish here between actions and reasons for action. The action is not conventionally immoral, but the reason for action is. I think this is probably a significant distinction, though how it is significant doesn’t feel very clear to me.
I don’t understand this distinction really, but I’m not great at the nuances of moral philosophy. Which action do you not think is “conventionally immoral?”
Not giving to global health charities.
Thanks yes that’s an interesting one. I understand the situation now and maybe it does matter to some degree, although like you I cant understand how it to what degree.
I think if you ask people a question like “do you think it’s immoral to stop giving to global health charities because they may peoples lives they may harm animals” then almost everyone would consider that conventionally immoral.
If you ask people “do you think it’s immoral to choose not stop giving to charities which save peoples lives” that might slip through as not immoral yes, but only because people would automatically assume other reasons for not taking that action.
In any case though, I think what I mostly object to isn’t the claim that if you endorse Vasco’s reasoning because you are a utilitarian that counts as “naive”, but rather the use of the “naive utilitarian” label to imply that his reasoning:
a) is distinctively utilitarian rather than being compatible with a variety of moral views
b) commits you to being prepared to use violence/deception.
I would probably agree with that, but I was responding to your criteria above, in which case I think it meets your “Naive utilitarian” citeria.