Tax Havens and the case for Tax Justice


Im­por­tant: Tax havens are a $500B/​year op­por­tu­nity due to lost tax rev­enue. At least $5B/​year is available for de­vel­op­ing coun­tries. In com­par­i­son, the world spends $2.7B/​year on malaria con­trol and erad­i­ca­tion.

Ne­glected: The tax jus­tice move­ment spends $100-200M/​year; com­pa­rable to the World Wildlife Fund. Tax Jus­tice Net­work’s bud­get is un­der $2M/​year.

Tractable: In the past 20 years, the OECD has par­tially im­ple­mented re­port­ing and ac­count­ing stan­dards to mon­i­tor and dis­close tax haven ac­tivi­ties. Full im­ple­men­ta­tion has in­vestor sup­port. Be­fore the pan­demic, a ma­jor­ity of the pub­lic in Canada, US, and UK strongly ap­proved of curb­ing tax havens. A UN Tax Con­ven­tion cov­er­ing tax havens is within reach.

Fit: Tax jus­tice is a good fit for EAs con­cerned about in­equal­ity, com­fortable with lower-qual­ity ev­i­dence than RCTs (i.e. eco­nomic data) and in­ter­ested in post-grad­u­ate stud­ies in eco­nomics, ac­count­ing, law or in­ter­na­tional policy.

Recom­men­da­tion: Tax Jus­tice Net­work is a highly effec­tive char­ity: con­sider donat­ing. Tax jus­tice is pos­si­bly a top ca­reer choice: con­sider ex­plor­ing.

I’m par­tic­u­larly grate­ful to Hauke Hille­brandt for the in­spira­tion, en­courage­ment and not-too-bru­tal feed­back. Most of the good ideas are prob­a­bly his; all the mediocre ideas are definitely mine.

Here, I pre­sent a shal­low re­view of tax havens. Tax havens are defined as “typ­i­cally small, well-gov­erned states that im­pose low or zero tax rates on for­eign in­vestors.”[1] For the sake of brevity, I will defer illicit fi­nan­cial flows to a sub­se­quent ar­ti­cle.

1. Importance

Tax havens con­tain around $12T—roughly 10% of global fi­nan­cial wealth[2]. They cost gov­ern­ments wor­ld­wide at least $500B/​year in lost tax rev­enue[3]. They are ex­ten­sively used by the rich and pow­er­ful as in­di­vi­d­u­als, as part of cor­po­rate struc­tures and via le­gal struc­tures such as trusts. The Panama Papers and Par­adise Papers data leaks and in­ves­ti­ga­tions con­firmed the ex­tent of their use.

How much of the $500B/​year would ac­crue to de­vel­op­ing coun­tries?[4]

A very con­ser­va­tive es­ti­mate for In­dia is $3B/​year or an ad­di­tional 1% of tax rev­enues; a similarly con­ser­va­tive figure for sub-Sa­haran Africa would be $4-6B/​year[5]roughly twice the to­tal spent by all par­ties on malaria con­trol and erad­i­ca­tion.[6]

2. Neglectedness

Although tax havens fea­ture in the press, books and even a 2019 film star­ring Meryl Streep, there are only a hand­ful of tax jus­tice NGOs op­er­at­ing with limited bud­gets which severely con­strain their efforts.[7]

Tax Jus­tice Net­work (TJN), founded in 2003, fo­cuses on in­ter­na­tional tax­a­tion. Their aim is for gov­ern­ments in de­vel­op­ing coun­tries to de­liver pub­lic ser­vices them­selves with­out ex­ter­nal debt — and ex­ter­nal aid.

Ex­cept for GiveWell, tax havens, tax jus­tice and do­mes­tic re­source mo­bi­liza­tion[8] have re­ceived min­i­mal at­ten­tion by the EA com­mu­nity:

  • 2 EA Fo­rum posts in 2015 and 2016 dis­cuss tax havens

  • An ar­ti­cle on 80,000 Hours from 2016 men­tions tax havens

  • An in­ter­view on 80,000 Hours from 2018 briefly touches on tax havens

  • Chap­ter 7, “Effec­tive Altru­ism, Global Poverty, and Sys­temic Change” of Effec­tive Altru­ism: Philo­soph­i­cal Is­sues (2019) dis­cusses tax justice

