Does experientialist minimalism imply that being murdered painlessly is always good for the person who is murdered? Does it imply that being painfully murdered is good for the person murdered, provided that the pain involved is less than the total expected pain they would otherwise have experienced? Note that Iâm not asking whether the view implies you should murder people, all things considered, just about what its axiology implies is in the self-interest of the potential murder victim alone. (Obviously, minimalist views which are about avoiding frustrated preferences, regardless of whether the frustration is experienced donât have trouble here.)
If so the view has very repugnant implication about, for example, what was in the interest of, to choose one somewhat emotive example, young children shot by the Nazis during the holocaust. Or at least, I find it repugnant to think that killing those children probably did them a favor, as individuals, independently of whether the view endorses the killing as morally right. It seems to take away their status as having been wronged, even if the action itself was wrong. Instead, the (all-things-considered) victims of the action become only those harmed by indirect effects.
Varieties of experientialist minimalist views that are overlooked in this piece
I think the definition of experientialist minimalism employed in the post is in need of elaboration, as it seems that there are in fact minimalist experientialist views that would not necessarily have the implications that you inquire about, yet these views appear to differ from the experientialist minimalist views considered in the post.
To give an example, one could think that what matters is only the reduction of experiential disvalue (and thereby be an experientialist minimalist), but then further hold that the disvalue of the experiences in a life must be evaluated in light of the total experiential contents of a life, as opposed to evaluating it in reductionist terms that allow us to always judge the disvalue of individual experiences in isolation, without regard to context. (I suspect that Teo implicitly assumes the latter view, though he can obviously best answer for himself.)
In particular, one could hold that a painful experience of toiling toward some end will have greater disvalue if the end goal is never realized (these experientialist views could thus have a lot in common with preference-based views). Or one could think that painful experiences in a life that does not contain certain experiences later, e.g. experiences of learning, are worse than otherwise, even if those ameliorating experiences were never desired by the subject (these experientialist views could thus also have a lot in common with objective-list views). This approach to evaluating experiences seems similar to how some views will assign negative value to sadistic pleasures, in that context is taken to matter to the value or disvalue of experiences.
Regardless of whether these âcontext-sensitiveâ experientialist views are plausible, it seems that, as a conceptual matter, the post would have benefited from clarifying whether they are excluded from its scope, as they seem to be (I share responsibility for this omission, since I gave extensive feedback on the post). [ETA: The post now does include a note on this, âRelatedly, I further assume âŚâ]
(As for the substantive plausibility of such âcontext-sensitiveâ experientialist minimalist views, Iâm not sure whether such views would fare better or worse than, say, preference-based views, but then I admittedly havenât thought much about their comparative strengths and weaknesses.)
The Epicurean view: Existing defenses
On the general question of whether beings can be harmed by death, itâs worth noting that this is, of course, a question that has been elaborately discussed in the literature. And the view that death cannot be bad for the being who dies â i.e. the Epicurean view â has been defended in modern times in, for example, Rosenbaum, 1986 and Hol, 2019. (But again, itâs worth stressing that death can still be extremely bad for instrumental reasons, even if one grants the Epicurean view.)
Comparative repugnance
Lastly, concerning the plausibility of experientialist views that assign (dis)value to individual experiences in isolation, without regard to context, I think one can reasonably argue that minimalist versions of these views still overall have less repugnant implications than do the contrasting offsetting experientialist views (see e.g. here and here). (The comparison between minimalist and offsetting experientialist views seems relevant here since experientialist views appear to be popular in EA, cf. the EA Survey; I realize that experientialist offsetting views werenât claimed to be more plausible than experientialist minimalist views in the comment above.)
In particular, if we use emotive examples in order to stress-test minimalist versions of these views, then we should presumably also be willing to use emotive examples to stress-test corresponding offsetting views, such as examples involving, say, a group associated with atrocious evil that forces individuals into experience machines in which these individuals experience a large amount of bliss after which they are tortured to death, yet where the bliss outweighs the torture on the offsetting view under consideration. It likewise seems repugnant â in my view considerably more repugnant â to think that such a group of actors would be doing the forced individuals a favor.
