Your comments about coup-proofing seem interesting and useful.
Weāve since observed that lots of dictators (and coup-threatened democracies) practice coup-proofing. So I would be careful about attributing the *intra-elite* violence by particular regimes to the personalities of the leaders.
I think the fact that more leaders engaged in violent coup-proofing (rather than it just being Hitler, Stalin, and Mao) should indeed provide weak evidence against the theory that the unusual (compared to the population as a whole) personalities of leaders plays a key role in whether violent coop-proofing occurs. This is because that theory would now need to claim that a larger number of leaders have personalities that are unusual in the relevant way, or that a lack of such unusual personalities was āmade up forā by other factors in some cases.
But I think that this fact would only serve as weak evidence, because it doesnāt seem very implausible to claim that a fairly large number of dictators, or leaders of coup-threatened democracies, have personalities that are unusual in the relevant way. These are people in unusual positions which are arguably easier to get into if one is ruthlessly self-interested, so it wouldnāt seem surprising (prima facie) if their average levels of ruthlessness-relevant traits was notably above population averages.
Additionally, it seems worth distinguishing violent coup-proofing from coup-proofing as a whole. In terms of how well they might evidence malevolent traits, ārotating [...] officersā and āsplitting the army into multiple factions/āmilitiasā seem quite different from the sorts of violent purges engaged in by e.g. Stalin. (It may well be that violent coup-proofing is very common as well; Iām just flagging that the distinction seems relevant for my purposes.)
You also seem to imply that (a) these coup-proofing behaviours may have been rational things for a self-interested leader to do in those situations, and (b) this is reason to be careful in assuming that this is about personality. I think (a) is a good point. And I think thereās some merit to (b), in the sense that this pushes against thinking something like āThese leaders are just crazy and evil.ā
But overall, I donāt think this is a question of personality vs incentive structures. I think neither determines a personās behaviour by itself. And I think whether or not one would do even horrific things if itās in oneās self-interest is partly a matter of personality. E.g., Iād be willing to bet that a very large portion of people wouldnāt engage in violent coup-proofing, even if they were in a situation where doing so would help them keep power. (Another framing of this is that a personās personality and values helps determine their incentives, in the sense that it influences what we like and dislike, including how much we dislike harming people.)
Coup-proofing cannot explain violence against non-elites by those regimes.
I think this is key; I think the massive-scale violence against non-elites is probably a larger part of why Hitler, Stalin, and Mao seem like interesting case studies of potential harm from malevolence than is the potentially ārationalā coup-proofing.
That said, itās good to independently consider the merits of a even non-central arguments/āpoints, and to update incrementally, so your arguments against making naive inferences from coup-proofing behaviours are still useful.
I have one criticism of the argument that coup-proofing prevalence is evidence for personality factors. Suppose that if people observe a game being played multiple times they are more likely to set aside their personal preferences and āplay to winā. So if I were the first dictator of Iraq I might say āno Iām not going to kill generals who come from different towns, that would be evilā. And then get killed for it. And maybe the second dictator says the same thing. But by the time the third or fourth dictator rises to power heāll either be selected for willingness to use violence or he will decide his preference for living is stronger than his preference for not killing. While I agree that many people would not commit inter-elite violence as the first leader, I suspect a much larger number would as the 5th leader. So an argument for point B.
Saddam Hussein was the 5th Iraqi leader to take power by coup within 21 years.
But on the other hand, there are lots of leaders that just stepped down when they lost the support of their ruling coalitions. And those heroes do not become famous. This is strong evidence of the importance of personality.
I have one criticism of the argument that coup-proofing prevalence is evidence for personality factors.
To be clear, my argument was more like ācoup-proofing prevalence doesnāt seem like strong evidence against personality playing an important roleā. I.e., I donāt think that it should reduce our belief that personality plays an important role.
It is true that I think Iād see these behaviours as evidence for personality playing an important role. But Iām not sure, and Iām not seeing it as key evidence.
While I agree that many people would not commit inter-elite violence as the first leader, I suspect a much larger number would as the 5th leader. So an argument for point B.
Iād agree that a much larger number would as the 5th leader than as the 1st leader, in the scenario you describe. And I think this is a valuable point.
But, in line with your final paragraph, Iād still bet that many people wouldnāt; I think many people would simply step down, flee, or accept radical changes to the nature of their regime.
And perhaps more importantly, I think personality influences whether someone tries to become a leader in the first place, and whether they succeed in that. So I expect a lot of people to not want to ādo horrible thingsā, recognise that pursuing this leadership position may require them to ādo horrible thingsā along the way or to stay in power, and thus just not pursue those positions.
