[Apologies for length, but I think these points are worth sharing in full.]
As someone who is highly sympathetic to the procreation asymmetry, I have to say, I still found this post quite moving. Iāve had, and continue to have, joys profound enough to know the sense of awe youāre gesturing at. If there were no costs, Iād want those joys to be shared by new beings too.
Unfortunately, assuming that weāre talking about practically relevant cases where creating a āhappyā life also entails suffering of the created person and other beings, there are costs in expectation. (I assume no one has moral objections to creating utterly flawless lives, so the former is the sense in which I read āneutrality.ā See also this comment. Please let me know if Iāve misunderstood.) And I find those costs qualitatively more serious than the benefits. Let me see if I can convey where Iām coming from.
I found it surprising that you wrote:
I have refrained, overall, from framing the preceding discussion in specifically moral terms ā implying, for example, that I am obligated to create Michael, instead of going on my walk. I think I have reasons to create Michael that have to do with the significance of living forMichael; but thatās not yet to say, for example, that I owe it to Michael to create him, or that I am wronging Michael if I donāt.
Because to me this is exactly the heart of the asymmetry. Itās uncontroversial that creating a person with a bad life inflicts on them a serious moral wrong. Those of us who endorse the asymmetry donāt see such a moral wrong involved in not creating a happy life. (If one is a welfarist consequentialist, a fortiori this calls into question the idea that the uncreated happy person is āwrongedā in any prudential sense.)
To flesh that out a bit: You acknowledged, in sketching out Michaelās hypothetical life, these pains:
I see a fight with that same woman, a sense of betrayal, months of regret. ā¦ I see him on his deathbed ā¦ cancer blooming in his stomach
When I imagine the prospect of creating Michael, these moments weigh pretty gravely. I feel the pang of knowing just how utterly crushing a conflict with the most important person in oneās life can be; the pit in the gut, the fear, shock, and desperation. I havenāt had cancer, but I at least know the fear of death, and can only imagine it gets more haunting when one actually expects to die soon. By all reports, cancer is clearly a fate I couldnāt possibly wish on anyone, and suffering it slowly in a hospital sounds nothing short of harrowing.
I simply canāt comprehend creating those moments in good conscience, short of preventing greater pain broadly construed. It seems cruel to do so. By contrast, although Michael-while-happy would feel grateful to exist, it doesnāt seem cruel to me at all to not invite his nonexistent self to the āparty,ā in your words. As you acknowledge, the objection is that āif [he] hadnāt been created, [he] wouldnāt exist, and there would be no one that [my] choice was āworse for.āā I donāt see a strong enough reason to think the Michael-while-happy experiences override the Michael-while-miserable experiences, given the difference in moral gravity. It seems cold comfort to tell the moments of Michael that beg for relief, āIām sorry for the pain I gave you, but itās worth it for the party to come.ā
I feel inclined, not to ādisagreeā with them, but rather to inform them that they are wrong
Likewise I feel inclined to inform the Michael-creators that they are wrong, in implicitly claiming that the majority vote of Michael-while-happy can override the pleas of Michael-while-miserable. Make no mistake, I abhor scope neglect. But this is not a question of ignoring numbers, any more than someone who would not torture a person for any number of beautiful lifeless planets created in a corner of the universe where no one could ever observe them. Itās about prioritizing needs over wants, the tragic over the precious.
Lastly, you mention the golden rule as part of your case. I personally would not want to be forced by anyoneāincluding my past self, who often acts in a state of myopia and doesnāt remember how awful the worst moments areāto suffer terribly because they judged it was worth it for the goods in life.
I do of course have some moral uncertainty on this. There are some counterintuitive implications to the view I sketched here. But I wouldnāt say this is an unnecessary addition to the hardness of population ethics.
Because to me this is exactly the heart of the asymmetry. Itās uncontroversial that creating a person with a bad life inflicts on them a serious moral wrong. Those of us who endorse the asymmetry donāt see such a moral wrong involved in not creating a happy life.
+1. I think many who have asymmetric sympathies might say that there is a strong aesthetic pull to bringing about a life like Michaelās, but that there is an overriding moral responsibility not to create intense suffering.
Itās uncontroversial that creating a person with a bad life inflicts on them a serious moral wrong.
This seems possibly true to me, but not obviously the case, and definitely not uncontroversial. I would guess many people who lived unfortunate lives would nonetheless disagree that their parents inflicted a moral wrong upon them by conceiving them. Similarly, I donāt think I have ever heard anyone suggest that children who suffer at the hands of abusers or terrorists were first wronged, not by their tormentor, but by their parents. Even in bleak circumstances, so long as the parents didnāt intend to make things bad for the children, I think most people would refrain from such a judgement.
Maybe this is just an ex post vs. ex ante distinction? If children with unfortunate lives think they just got unlucky and think their lives would have been positive in expectancy, they might not think that their parents did anything morally wrong. But they might feel differently if the parents knew their children would have a very serious genetic medical condition.