  • A Cen­tre for Effec­tive Altru­ism ar­ti­cle from 2019 dis­cusses tax rev­enues and do­mes­tic re­source mobilization

Main points from these ar­ti­cles and in­ter­views:

  • Tax havens de­prive de­vel­op­ing coun­tries of tax rev­enue for in­fras­truc­ture, health and ed­u­ca­tion.[9]

  • The im­pacts of tax havens are mi­s­un­der­stood and mis­rep­re­sented by blam­ing multi­na­tion­als for do­mes­tic prob­lems in de­vel­op­ing coun­tries.[10]

  • Tax havens con­tribute to an un­healthy tax avoidance arms race.[11]

  • More scrutiny should be paid to tax havens due to the flows of money out of de­vel­op­ing coun­tries into tax havens.[12]

  • Tax jus­tice is an ex­am­ple of “miss­ing mid­dle” sys­temic change: be­tween low value/​high con­fi­dence char­i­ties recom­mended by GiveWell and high value/​low con­fi­dence longter­mism (ex­is­ten­tial risk, AI).[13]

  • Tax rev­enue is em­pow­er­ing to lo­cal de­ci­sion-mak­ers since they can spend the money on their own pri­ori­ties.[14]

GiveWell in­ter­viewed Tax Jus­tice Net­work in 2017 and 2019. Key high­lights in­clude:

  • The im­pact of tax havens on de­vel­op­ing coun­tries like Kenya’s tax rev­enue is net nega­tive.[15]

  • When a de­vel­op­ing coun­try’s tax-to-GDP ra­tio rises above 15%, it passes a tip­ping point and can progress to mid­dle-in­come status

  • Public health spend­ing fi­nanced by taxes is more effec­tive and in­clu­sive than aid-fi­nanced pub­lic health

  • Effec­tive tax­a­tion fosters ac­countable gov­ern­ment. Ci­ti­zens de­mand a higher level of effec­tive­ness when gov­ern­ment is pri­mar­ily funded by their taxes in­stead of by nat­u­ral re­source wealth, aid or bor­row­ing.[16]

Ad­di­tional in­di­ca­tors:

  • the Our World in Data page on Tax­a­tion does not men­tion tax havens

  • the tax jus­tice com­mu­nity has fund­ing some­where in the or­der of $100-200M/​year[17] -- an amount com­pa­rable to in­di­vi­d­ual, in-kind and other dona­tions to the World Wildlife Fund [18]

  • TJN’s in­come is tiny: $1.7M in 2018.

3. Tractabil­ity

Tax havens have ex­isted for at least 85 years; leg­is­la­tion built and can dis­man­tle them. For ex­am­ple, in 1976, the US granted the man­u­fac­tur­ing sec­tor in Puerto Rico spe­cial tax haven sta­tus. In 1996, the US ini­ti­ated a 10-year phase­out of this spe­cial sta­tus.

In the past 20 years, re­search into tax havens and tax jus­tice has surged:

Source: Google Scholar[19]

Tax Jus­tice Net­work has started chang­ing the nar­ra­tive on tax havens. For ex­am­ple, in 2007, with help from TJN, The Guardian pub­lished the first ma­jor story on multi­na­tional tax avoidance: the ba­nana in­dus­try used tax havens to split taxes in both pro­duc­ing and con­sum­ing coun­tries by half[20].

The tax jus­tice com­mu­nity has pur­sued sev­eral poli­cies:

  • Au­to­matic Ex­change of Information

  • Ul­ti­mate Benefi­cial Ownership

  • Coun­try-by-Coun­try Re­port­ing

Au­to­matic Ex­change of In­for­ma­tion (AEOI)

His­tor­i­cally, ju­ris­dic­tions were re­quired to ask for tax in­for­ma­tion on a case-by-case ba­sis. In 2007, TJN recom­mended AEOI to the UN[21]. To date, the OECD Com­mon Re­port­ing Stan­dard has im­ple­mented par­tial AEOI: ac­cess to tax haven ju­ris­dic­tions, such as Cay­man Is­lands, is available for de­vel­oped coun­tries, but ac­cess for de­vel­op­ing coun­tries is limited. Coun­tries can pick and choose which ju­ris­dic­tions can ac­cess their tax data. Filling this gap with a UN Tax Con­ven­tion is tractable[22].