So among experientialist views, it seems plausible (to me at least) to claim that minimalist views are the least repugnant, all things considered. And the same arguably goes for preference-based axiological views (as argued here and here).
Asserting (as epicurean views do) death is not bad (in itself) for the being that dies is one thing. Asserting (as the views under discussion do) that death (in itself) is goodâand ongoing survival badâfor the being that dies is quite another.
Besides its divergence from virtually everyoneâs expressed beliefs and general behaviour, it doesnât seem to fare much better under deliberate reflection. For the sake of a less emotionally charged variant of Mathersâ example, responses to the Singerâs shallow pond case along the lines of, âI shouldnât step in, because my non-intervention is in the childâs best interest: the normal life they could âenjoyâ if they survive accrues more suffering in expectation than their imminent drowningâ appear deranged.
Asserting (as epicurean views do) death is not bad (in itself) for the being that dies is one thing.
But Epicureans tend to defend a stronger claim, namely that there is nothing suboptimal about death â or rather, about being dead â for the being who dies (which is consistent with Epicurean views of wellbeing). I believe this is the view defended in Hol, 2019.
Asserting (as the views under discussion do) that death (in itself) is good
But death is not good in itself on any of the views under discussion. First, death in itself has no value or disvalue on any of these views. Second, using the word âgoodâ is arguably misleading, since death (in terms of its counterfactual effects) can at most be less bad on minimalist views:
The death is only âgoodâ in the sense that, for example, we might say that it was âgoodâ that a moose who had been hit by a car was euthanized (assuming the moose would otherwise have died more painfully). It is more clear and charitable to use the phrase âless bad.â
Besides its [i.e. experientialist minimalismâs] divergence from virtually everyoneâs expressed beliefs and general behaviour
This may be too strong a statement. For instance, it seems that there is a considerable number of Buddhists (and others) who at least express, and aspire to act in alignment with, views centered on the minimization of suffering.
Regardless, I donât think divergence from most peopleâs behavior is a strong point against any given axiology. After all, most peopleâs behavior is inconsistent with impartial axiologies/âethics in general, as well as with classical utilitarian axiology/âethics in particular, even in their prudential concerns. As one would expect, we mostly seem to optimize for biological and social drives rather than for any reflectively endorsed axiology.
For the sake of a less emotionally charged variant of Mathersâ example, responses to the Singerâs shallow pond case along the lines of, âI shouldnât step in, because my non-intervention is in the childâs best interest: the normal life they could âenjoyâ if they survive accrues more suffering in expectation than their imminent drowningâ appear deranged.
As Teo has essentially spent much of his sequence arguing, minimalist axiologies would strongly agree that such a response is extremely implausible in any practically relevant case, for many reasons: it overlooks the positive roles of the childâs continued existence, the utility of strong norms of helping and protecting life, the value of trying to reduce clear and present suffering, etc. (Just to clarify that important point. I realize that there likely was an implicit âother things equalâ qualification in that thought experiment, but itâs arguably critical to make that radical assumption explicit.)
Additionally, minimalist axiology is compatible with moral duties or moral rights that would require us to help and protect others, which is another way in which someone who endorses an experientialist minimalist axiology may agree that it is wrong not to help.
In any case, the thought experiment above seems to ignore the question of comparative repugnance. For starters, a contrasting axiology such as CU would imply that it would be better to let the child drown (in the other things equal, isolated case) if the rest of the childâs life were going to be overall slightly ânet negativeâ otherwise (as we can stipulate that it would be in the hypothetical case weâre considering). This also seems repugnant.
Yet CU is subject to far more repugnant implications of this kind. For example, assume that other things are equal, and imagine that we walk past a person who is experiencing the most extreme suffering â suffering so extreme that the sufferer in that moment will give anything to make it stop. Imagine that we can readily step in and stop this suffering, in which case the person we are saving will live an untroubled life for the rest of their days. Otherwise, the sufferer will continue to experience extreme, incessant suffering, followed, eventually, by a large amount of bliss that according to CU would outweigh the suffering. (This is somewhat analogous to the first thought experiment found here.)
