I agree with the comments that this post is better-informed than many EA critiques. Lots of the factual content is at least roughly correct (although lots of the judgement calls I donât agree with, e.g. how intertwined EA and rationality are in practice).
As a piece of criticism, though, I donât feel moved by it. (edit: to be clear this is not a criticism of making a linkpost here! I think itâs good to be aware of this stuff. I just want to be frank about my take on it.)
The article includes a whole series of things that sound superficially (to my imagined EA-unaware reader) significant, but it just drops them in and shows seemingly no interest in following up on them:
wait, is it really a cult or what? what would the implications of that be?
those rationality workshops sound expensive, is that a scam or something?
one of its promoters did a multi-billion dollar fraud? weâre just going to move on from that with no further comment?
wait why do they have two castles
sex redistribution for incels??
is it bad that they tried to fire Sam Altman?
why are we talking about toilet paper and none of these things
Overall it feels like they had a checklist of points to hit but donât really have much to say about them, instead preferring to remain in a purely abstract critique about the foundation of what it is to be good to another person, which a lot of the other content⌠doesnât really seem relevant to. At the end it seems decidedly confused about whether contributing to effective altruism is good or bad:
We should celebrate this work, and if more is to come, celebrate it too. But the rationalists err in seeing this all as a useful occasion to atone for our cognitive sins. And the effective altruists fail in urging us to see this as the whole story, or even the main act.
ok, but like, what is the import of that failure? the work is to be celebrated but it doesnât matter that much actually? should we, the virtuous, who consider our fellow person, donate to bednets or what?
I had a similar question to yours about what the essay is trying to say about Givewell-style effective altruism. My interpretation, which could be wrong, was that the author is saying that Givewell-style EA is a good thing, but is not a moral obligation. I responded in a blog post (not aimed at EAs, but people who may share the same hesitancies as the author) âHow do you know how to save a drowning child across the world?â.
Following from this, I think criticisms of effective altruism often end up with a conclusion that is too far in the other direction: the conclusion that we only have moral obligation to people in our immediate circles and thus should focus on parochial charity, a conclusion that does not leave room for moral concern and yes, even obligation,2 for the global rich to people living in poverty far from us.
I donât think any argument that focuses solely on helping within communities that we are already in â communities that are, even in the US alone, highly segregated by income; and are globally even more vastly unequal â adequately addresses the moral ill that is global poverty.
I argue that people who might share the concerns of the author (as I understood them) about EA might want to take the option of donating to direct cash transfers or effective community-based organizations in low- and middle-income countries.
I agree with the comments that this post is better-informed than many EA critiques. Lots of the factual content is at least roughly correct (although lots of the judgement calls I donât agree with, e.g. how intertwined EA and rationality are in practice).
As a piece of criticism, though, I donât feel moved by it. (edit: to be clear this is not a criticism of making a linkpost here! I think itâs good to be aware of this stuff. I just want to be frank about my take on it.)
The article includes a whole series of things that sound superficially (to my imagined EA-unaware reader) significant, but it just drops them in and shows seemingly no interest in following up on them:
wait, is it really a cult or what? what would the implications of that be?
those rationality workshops sound expensive, is that a scam or something?
one of its promoters did a multi-billion dollar fraud? weâre just going to move on from that with no further comment?
wait why do they have two castles
sex redistribution for incels??
is it bad that they tried to fire Sam Altman?
why are we talking about toilet paper and none of these things
Overall it feels like they had a checklist of points to hit but donât really have much to say about them, instead preferring to remain in a purely abstract critique about the foundation of what it is to be good to another person, which a lot of the other content⌠doesnât really seem relevant to. At the end it seems decidedly confused about whether contributing to effective altruism is good or bad:
ok, but like, what is the import of that failure? the work is to be celebrated but it doesnât matter that much actually? should we, the virtuous, who consider our fellow person, donate to bednets or what?
I had a similar question to yours about what the essay is trying to say about Givewell-style effective altruism. My interpretation, which could be wrong, was that the author is saying that Givewell-style EA is a good thing, but is not a moral obligation. I responded in a blog post (not aimed at EAs, but people who may share the same hesitancies as the author) âHow do you know how to save a drowning child across the world?â.
I argue that people who might share the concerns of the author (as I understood them) about EA might want to take the option of donating to direct cash transfers or effective community-based organizations in low- and middle-income countries.