Yeah, I think all of thatās right. I ended up coincidentally finding my way to a bunch of stuff about Goodhart on LW that I think is what you were referring to in another comment, and Iāve realised my explanation of the curse moved too fast and left out details. I think I was implicitly imagining that weād already adjusted for what we know about the uncertainties of the estimates of the different optionsābut that wasnāt made clear.
Iāve now removed the sentence you quote (as I think it was unnecessary there anyway), and changed my earlier claims to:
*The optimizerās curse is likely to be a pervasive problem and is worth taking seriously.
*In many situations, the curse will just indicate that weāre probably overestimating how much better (compared to the alternatives) the option we estimate is best isāit wonāt indicate that we should actually change what option we pick.
*But the curse can indicate that we should pick an option other than that which we estimate is best, if we have reason to believe that our estimate of the value of the best option is especially uncertain, and we donāt model that information.
Iāve deliberately kept the above points brief (again, see the sources linked to for further explanations and justifications). This is because those claims are only relevant to the question of when to use EPs if the optimizerās curse is a larger problem when using EPs than when using alternative approaches, and I donāt think it necessarily is.
Now, thatās not very clear, but I think itās more accurate, at least :D
I think that makes sense. Some of it is a matter of interpretation.
From one perspective, the optimizerās curse is a dramatic and challenging dilemma facing modern analysis. From another perspective, itās a rather obvious and simple artifact from poorly-done estimates.
I.E. they sometimes say that if mathamaticians realize something is possible, they consider the problem trivial. Here the optimizerās curse is considered a reasonably-well-understood phenomena, unlike some other estimation-theory questions currently being faced.
Yeah, I think all of thatās right. I ended up coincidentally finding my way to a bunch of stuff about Goodhart on LW that I think is what you were referring to in another comment, and Iāve realised my explanation of the curse moved too fast and left out details. I think I was implicitly imagining that weād already adjusted for what we know about the uncertainties of the estimates of the different optionsābut that wasnāt made clear.
Iāve now removed the sentence you quote (as I think it was unnecessary there anyway), and changed my earlier claims to:
Now, thatās not very clear, but I think itās more accurate, at least :D
I think that makes sense. Some of it is a matter of interpretation.
From one perspective, the optimizerās curse is a dramatic and challenging dilemma facing modern analysis. From another perspective, itās a rather obvious and simple artifact from poorly-done estimates.
I.E. they sometimes say that if mathamaticians realize something is possible, they consider the problem trivial. Here the optimizerās curse is considered a reasonably-well-understood phenomena, unlike some other estimation-theory questions currently being faced.