CU would say that it is better to leave that person to continue to be tormented for the sake of the eventual bliss, even though the person would rather be freed from the extreme suffering while in that state.
Is that a less repugnant implication?
In general, it seems important to compare the repugnant conclusions of different views. And as Teo has recently argued, when we compare the most repugnant conclusions of different views in population ethics, minimalist views are arguably less repugnant than offsetting views.
Does experientialist minimalism imply that being murdered painlessly is always good for the person who is murdered? Does it imply that being painfully murdered is good for the person murdered, provided that the pain involved is less than the total expected pain they would otherwise have experienced? Note that Iâm not asking whether the view implies you should murder people, all things considered, just about what its axiology implies is in the self-interest of the potential murder victim alone. (Obviously, minimalist views which are about avoiding frustrated preferences, regardless of whether the frustration is experienced donât have trouble here.)
If so the view has very repugnant implication about, for example, what was in the interest of, to choose one somewhat emotive example, young children shot by the Nazis during the holocaust. Or at least, I find it repugnant to think that killing those children probably did them a favor, as individuals, independently of whether the view endorses the killing as morally right. It seems to take away their status as having been wronged, even if the action itself was wrong. Instead, the (all-things-considered) victims of the action become only those harmed by indirect effects.
Varieties of experientialist minimalist views that are overlooked in this piece
I think the definition of experientialist minimalism employed in the post is in need of elaboration, as it seems that there are in fact minimalist experientialist views that would not necessarily have the implications that you inquire about, yet these views appear to differ from the experientialist minimalist views considered in the post.
To give an example, one could think that what matters is only the reduction of experiential disvalue (and thereby be an experientialist minimalist), but then further hold that the disvalue of the experiences in a life must be evaluated in light of the total experiential contents of a life, as opposed to evaluating it in reductionist terms that allow us to always judge the disvalue of individual experiences in isolation, without regard to context. (I suspect that Teo implicitly assumes the latter view, though he can obviously best answer for himself.)
In particular, one could hold that a painful experience of toiling toward some end will have greater disvalue if the end goal is never realized (these experientialist views could thus have a lot in common with preference-based views). Or one could think that painful experiences in a life that does not contain certain experiences later, e.g. experiences of learning, are worse than otherwise, even if those ameliorating experiences were never desired by the subject (these experientialist views could thus also have a lot in common with objective-list views). This approach to evaluating experiences seems similar to how some views will assign negative value to sadistic pleasures, in that context is taken to matter to the value or disvalue of experiences.
Regardless of whether these âcontext-sensitiveâ experientialist views are plausible, it seems that, as a conceptual matter, the post would have benefited from clarifying whether they are excluded from its scope, as they seem to be (I share responsibility for this omission, since I gave extensive feedback on the post). [ETA: The post now does include a note on this, âRelatedly, I further assume âŚâ]
(As for the substantive plausibility of such âcontext-sensitiveâ experientialist minimalist views, Iâm not sure whether such views would fare better or worse than, say, preference-based views, but then I admittedly havenât thought much about their comparative strengths and weaknesses.)
The Epicurean view: Existing defenses
On the general question of whether beings can be harmed by death, itâs worth noting that this is, of course, a question that has been elaborately discussed in the literature. And the view that death cannot be bad for the being who dies â i.e. the Epicurean view â has been defended in modern times in, for example, Rosenbaum, 1986 and Hol, 2019. (But again, itâs worth stressing that death can still be extremely bad for instrumental reasons, even if one grants the Epicurean view.)
Comparative repugnance
Lastly, concerning the plausibility of experientialist views that assign (dis)value to individual experiences in isolation, without regard to context, I think one can reasonably argue that minimalist versions of these views still overall have less repugnant implications than do the contrasting offsetting experientialist views (see e.g. here and here). (The comparison between minimalist and offsetting experientialist views seems relevant here since experientialist views appear to be popular in EA, cf. the EA Survey; I realize that experientialist offsetting views werenât claimed to be more plausible than experientialist minimalist views in the comment above.)
