I had a similar question to yours about what the essay is trying to say about Givewell-style effective altruism. My interpretation, which could be wrong, was that the author is saying that Givewell-style EA is a good thing, but is not a moral obligation. I responded in a blog post (not aimed at EAs, but people who may share the same hesitancies as the author) “How do you know how to save a drowning child across the world?”.
Following from this, I think criticisms of effective altruism often end up with a conclusion that is too far in the other direction: the conclusion that we only have moral obligation to people in our immediate circles and thus should focus on parochial charity, a conclusion that does not leave room for moral concern and yes, even obligation,2 for the global rich to people living in poverty far from us.
I don’t think any argument that focuses solely on helping within communities that we are already in — communities that are, even in the US alone, highly segregated by income; and are globally even more vastly unequal — adequately addresses the moral ill that is global poverty.
I argue that people who might share the concerns of the author (as I understood them) about EA might want to take the option of donating to direct cash transfers or effective community-based organizations in low- and middle-income countries.
I had a similar question to yours about what the essay is trying to say about Givewell-style effective altruism. My interpretation, which could be wrong, was that the author is saying that Givewell-style EA is a good thing, but is not a moral obligation. I responded in a blog post (not aimed at EAs, but people who may share the same hesitancies as the author) “How do you know how to save a drowning child across the world?”.
I argue that people who might share the concerns of the author (as I understood them) about EA might want to take the option of donating to direct cash transfers or effective community-based organizations in low- and middle-income countries.