Ul­ti­mate Benefi­cial Ownership

Dis­clo­sure of the real peo­ple be­hind com­pa­nies and trusts is vi­tal to curb­ing cor­rup­tion and illicit fi­nan­cial flows. Tax havens in­hibit trans­parency since own­er­ship can be lay­ered across nu­mer­ous com­pa­nies and trusts in var­i­ous ju­ris­dic­tions. Without know­ing who the real own­ers and de­ci­sion-mak­ers are AEOI is less use­ful. I’ll cover trans­parency and illicit fi­nan­cial flows in an up­com­ing ar­ti­cle.

Coun­try-by-Coun­try Re­port­ing (CbCR)

Un­der CbCR, multi­na­tional en­ter­prises dis­close key data such as sales, ex­penses, prof­its (be­fore tax), tax ac­crued/​paid, tan­gible as­sets and num­ber of em­ploy­ees for ev­ery coun­try in which they op­er­ate. When CbCR was recom­mended as an ac­count­ing stan­dard by a TJN co-founder in 2003, the re­quest seemed in­tractable.[23]

As of 2015, the OECD im­ple­mented CbCR for dis­clo­sure to tax au­thor­i­ties.[24] The EU went a step fur­ther and man­dated pub­lic dis­clo­sure for large banks. Thanks to CbCR, more data is available to un­der­stand tax havens and eval­u­ate tax jus­tice[25]. There is more work to be done: CbCR data (GRI Stan­dard 207-4)[26] should be pub­lic for all multi­na­tion­als. In­dus­try groups, pro­fes­sional ser­vice firms and multi­na­tion­als them­selves are drag­ging their feet:

Source: Tax Jus­tice Net­work[27]

Fu­ture plans in­clude:

  • Us­ing CbCR data to test the Fi­nance Curse hy­poth­e­sis: fi­nance is a nec­es­sary el­e­ment of an econ­omy, but when it be­comes cen­tral to an econ­omy, such as a tax haven, it harms the over­all econ­omy.

  • Build con­sen­sus on com­pe­ti­tion: real com­pe­ti­tion fo­cuses on the best pub­lic ser­vices and in­fras­truc­ture. Tax/​reg­u­la­tory com­pe­ti­tion dam­ages both “win­ners” and losers and dis­torts real mar­ket com­pe­ti­tion.

  • Change the story: re­place “tax in­cen­tives are im­por­tant for in­vest­ment and growth” with “tax in­cen­tives dis­tort mar­kets im­pairing in­vest­ment and growth”.[28]

TJN has in­spired many key or­ga­ni­za­tions in the broader tax jus­tice move­ment:

  • TJN Africa – a re­search and ad­vo­cacy or­ga­ni­za­tion fo­cused on Africa

  • Global Alli­ance for Tax Jus­tice (GATJ) – an ad­vo­cacy or­ga­ni­za­tion

  • Fi­nance Un­cov­ered – a me­dia train­ing organization

  • Tax In­spec­tors Without Borders – an OECD/​UNDP part­ner­ship to train and sup­port tax in­spec­tors in de­vel­op­ing countries

Public pol­ling shows strong sup­port for curb­ing tax havens:

Sources: En­vi­ron­ics Re­search (Canada 2017)[29], Chris­tian Aid (UK 2017)[30], Hart Re­search As­so­ci­ates (USA 2013)[31]

Govern­ments such as France, Den­mark and Poland have banned firms with offshore tax havens from Covid-19 bailout funds[32]. Tax havens and tax jus­tice will likely be very tractable dur­ing the on-go­ing crisis and pro­longed re­cov­ery. As stated by the UN Sec­re­tary-Gen­eral, “A global con­sen­sus to end tax havens is es­sen­tial.”[33]

4. Fit

Tax Jus­tice is a good fit for EAs con­cerned about in­equal­ity, com­fortable with lower-qual­ity ev­i­dence than RCTs (i.e. eco­nomic data) and in­ter­ested in post-grad­u­ate stud­ies in eco­nomics, ac­count­ing, law or in­ter­na­tional policy.

5. Ob­jec­tions


Tax havens are a dis­trac­tion. The real is­sue is tax re­form via sim­plifi­ca­tion and base-broad­en­ing; how­ever, this is poli­ti­cally difficult due to sub­sidies, con­ces­sions and com­plex­ity. In a similar vein, tax­ing land value and con­sump­tion avoids tax haven is­sues.