In particular, if we use emotive examples in order to stress-test minimalist versions of these views, then we should presumably also be willing to use emotive examples to stress-test corresponding offsetting views, such as examples involving, say, a group associated with atrocious evil that forces individuals into experience machines in which these individuals experience a large amount of bliss after which they are tortured to death, yet where the bliss outweighs the torture on the offsetting view under consideration. It likewise seems repugnant â in my view considerably more repugnant â to think that such a group of actors would be doing the forced individuals a favor.
So among experientialist views, it seems plausible (to me at least) to claim that minimalist views are the least repugnant, all things considered. And the same arguably goes for preference-based axiological views (as argued here and here).
Asserting (as epicurean views do) death is not bad (in itself) for the being that dies is one thing. Asserting (as the views under discussion do) that death (in itself) is goodâand ongoing survival badâfor the being that dies is quite another.
Besides its divergence from virtually everyoneâs expressed beliefs and general behaviour, it doesnât seem to fare much better under deliberate reflection. For the sake of a less emotionally charged variant of Mathersâ example, responses to the Singerâs shallow pond case along the lines of, âI shouldnât step in, because my non-intervention is in the childâs best interest: the normal life they could âenjoyâ if they survive accrues more suffering in expectation than their imminent drowningâ appear deranged.
But Epicureans tend to defend a stronger claim, namely that there is nothing suboptimal about death â or rather, about being dead â for the being who dies (which is consistent with Epicurean views of wellbeing). I believe this is the view defended in Hol, 2019.
But death is not good in itself on any of the views under discussion. First, death in itself has no value or disvalue on any of these views. Second, using the word âgoodâ is arguably misleading, since death (in terms of its counterfactual effects) can at most be less bad on minimalist views:
This may be too strong a statement. For instance, it seems that there is a considerable number of Buddhists (and others) who at least express, and aspire to act in alignment with, views centered on the minimization of suffering.
Regardless, I donât think divergence from most peopleâs behavior is a strong point against any given axiology. After all, most peopleâs behavior is inconsistent with impartial axiologies/âethics in general, as well as with classical utilitarian axiology/âethics in particular, even in their prudential concerns. As one would expect, we mostly seem to optimize for biological and social drives rather than for any reflectively endorsed axiology.
As Teo has essentially spent much of his sequence arguing, minimalist axiologies would strongly agree that such a response is extremely implausible in any practically relevant case, for many reasons: it overlooks the positive roles of the childâs continued existence, the utility of strong norms of helping and protecting life, the value of trying to reduce clear and present suffering, etc. (Just to clarify that important point. I realize that there likely was an implicit âother things equalâ qualification in that thought experiment, but itâs arguably critical to make that radical assumption explicit.)
Additionally, minimalist axiology is compatible with moral duties or moral rights that would require us to help and protect others, which is another way in which someone who endorses an experientialist minimalist axiology may agree that it is wrong not to help.
In any case, the thought experiment above seems to ignore the question of comparative repugnance. For starters, a contrasting axiology such as CU would imply that it would be better to let the child drown (in the other things equal, isolated case) if the rest of the childâs life were going to be overall slightly ânet negativeâ otherwise (as we can stipulate that it would be in the hypothetical case weâre considering). This also seems repugnant.
Yet CU is subject to far more repugnant implications of this kind. For example, assume that other things are equal, and imagine that we walk past a person who is experiencing the most extreme suffering â suffering so extreme that the sufferer in that moment will give anything to make it stop. Imagine that we can readily step in and stop this suffering, in which case the person we are saving will live an untroubled life for the rest of their days. Otherwise, the sufferer will continue to experience extreme, incessant suffering, followed, eventually, by a large amount of bliss that according to CU would outweigh the suffering. (This is somewhat analogous to the first thought experiment found here.)
CU would say that it is better to leave that person to continue to be tormented for the sake of the eventual bliss, even though the person would rather be freed from the extreme suffering while in that state.
Is that a less repugnant implication?
In general, it seems important to compare the repugnant conclusions of different views. And as Teo has recently argued, when we compare the most repugnant conclusions of different views in population ethics, minimalist views are arguably less repugnant than offsetting views.