Thanks for writing this up. This question came up in a Precipice reading group I was facilitating for last year. We also used the idea that collapse was ‘re-rolling the dice’ on values, and I think it’s the right framing.
I recall that the ‘better values’ argument was:
We should assume that our current values are ‘average’. If we reran the last three millennia of human history 1000 times (from 1000BC), we should assume that the current spectrum of values would be somewhere near the average of whatever civilization(s) would emerge in the early 21st century.
But if you believe in moral progress, the starting point is important. In all but the most extreme collapse scenarios, we’d assume some kind of ethical continuity and therefore a much better starting point than humans in 1000BC had.
Therefore a society that evolved post-collapse would probably lead to the emergence of better moral values.
The ‘worse values’ argument was:
We should not assume that our current values are average, we should rather assume that we’ve been uncommonly lucky (top ~10% of potential scenarios).
This is because most historical societies have had much worse values, and it has been by chance that we have managed to avoid more dystopian scenarios (multi-century global rule by fascist or communist dictatorships, and modern technologically-dominant theocracies).
Any collapse worthy of the name would lead to a societal reset, and a return to pre-industrial, even pre-agricultural, norms. We’d probably lose education and literacy. In that case, it would be very similar to re-rolling the dice from a certain point in history, therefore it’s more likely that we would end up in one of those dystopian worlds.
We also discussed the argument that, if you’re a longtermist who is very concerned about x-risk and you’re confident (~70+%) that we would develop better values post-collapse, this may lead to the uncomfortable conclusion that collapse might be morally okay or desirable.
If I had to put a number on my estimates, I’d probably go for 55% better, 45% worse, with very high variation (hence the lack of a ‘similar’ option).
“We should not assume that our current values are average, we should rather assume that we’ve been uncommonly lucky”
Why? That seems like a very weird claim to me—we’ve seen evolution of moral reasoning over time, so it seems weird to claim we wouldn’t see similar evolution a second time.
The claim that we wouldn’t see similar evolution of moral reasoning a second time doesn’t seem weird to me at all. The claim that we should assume that we’ve been exceptionally / top 10%- lucky might be a bit weird. Despite a few structural factors (more complex, more universal moral reasoning develops with economic complexity), I see loads of contingency and path dependence in the way that human moral reasoning has evolved. If we re-ran the last few millennia 1000 times, I’m pretty convinced that we’d see significant variation in norms and reasoning, including:
Some worlds with very different moral foundations- think a more Confucian variety of philosophy emerging in classical Athens, rather than Socratic-Aristotelian philosophy. (The emergence of analytical philosophy in classical Athens seems like a very contingent event with far-reaching moral consequences).
Some worlds in which ‘dark ages’, involving decay/ stagnation in moral reasoning persisted for longer or shorter periods, or where intellectual revolutions never happened, or happened earlier.
Worlds where empires with very different moral foundations than the British/ American would have dominated most of the world during the critical modernisation period.
Worlds where seemingly small changes would have huge ethical implications- imagine the pork taboo persisting in Christianity, for example.
The argument that we’ve been exceptionally lucky is more difficult to examine using a longer timeline. We can imagine much better and much worse scenarios, and I can’t think of a strong reason to assume either way. But with a shorter timeline we can make some meaningful claims about things that could have gone better or worse. It does feel like there are many ways that the last few hundred years could have led to much worse moral philosophies becoming more globally prominent- particularly if other empires (Qing, Spanish, Ottoman, Japanese, Soviet, Nazi) had become more dominant.
I’m fairly uncertain about this later claim, so I’d like to hear from people with more expertise in world history/ history of moral thought to see if they agree with my intuitions about potential counterfactuals.
I agree that if we re-ran history, we’d see significant variations, but I don’t think I have any reason to think our current trajectory is particularly better than others would be.
For example, worlds where empires with very different moral foundations than the British/ American could easily have led to a more egalitarian view of economics, or a more holistic view of improving the world far earlier. And some seemingly small changes such as persistence of pork taboos, or adoption of anti-beef and vegetarian lifestyles as a moral choice don’t seem to lead to worse outcomes.
But I agree that it’s an interesting question for historians, and I’d love to see someone do a conference and anthology of papers on the topic.
