-How can you judge calibration vs miscalculation on a question like this?
-David changing his mind doesn’t seem like a good proxy, because in this context a change of mind might be better explained by cultural factors than his prior being miscalibrated
Sure, the more idealized bet would be to commit to whatever the equivalent of “my estate” will be in 2223 to give him $1, and for David’s estate to give my estate back $2000 inflation-adjusted dollars in 1,000,200 years from now.
But this seems hard to pull off logistically. 10 years is already a long time.
David changing his mind doesn’t seem like a good proxy, because in this context a change of mind might be better explained by cultural factors
I don’t know, man, it sure feels like at some level “the progenitor of a theory disavows it after some deliberation” should be one of the stronger pieces of evidence we have that a theory is false, in worlds where empirical evidence is very hard to get quickly.
-How can you judge calibration vs miscalculation on a question like this? -David changing his mind doesn’t seem like a good proxy, because in this context a change of mind might be better explained by cultural factors than his prior being miscalibrated
Sure, the more idealized bet would be to commit to whatever the equivalent of “my estate” will be in 2223 to give him $1, and for David’s estate to give my estate back $2000 inflation-adjusted dollars in 1,000,200 years from now.
But this seems hard to pull off logistically. 10 years is already a long time.
I don’t know, man, it sure feels like at some level “the progenitor of a theory disavows it after some deliberation” should be one of the stronger pieces of evidence we have that a theory is false, in worlds where empirical evidence is very hard to get quickly.
I like the category of bets that says: “You believe X; I predict you will change your mind, let’s bet on it”.
I think this does promote good epistemics.