Re­sponse: As dis­cussed above, the tax jus­tice com­mu­nity is en­gaged in sim­plifi­ca­tion and base-broad­en­ing efforts, such as AEOI and CbCR. In de­vel­op­ing coun­tries, di­rect taxes, such as prop­erty tax, are slightly prefer­able for more pub­lic health spend­ing than in­di­rect taxes, such as con­sump­tion.[34] Tax havens can be some­what of a dis­trac­tion – as I will ad­dress in fu­ture, le­gi­t­i­mate uses hide illicit fi­nan­cial flows.

Devel­op­ing Countries

Tax havens are nec­es­sary struc­tures in en­courag­ing in­vest­ment in de­vel­op­ing coun­tries[35]. Similarly, prob­lems in de­vel­op­ing coun­tries are do­mes­tic, not a re­sult of multi­na­tion­als us­ing tax havens.

Re­sponse: Agreed—de­vel­op­ing coun­tries need to build both le­gal and tax sys­tem ca­pac­ity. Devel­op­ment Fi­nanc­ing In­sti­tutes and other in­vestors re­quire de­vel­op­ing coun­tries to hon­our and en­force con­tracts and to re­frain from ar­bi­trary seizure of as­sets. Although many prob­lems are do­mes­tic, multi­na­tion­als must demon­strate they are truly de­liv­er­ing value and not sim­ply ex­tract­ing it. AEOI and CbCR help in this equa­tion; likely, tack­ling illicit fi­nan­cial flows helps even more.

US Participation

Tax havens are an in­ter­na­tional is­sue. As seen with cli­mate change, mean­ingful progress de­pends on US par­ti­ci­pa­tion.

Re­sponse: Clearly, mean­ingful progress on tax havens is more difficult with­out US par­ti­ci­pa­tion. Ac­tion on cli­mate change, such as re­new­able en­ergy, shows lo­cal and re­gional health and eco­nomic benefits ab­sent US par­ti­ci­pa­tion. Similarly, in­di­vi­d­ual coun­tries and blocs can still benefit from tax jus­tice ini­ti­a­tives with­out the US.


Tax havens pro­mote eco­nomic growth in high-tax coun­tries, es­pe­cially those lo­cated near tax havens. US multi­na­tion­als’ use of tax havens shifts tax rev­enue from for­eign gov­ern­ments to the US by re­duc­ing the for­eign tax cred­its they claim against US tax payable. As a re­sult of the 1996 Puerto Rico tax haven phase­out men­tioned above, em­ploy­ment by af­fected firms dropped not just in Puerto Rico, but in the US as a whole; af­fected firms re­duced in­vest­ment globally.[36]

Re­sponse: If curb­ing tax havens re­duces growth and taxes in de­vel­oped coun­tries for the benefit of de­vel­op­ing coun­tries, that is likely a trade-off many EAs would be will­ing to make (see be­low). Ab­bott Lab­o­ra­to­ries and other multi­na­tion­als af­fected by the Puerto Rico phase­out may have re­duced global in­vest­ment, but in­creased in­vest­ment and jobs in de­vel­op­ing coun­tries such as In­dia. Given that US dol­lars go a lot fur­ther in less de­vel­oped coun­tries, a re­duc­tion in global in­vest­ment by spe­cific firms could also re­flect bet­ter value for money.

Govern­ment Spend­ing/​Incentives

Govern­ments such as the US would spend ex­tra rev­enue poorly. In con­trast, billion­aires have funded causes that have saved mil­lions of lives[37]; thanks to tax-free in­vest­ment growth in­side tax havens, they have more money to donate to effec­tive causes. Tax havens pre­vent gov­ern­ments from over-reach­ing on taxes to fund un­pro­duc­tive and coun­ter­pro­duc­tive ini­ti­a­tives, such as mil­i­tary ad­ven­tures. Higher taxes on the rich are also bad for eco­nomic in­cen­tives.

Re­sponse: As noted above, curb­ing tax havens may re­duce gov­ern­ment rev­enue in de­vel­oped coun­tries. Even if that is not true, demo­cratic gov­ern­ments can use ad­di­tional rev­enues from curb­ing tax havens to re­duce other taxes or pay to­wards the costs of Covid-19 and the eco­nomic re­cov­ery. Higher taxes on the rich may re­duce in­cen­tives, but may in­crease over­all util­ity. Be­sides, the real benefi­cia­ries of tax havens are the providers of pro­fes­sional and fi­nan­cial ser­vices and not in­vestors who origi­nally be­came rich from pro­duc­tive ac­tivity.