(But this is wild speculation, I have not checked for any empirical data on this.)
I guess it was unclear that here I was assuming that the creator knows with certainty all the evaluative contents of the life theyāre creating. (As in the Wilbur and Michael thought experiments.) I would be surprised if anyone disagreed that creating a life you know wonāt be worth living, assuming no other effects, is wrong. But Iād agree that the claim about lives not worth living in expectation isnāt uncontroversial, though I endorse it.
[Apologies for length, but I think these points are worth sharing in full.]
As someone who is highly sympathetic to the procreation asymmetry, I have to say, I still found this post quite moving. Iāve had, and continue to have, joys profound enough to know the sense of awe youāre gesturing at. If there were no costs, Iād want those joys to be shared by new beings too.
Unfortunately, assuming that weāre talking about practically relevant cases where creating a āhappyā life also entails suffering of the created person and other beings, there are costs in expectation. (I assume no one has moral objections to creating utterly flawless lives, so the former is the sense in which I read āneutrality.ā See also this comment. Please let me know if Iāve misunderstood.) And I find those costs qualitatively more serious than the benefits. Let me see if I can convey where Iām coming from.
I found it surprising that you wrote:
Because to me this is exactly the heart of the asymmetry. Itās uncontroversial that creating a person with a bad life inflicts on them a serious moral wrong. Those of us who endorse the asymmetry donāt see such a moral wrong involved in not creating a happy life. (If one is a welfarist consequentialist, a fortiori this calls into question the idea that the uncreated happy person is āwrongedā in any prudential sense.)
To flesh that out a bit: You acknowledged, in sketching out Michaelās hypothetical life, these pains:
When I imagine the prospect of creating Michael, these moments weigh pretty gravely. I feel the pang of knowing just how utterly crushing a conflict with the most important person in oneās life can be; the pit in the gut, the fear, shock, and desperation. I havenāt had cancer, but I at least know the fear of death, and can only imagine it gets more haunting when one actually expects to die soon. By all reports, cancer is clearly a fate I couldnāt possibly wish on anyone, and suffering it slowly in a hospital sounds nothing short of harrowing.
I simply canāt comprehend creating those moments in good conscience, short of preventing greater pain broadly construed. It seems cruel to do so. By contrast, although Michael-while-happy would feel grateful to exist, it doesnāt seem cruel to me at all to not invite his nonexistent self to the āparty,ā in your words. As you acknowledge, the objection is that āif [he] hadnāt been created, [he] wouldnāt exist, and there would be no one that [my] choice was āworse for.āā I donāt see a strong enough reason to think the Michael-while-happy experiences override the Michael-while-miserable experiences, given the difference in moral gravity. It seems cold comfort to tell the moments of Michael that beg for relief, āIām sorry for the pain I gave you, but itās worth it for the party to come.ā
Likewise I feel inclined to inform the Michael-creators that they are wrong, in implicitly claiming that the majority vote of Michael-while-happy can override the pleas of Michael-while-miserable. Make no mistake, I abhor scope neglect. But this is not a question of ignoring numbers, any more than someone who would not torture a person for any number of beautiful lifeless planets created in a corner of the universe where no one could ever observe them. Itās about prioritizing needs over wants, the tragic over the precious.
Lastly, you mention the golden rule as part of your case. I personally would not want to be forced by anyoneāincluding my past self, who often acts in a state of myopia and doesnāt remember how awful the worst moments areāto suffer terribly because they judged it was worth it for the goods in life.
I do of course have some moral uncertainty on this. There are some counterintuitive implications to the view I sketched here. But I wouldnāt say this is an unnecessary addition to the hardness of population ethics.
+1. I think many who have asymmetric sympathies might say that there is a strong aesthetic pull to bringing about a life like Michaelās, but that there is an overriding moral responsibility not to create intense suffering.
This seems possibly true to me, but not obviously the case, and definitely not uncontroversial. I would guess many people who lived unfortunate lives would nonetheless disagree that their parents inflicted a moral wrong upon them by conceiving them. Similarly, I donāt think I have ever heard anyone suggest that children who suffer at the hands of abusers or terrorists were first wronged, not by their tormentor, but by their parents. Even in bleak circumstances, so long as the parents didnāt intend to make things bad for the children, I think most people would refrain from such a judgement.
Maybe this is just an ex post vs. ex ante distinction? If children with unfortunate lives think they just got unlucky and think their lives would have been positive in expectancy, they might not think that their parents did anything morally wrong. But they might feel differently if the parents knew their children would have a very serious genetic medical condition.
(But this is wild speculation, I have not checked for any empirical data on this.)
I guess it was unclear that here I was assuming that the creator knows with certainty all the evaluative contents of the life theyāre creating. (As in the Wilbur and Michael thought experiments.) I would be surprised if anyone disagreed that creating a life you know wonāt be worth living, assuming no other effects, is wrong. But Iād agree that the claim about lives not worth living in expectation isnāt uncontroversial, though I endorse it.
[edit: Denise beat me to the punch :)]