Yes, I understand that youâre saying thatâs a problem that you canât assign a probability-weighted expectation. Iâm pointing out that if you canât do that, then cluelessness doesnât support any claims that any other action (besides the highest-EV action based on the premise that you can assign a non-arbitrary probability-weighted expectation) is higher-EV, so you should do the previously-chosen highest-EV action anyway. Therefore cluelessness is irrelevant.
Ah, sorry, I thought you were making the first-order wager argument (Q3 here), but IIUC youâre making a metanormative wager argument as Toby suggested. I discuss why Iâm unconvinced of that here. (And as another commenter pointed out, this is supplemented by âWhy cluelessness mattersâ in the OP.)
Even if itâs true that itâs unjustified, thatâs not relevant. If the decision-making process canât justify any actions, you can do whatever you want. Might as well act as if it can and do whatever I would have done anyway. (It would be less justified, but⌠shrug)
Iâd be interested in reading the case for it
Conveniently, itâs not necessary to justify it and try to increase anyoneâs credence that itâs true, because the alternative doesnât affect what decision they should make, so they should behave as if itâs true regardless of the probability, anywhere from 0 to 100%.
Yes, I understand that youâre saying thatâs a problem that you canât assign a probability-weighted expectation. Iâm pointing out that if you canât do that, then cluelessness doesnât support any claims that any other action (besides the highest-EV action based on the premise that you can assign a non-arbitrary probability-weighted expectation) is higher-EV, so you should do the previously-chosen highest-EV action anyway. Therefore cluelessness is irrelevant.
Ah, sorry, I thought you were making the first-order wager argument (Q3 here), but IIUC youâre making a metanormative wager argument as Toby suggested. I discuss why Iâm unconvinced of that here. (And as another commenter pointed out, this is supplemented by âWhy cluelessness mattersâ in the OP.)
Yep, and I think I disagree that youâre justified in doing that, but Iâd be interested in reading the case for it.
Even if itâs true that itâs unjustified, thatâs not relevant. If the decision-making process canât justify any actions, you can do whatever you want. Might as well act as if it can and do whatever I would have done anyway. (It would be less justified, but⌠shrug)
Conveniently, itâs not necessary to justify it and try to increase anyoneâs credence that itâs true, because the alternative doesnât affect what decision they should make, so they should behave as if itâs true regardless of the probability, anywhere from 0 to 100%.