6. Con­clu­sion

Even with­out delv­ing into the role tax havens play in illicit fi­nan­cial flows, their value is ques­tion­able. Tax Jus­tice Net­work is lay­ing the foun­da­tion for de­vel­op­ing coun­tries to be­come self-suffi­cient. Based on their work on tax havens alone, TJN is a highly-effec­tive char­ity. Once we con­sider their role in curb­ing illicit fi­nan­cial flows, we may see TJN rise to a top char­ity for poverty alle­vi­a­tion and gov­er­nance.

Work­ing on tax jus­tice could be a top ca­reer – stay tuned!

Fi­nally, in­creased tax rev­enue might in­crease fund­ing for ed­u­ca­tion and health, re­duce in­equal­ity, sta­bi­lize so­ciety and thereby re­duce risks from emerg­ing tech­nol­ogy. In­ter­est­ingly, bet­ter tax­a­tion (i.e. curb­ing tax avoidance) might be a spe­cial case where higher tax­a­tion might ac­tu­ally in­crease growth. This is be­cause if only some cor­po­ra­tions are avoid­ing taxes (es­pe­cially tech com­pa­nies, which can more eas­ily shift prof­its) while oth­ers are not, they have a dis­tor­tionary dis­ad­van­tage, which is eco­nom­i­cally in­effi­cient.

7. Acknowledgments

Hauke Hille­brandt; Aaron Gertler; Rob Wiblin; Bran­don Shumway; weeatquince; Mercer Shavel­son; David Lawrence.

Colin, Rob, Giles, Daniel, Se­bas­tian and all the other won­der­ful peo­ple of EA Toronto.

8. Fur­ther Read­ing

Short Ar­ti­cles

Covid-19 and the fight against tax havens: Op­por­tu­ni­ties and risks for de­vel­op­ing coun­tries
Uganda Case Study: Har­ness­ing Do­mes­tic Re­sources through Im­proved Tax Com­pli­ance by Multi­na­tional Com­pa­nies
En­hanc­ing Do­mes­tic Re­source Mo­bi­liza­tion: What are the Real Ob­sta­cles?

Long Reads

Can Stop­ping ‘Tax Dodg­ing’ by Multi­na­tional En­ter­prises Close the Gap in Fi­nance for Devel­op­ment?
Why Devel­op­ment Fi­nance In­sti­tu­tions Use Tax Havens
Tax Jus­tice Net­work An­nual Re­port 2018 (PDF)
An in­for­mal his­tory of TJN and the tax jus­tice move­ment

9. Notes

[1] Hines Jr. et al. (2016). “Multi­na­tional Firms and Tax Havens”. The Re­view of Eco­nomics and Statis­tics. 98 (4): 713–727.

[2] Dam­gaard, Pierc­ing the Veil

[3] Shax­son, Tack­ling Tax Havens

[4] Forstater, Ex­ag­ger­at­ing Multi­na­tional Tax Avoidance Does Not Help Africa

[5] In Ex­ag­ger­at­ing Multi­na­tional Tax Avoidance Does Not Help Africa, the TWZ method used gross sur­plus of all for­eign firms of $15/​cap­ita for In­dia re­sult­ing in po­ten­tial ad­di­tional tax rev­enues of $2/​cap­ita or $3B (pre­sum­ably with a 10-15% tax differ­en­tial). Us­ing World Bank 2018 data, sub-Sa­haran Africa had a gross sur­plus of $50B ($45/​cap­ita) re­sult­ing in po­ten­tial ad­di­tional tax rev­enues of $5/​cap­ita or $6B. Tax sys­tems in sub-Sa­haran Africa are pos­si­bly less effi­cient than In­dia, so the rough es­ti­mate of $4-6B has been used.

[6] WHO, Malaria: Key facts, “To­tal fund­ing for malaria con­trol and elimi­na­tion reached an es­ti­mated US$2.7 billion in 2018.”

[7] Gabriel and McElwee, “Effec­tive Altru­ism, Global Poverty, and Sys­temic Change” in Effec­tive Altru­ism: Philo­soph­i­cal Is­sues, ed. Greaves and Pum­mer (OUP, 2019), 120.