(That said, I did say āIād be willing to bet that a very large portion of people wouldnāt engage in violent coup-proofing, even if they were in a situation where doing so would help them keep power.ā So thereās a valid reason why you focused on how people would behave if they somehow landed in the leadership position, rather than how likely they are to enter those positions to begin with.)
Your comments about coup-proofing seem interesting and useful.
I think the fact that more leaders engaged in violent coup-proofing (rather than it just being Hitler, Stalin, and Mao) should indeed provide weak evidence against the theory that the unusual (compared to the population as a whole) personalities of leaders plays a key role in whether violent coop-proofing occurs. This is because that theory would now need to claim that a larger number of leaders have personalities that are unusual in the relevant way, or that a lack of such unusual personalities was āmade up forā by other factors in some cases.
But I think that this fact would only serve as weak evidence, because it doesnāt seem very implausible to claim that a fairly large number of dictators, or leaders of coup-threatened democracies, have personalities that are unusual in the relevant way. These are people in unusual positions which are arguably easier to get into if one is ruthlessly self-interested, so it wouldnāt seem surprising (prima facie) if their average levels of ruthlessness-relevant traits was notably above population averages.
Additionally, it seems worth distinguishing violent coup-proofing from coup-proofing as a whole. In terms of how well they might evidence malevolent traits, ārotating [...] officersā and āsplitting the army into multiple factions/āmilitiasā seem quite different from the sorts of violent purges engaged in by e.g. Stalin. (It may well be that violent coup-proofing is very common as well; Iām just flagging that the distinction seems relevant for my purposes.)
You also seem to imply that (a) these coup-proofing behaviours may have been rational things for a self-interested leader to do in those situations, and (b) this is reason to be careful in assuming that this is about personality. I think (a) is a good point. And I think thereās some merit to (b), in the sense that this pushes against thinking something like āThese leaders are just crazy and evil.ā
But overall, I donāt think this is a question of personality vs incentive structures. I think neither determines a personās behaviour by itself. And I think whether or not one would do even horrific things if itās in oneās self-interest is partly a matter of personality. E.g., Iād be willing to bet that a very large portion of people wouldnāt engage in violent coup-proofing, even if they were in a situation where doing so would help them keep power. (Another framing of this is that a personās personality and values helps determine their incentives, in the sense that it influences what we like and dislike, including how much we dislike harming people.)
I think this is key; I think the massive-scale violence against non-elites is probably a larger part of why Hitler, Stalin, and Mao seem like interesting case studies of potential harm from malevolence than is the potentially ārationalā coup-proofing.
That said, itās good to independently consider the merits of a even non-central arguments/āpoints, and to update incrementally, so your arguments against making naive inferences from coup-proofing behaviours are still useful.
I have one criticism of the argument that coup-proofing prevalence is evidence for personality factors. Suppose that if people observe a game being played multiple times they are more likely to set aside their personal preferences and āplay to winā. So if I were the first dictator of Iraq I might say āno Iām not going to kill generals who come from different towns, that would be evilā. And then get killed for it. And maybe the second dictator says the same thing. But by the time the third or fourth dictator rises to power heāll either be selected for willingness to use violence or he will decide his preference for living is stronger than his preference for not killing. While I agree that many people would not commit inter-elite violence as the first leader, I suspect a much larger number would as the 5th leader. So an argument for point B.
Saddam Hussein was the 5th Iraqi leader to take power by coup within 21 years.
But on the other hand, there are lots of leaders that just stepped down when they lost the support of their ruling coalitions. And those heroes do not become famous. This is strong evidence of the importance of personality.
To be clear, my argument was more like ācoup-proofing prevalence doesnāt seem like strong evidence against personality playing an important roleā. I.e., I donāt think that it should reduce our belief that personality plays an important role.
It is true that I think Iād see these behaviours as evidence for personality playing an important role. But Iām not sure, and Iām not seeing it as key evidence.
Iād agree that a much larger number would as the 5th leader than as the 1st leader, in the scenario you describe. And I think this is a valuable point.
But, in line with your final paragraph, Iād still bet that many people wouldnāt; I think many people would simply step down, flee, or accept radical changes to the nature of their regime.
And perhaps more importantly, I think personality influences whether someone tries to become a leader in the first place, and whether they succeed in that. So I expect a lot of people to not want to ādo horrible thingsā, recognise that pursuing this leadership position may require them to ādo horrible thingsā along the way or to stay in power, and thus just not pursue those positions.
(That said, I did say āIād be willing to bet that a very large portion of people wouldnāt engage in violent coup-proofing, even if they were in a situation where doing so would help them keep power.ā So thereās a valid reason why you focused on how people would behave if they somehow landed in the leadership position, rather than how likely they are to enter those positions to begin with.)