First, thanks for writing this up. I mostly agree with the points being made, but I disgree with some of the conclusions.
Yes, the BWC is dysfunctional, and yes, it’s unlikely to materially reduce bioweapon risk below the (currently low) levels they are at today. But, as you say, it’s better for it to exist than not. I think the counterfactual here is critical. If we look at the BWC compared to other weapon bans, it’s somewhat weaker than the IAEA, though arguably stronger than the NPT, and it’s weaker than the CWC, though chemical weapons are used more. On the other hand, it’s far stronger than the ban on landmines, the ban on exploding / fragmenting bullets, etc. And one difference is obvious, and in my view central—having an annual meeting where states come to recommit and discuss progress on a ban.
I also think it’s good to have junior people attend, to give them experience with international systems. It’s a cheap convention compared to running something elsewhere focused on biorisks, and it serves that purpose well.
Additionally, the BWC is also a place (the only place?) for experts to inform State representatives and the international community of emerging risks—a function which I worry will be tested in coming years, and could be critical.
Lastly, it’s very good for states and NGOs to continue to use as a Schelling point. It has become a key place for announcing efforts towards reducing risks, which are planned beforehand in order to announce them there, and which are motivated in part because there is a place to talk about them.
Thanks good points, I don’t think we disagree directionally, perhaps just on how important some of these effects are. It feels like a very difficult epistemic problem to attribute how much the relative absence of bioweapons use is attributable to the BWC—I know roughly nothing about exploding bullets and the like, but maybe they are just more useful than bioweapons for most belligerants? And therefore are used more irrespective of how strong the relevant treaties are.
But yes, agree that these aspects still provide some value :)
Yeah, I don’t think there’s a ton of benefit it trading hypotheticals and counterfactuals here, especially because I don’t think much of anyone’s intutions will be conveyed clearly, but I do think it’s worth noting that it’s not obvious to me that the convention didn’t have a large counterfactual impact over the past 50 years.
First, thanks for writing this up. I mostly agree with the points being made, but I disgree with some of the conclusions.
Yes, the BWC is dysfunctional, and yes, it’s unlikely to materially reduce bioweapon risk below the (currently low) levels they are at today. But, as you say, it’s better for it to exist than not. I think the counterfactual here is critical. If we look at the BWC compared to other weapon bans, it’s somewhat weaker than the IAEA, though arguably stronger than the NPT, and it’s weaker than the CWC, though chemical weapons are used more. On the other hand, it’s far stronger than the ban on landmines, the ban on exploding / fragmenting bullets, etc. And one difference is obvious, and in my view central—having an annual meeting where states come to recommit and discuss progress on a ban.
I also think it’s good to have junior people attend, to give them experience with international systems. It’s a cheap convention compared to running something elsewhere focused on biorisks, and it serves that purpose well.
Additionally, the BWC is also a place (the only place?) for experts to inform State representatives and the international community of emerging risks—a function which I worry will be tested in coming years, and could be critical.
Lastly, it’s very good for states and NGOs to continue to use as a Schelling point. It has become a key place for announcing efforts towards reducing risks, which are planned beforehand in order to announce them there, and which are motivated in part because there is a place to talk about them.
Thanks good points, I don’t think we disagree directionally, perhaps just on how important some of these effects are. It feels like a very difficult epistemic problem to attribute how much the relative absence of bioweapons use is attributable to the BWC—I know roughly nothing about exploding bullets and the like, but maybe they are just more useful than bioweapons for most belligerants? And therefore are used more irrespective of how strong the relevant treaties are. But yes, agree that these aspects still provide some value :)
Yeah, I don’t think there’s a ton of benefit it trading hypotheticals and counterfactuals here, especially because I don’t think much of anyone’s intutions will be conveyed clearly, but I do think it’s worth noting that it’s not obvious to me that the convention didn’t have a large counterfactual impact over the past 50 years.