In particular, it seems hard to make utilitarianism consistent with caring much more about people close to us than strangers.
Why exactly is this a problem? To me it seems more sensible to recognize our disproportionate partiality toward people close to us as an evolutionary bug, rather than a feature. Even though we do care about people close to us much more, this doesnât mean we actually should regard their interests as overwhelmingly more important than those of strangers (whom we can probably help more cheaply), on critical reflection.
The problem is that one manâs modus ponens is another manâs modus tollens. Lots of people take the fact that utilitarianism says that you shouldnât care about your family more than a stranger as a rebuttal to utilitarianism.
Now, we could try to persuade them otherwise, but whatâs the point? Even amongst utilitarians, almost nobody gets anywhere near placing as much moral value on a spouse as a stranger. If thereâs a part of a theory that is of very little practical use, but is still seen as a strong point against the theory, we should try find a version without it. Thatâs what I intend scope-sensitive ethics to be.
In other words, we go from âmy moral theory says you should do X and Y, but everyone agrees that itâs okay to ignore X, and Y is much more importantâ to âmy moral theory says you should do Yâ, which seems better. Here X is âdonât give your family special treatmentâ and Y is âspend your career helping the worldâ.
My moral intuitions say that there isnât really an objective way that I should act, however I do think there are states of the world that are objectively better than others and that this betterness ordering is determined by whatever the best version of utilitarianism is.
So it is indeed better if I donât give my family special treatment, but Iâm not actually obligated to. Thereâs no rule in my opinion which says âyou must make the world as good as possibleâ.
This is how I have always interpreted utilitarianism. Not having studied philosophy formally Iâm not sure if this is a common view or if it is seen as stupid, but I feel it allows me to give my family some special treatment whilst also thinking utilitarianism is in some way ârightâ.
The problem is that one manâs modus ponens is another manâs modus tollens.
Fair :) I admit Iâm apparently unusually inclined to the modus ponens end of these dilemmas.
If thereâs a part of a theory that is of very little practical use, but is still seen as a strong point against the theory, we should try find a version without it.
I think this depends on whether the version without it is internally consistent. But more to the point, the question about the value of strangers does seem practically relevant. It influences how much youâre willing to effectively donate rather than spend on fancy gifts, for example, giving (far?) greater marginal returns of well-being to strangers than to loved ones. Ironically, if weâre not impartial, it seems our loved ones are âutility monstersâ in a sense. (Of course, you could still have some nonzero partiality while agreeing that the average person doesnât donate nearly enough.)
I find this as troubling as anyone else who cares deeply about their family and friends, certainly. But Iâm inclined to think itâs even more troubling that other sentient beings suffer needlessly because of my personal attachments⌠Ethics need not be easy.
Thereâs also the argument that optimal altruism is facilitated by having some baseline of self-indulgence, to avoid burnout, but 1) I think this argument can be taken too far into the realm of convenient rationalization, and 2) this doesnât require any actual partiality baked into the moral system. Itâs just that partial attachments are instrumentally useful.
Why exactly is this a problem? To me it seems more sensible to recognize our disproportionate partiality toward people close to us as an evolutionary bug, rather than a feature. Even though we do care about people close to us much more, this doesnât mean we actually should regard their interests as overwhelmingly more important than those of strangers (whom we can probably help more cheaply), on critical reflection.
The problem is that one manâs modus ponens is another manâs modus tollens. Lots of people take the fact that utilitarianism says that you shouldnât care about your family more than a stranger as a rebuttal to utilitarianism.
Now, we could try to persuade them otherwise, but whatâs the point? Even amongst utilitarians, almost nobody gets anywhere near placing as much moral value on a spouse as a stranger. If thereâs a part of a theory that is of very little practical use, but is still seen as a strong point against the theory, we should try find a version without it. Thatâs what I intend scope-sensitive ethics to be.
In other words, we go from âmy moral theory says you should do X and Y, but everyone agrees that itâs okay to ignore X, and Y is much more importantâ to âmy moral theory says you should do Yâ, which seems better. Here X is âdonât give your family special treatmentâ and Y is âspend your career helping the worldâ.
My moral intuitions say that there isnât really an objective way that I should act, however I do think there are states of the world that are objectively better than others and that this betterness ordering is determined by whatever the best version of utilitarianism is.
So it is indeed better if I donât give my family special treatment, but Iâm not actually obligated to. Thereâs no rule in my opinion which says âyou must make the world as good as possibleâ.
This is how I have always interpreted utilitarianism. Not having studied philosophy formally Iâm not sure if this is a common view or if it is seen as stupid, but I feel it allows me to give my family some special treatment whilst also thinking utilitarianism is in some way ârightâ.
Fair :) I admit Iâm apparently unusually inclined to the modus ponens end of these dilemmas.
I think this depends on whether the version without it is internally consistent. But more to the point, the question about the value of strangers does seem practically relevant. It influences how much youâre willing to effectively donate rather than spend on fancy gifts, for example, giving (far?) greater marginal returns of well-being to strangers than to loved ones. Ironically, if weâre not impartial, it seems our loved ones are âutility monstersâ in a sense. (Of course, you could still have some nonzero partiality while agreeing that the average person doesnât donate nearly enough.)
I find this as troubling as anyone else who cares deeply about their family and friends, certainly. But Iâm inclined to think itâs even more troubling that other sentient beings suffer needlessly because of my personal attachments⌠Ethics need not be easy.
Thereâs also the argument that optimal altruism is facilitated by having some baseline of self-indulgence, to avoid burnout, but 1) I think this argument can be taken too far into the realm of convenient rationalization, and 2) this doesnât require any actual partiality baked into the moral system. Itâs just that partial attachments are instrumentally useful.