I’m sure ~everyone involved considers nuclear war a negative-sum game. (They likely still think it’s preferable to win a nuclear war than to lose it, but they presumably think the “winner” doesn’t gain as much as the “loser” loses.)
On top of this, I imagine most involved view not fighting a nuclear war as preferable to fighting and winning. (In other words, a nuclear war is not only negative on net, but negative for everyone.)[1]
Yeah, my sense is multiple countries will upgrade their arsenals soon. I’m legitimately uncertain whether this will on net increase or decrease nuclear risk (largely I’m just ignorant here – there may be an expert consensus that I’m unaware of, but I don’t think the immediate reaction of “spending further money on nukes increases nuclear risk” is obviously necessarily correct).
I previously did some work (with/under Michael Aird) on the effects of nuclear weapons advances on nuclear risk. There’s no expert consensus I’m aware of: for many advances there are a bunch of considerations going in both directions.
One example of an advance that I’m somewhat confident would decrease risk is more accurate nuclear weapons. The main reason: nukes being more accurate means that fewer nukes, and/or nukes with lower explosive yields, are needed to hit the intended target. The effect of this is fewer direct casualties; also—and more importantly for x-risk—less soot generated, hence less of a nuclear winter effect.
(Tagging the OP, @Denis, in case my comment or the post I link to is of interest.)
This raises the obvious question, “Why fight at all?” As best I’m aware, the answer to that lies with things like false information (e.g., false alarm triggering a second strike that’s actually a first strike), and also with some artefacts of game theory (e.g., brinkmanship-gone-wrong; bargaining breakdown due to misevaluating how the opponent sees things; etc.) as well as the reality that actors don’t always behave rationally.
On top of this, I imagine most involved view not fighting a nuclear war as preferable to fighting and winning. (In other words, a nuclear war is not only negative on net, but negative for everyone.)[1]
I previously did some work (with/under Michael Aird) on the effects of nuclear weapons advances on nuclear risk. There’s no expert consensus I’m aware of: for many advances there are a bunch of considerations going in both directions.
One example of an advance that I’m somewhat confident would decrease risk is more accurate nuclear weapons. The main reason: nukes being more accurate means that fewer nukes, and/or nukes with lower explosive yields, are needed to hit the intended target. The effect of this is fewer direct casualties; also—and more importantly for x-risk—less soot generated, hence less of a nuclear winter effect.
(Tagging the OP, @Denis, in case my comment or the post I link to is of interest.)
This raises the obvious question, “Why fight at all?” As best I’m aware, the answer to that lies with things like false information (e.g., false alarm triggering a second strike that’s actually a first strike), and also with some artefacts of game theory (e.g., brinkmanship-gone-wrong; bargaining breakdown due to misevaluating how the opponent sees things; etc.) as well as the reality that actors don’t always behave rationally.