[8] USAID, Do­mes­tic Re­source Mo­bi­liza­tion: DRM does not nec­es­sar­ily mean new taxes or higher tax rates. Govern­ments of­ten see their rev­enues rise though im­proved au­dits or sim­plified filing pro­cesses. Suc­cess­ful DRM pro­grams are highly cost-effec­tive; they re­turn many times what is in­vested in them. One anal­y­sis showed rev­enue in­creases amount­ing to $20 or more for ev­ery as­sis­tance dol­lar in­vested.

[9] Wiblin, Should effec­tive al­tru­ists work on tax­a­tion of the very rich?

[10] Hille­brandt, Some ob­jec­tions and counter ar­gu­ments against global poverty/​health interventions

[11] Wiblin, What are the 10 most harm­ful jobs?

[12] Wiblin and Har­ris, A year’s worth of ed­u­ca­tion for un­der a dol­lar and other ‘best buys’ in de­vel­op­ment, from the UK aid agency’s Chief Economist

[13] Gabriel and McElwee, “Effec­tive Altru­ism, Global Poverty, and Sys­temic Change”, 123

[14] Zwane, Us­ing Ev­i­dence for Smart Im­pact In­vest­ing

[15] Rosen­berg, A con­ver­sa­tion with Alex Cob­ham, July 14, 2017

[16] Snow­den, A con­ver­sa­tion with Alex Cob­ham and Will Snell, March 22, 2019

[17] Large NGOs ac­tive in tax jus­tice such as Ox­fam, Ac­tion Aid and Chris­tian Aid have to­tal bud­gets above $1.5B/​year. Only a small por­tion (less than $100M/​year) is spent on tax jus­tice. Smaller NGOs such as TJN, Trans­parency In­ter­na­tional and Global Wit­ness have to­tal bud­gets around $100M/​year and spend a larger por­tion (25-100% each) on tax jus­tice.

[18] WWF, Fi­nan­cial Info lists $120M in in­di­vi­d­ual dona­tions and $81M in-kind and other dona­tions for FY19.

[19] More gen­eral search terms, “tax” and “eco­nomics”, are rel­a­tively sta­ble over the same pe­riod.

[20] Lawrence and Griffiths, Re­vealed: how multi­na­tional com­pa­nies avoid the tax­man

[21] UN, Re­port of the Ex­pert Group Meet­ing on “Tax Aspects of Do­mes­tic Re­source Mo­bil­i­sa­tion – A Dis­cus­sion of En­dur­ing and Emerg­ing Is­sues”

[22] Cob­ham, A UN Tax Con­ven­tion – then a U-turn

[23] Mur­phy and AABA, A Pro­posed In­ter­na­tional Ac­count­ing Stan­dard—Re­port­ing Turnover and Tax by Lo­ca­tion

[24] BEPS (Base Ero­sion and Profit Shift­ing) Ac­tion 13

[25] For ex­am­ple, see Bou­vatier and De­latte, Banks in Tax Havens: First Ev­i­dence based on Coun­try-by-Coun­try Reporting

[26] GRI, New Re­port­ing Stan­dard GRI 207: Tax 2019

[27] Cob­ham, In­vestors de­mand OECD tax trans­parency

[28] TJN, Strat­egy 2018-2021

[29] En­vi­ron­ics Re­search, Nine Out Of Ten Cana­di­ans Think It’s Mo­rally Wrong For Cana­dian Cor­po­ra­tions To Use Tax Havens: New Poll

[30] Pegg, Tax avoidance by big firms is morally wrong, say nine out of 10 in UK

[31] Hart Re­search As­so­ci­ates, Study #10840 Tax Re­form Sur­vey

[32] Bo­s­tock, France is bar­ring firms reg­istered in offshore tax havens from its gov­ern­ment coro­n­avirus bailout, fol­low­ing similar bans in Den­mark and Poland

[33] Guter­res, Tack­ling Inequal­ity: A New So­cial Con­tract for a New Era

[34] Carter and Cob­ham, Are taxes good for your health?

[35] Carter, Why Devel­op­ment Fi­nance In­sti­tu­tions Use Tax Havens

[36] Suárez Ser­rato, Un­in­tended Con­se­quences of Elimi­nat­ing Tax Havens

[37] Alexan­der, Against Against Billion­aire Philanthropy