Thanks for writing this up. This question came up in a Precipice reading group I was facilitating for last year. We also used the idea that collapse was ‘re-rolling the dice’ on values, and I think it’s the right framing.
I recall that the ‘better values’ argument was:
We should assume that our current values are ‘average’. If we reran the last three millennia of human history 1000 times (from 1000BC), we should assume that the current spectrum of values would be somewhere near the average of whatever civilization(s) would emerge in the early 21st century.
But if you believe in moral progress, the starting point is important. In all but the most extreme collapse scenarios, we’d assume some kind of ethical continuity and therefore a much better starting point than humans in 1000BC had.
Therefore a society that evolved post-collapse would probably lead to the emergence of better moral values.
The ‘worse values’ argument was:
We should not assume that our current values are average, we should rather assume that we’ve been uncommonly lucky (top ~10% of potential scenarios).
This is because most historical societies have had much worse values, and it has been by chance that we have managed to avoid more dystopian scenarios (multi-century global rule by fascist or communist dictatorships, and modern technologically-dominant theocracies).
Any collapse worthy of the name would lead to a societal reset, and a return to pre-industrial, even pre-agricultural, norms. We’d probably lose education and literacy. In that case, it would be very similar to re-rolling the dice from a certain point in history, therefore it’s more likely that we would end up in one of those dystopian worlds.
We also discussed the argument that, if you’re a longtermist who is very concerned about x-risk and you’re confident (~70+%) that we would develop better values post-collapse, this may lead to the uncomfortable conclusion that collapse might be morally okay or desirable.
If I had to put a number on my estimates, I’d probably go for 55% better, 45% worse, with very high variation (hence the lack of a ‘similar’ option).
“We should not assume that our current values are average, we should rather assume that we’ve been uncommonly lucky”
Why? That seems like a very weird claim to me—we’ve seen evolution of moral reasoning over time, so it seems weird to claim we wouldn’t see similar evolution a second time.
The claim that we wouldn’t see similar evolution of moral reasoning a second time doesn’t seem weird to me at all. The claim that we should assume that we’ve been exceptionally / top 10%- lucky might be a bit weird. Despite a few structural factors (more complex, more universal moral reasoning develops with economic complexity), I see loads of contingency and path dependence in the way that human moral reasoning has evolved. If we re-ran the last few millennia 1000 times, I’m pretty convinced that we’d see significant variation in norms and reasoning, including:
Some worlds with very different moral foundations- think a more Confucian variety of philosophy emerging in classical Athens, rather than Socratic-Aristotelian philosophy. (The emergence of analytical philosophy in classical Athens seems like a very contingent event with far-reaching moral consequences).
Some worlds in which ‘dark ages’, involving decay/ stagnation in moral reasoning persisted for longer or shorter periods, or where intellectual revolutions never happened, or happened earlier.
Worlds where empires with very different moral foundations than the British/ American would have dominated most of the world during the critical modernisation period.
Worlds where seemingly small changes would have huge ethical implications- imagine the pork taboo persisting in Christianity, for example.
The argument that we’ve been exceptionally lucky is more difficult to examine using a longer timeline. We can imagine much better and much worse scenarios, and I can’t think of a strong reason to assume either way. But with a shorter timeline we can make some meaningful claims about things that could have gone better or worse. It does feel like there are many ways that the last few hundred years could have led to much worse moral philosophies becoming more globally prominent- particularly if other empires (Qing, Spanish, Ottoman, Japanese, Soviet, Nazi) had become more dominant.
I’m fairly uncertain about this later claim, so I’d like to hear from people with more expertise in world history/ history of moral thought to see if they agree with my intuitions about potential counterfactuals.
I agree that if we re-ran history, we’d see significant variations, but I don’t think I have any reason to think our current trajectory is particularly better than others would be.
For example, worlds where empires with very different moral foundations than the British/ American could easily have led to a more egalitarian view of economics, or a more holistic view of improving the world far earlier. And some seemingly small changes such as persistence of pork taboos, or adoption of anti-beef and vegetarian lifestyles as a moral choice don’t seem to lead to worse outcomes.
But I agree that it’s an interesting question for historians, and I’d love to see someone do a conference and anthology of papers on the topic.