I think you’re probably right that society is likely to respond by increasing our ability to respond to natural pandemics in various ways. There’s a lot of great people who are now way more interested in pandemics than they were before.
(Come to think of it, putting some thought now into how to mobilise those forces to avert the next pandemic is probably warranted, since I think there’s a pretty good chance all that energy dissipates without much to show for it within a few years of this pandemic ending.)
When it comes to biorisk as a whole, the picture is less clear (though my guess is still probably positive?). There does seem to be some danger that people neglect considerations around engineered pandemics (DURC, info hazards, etc.) in their rush to tackle natural pandemics. I think a lot of work done on the latter is still useful for preventing the former, but they don’t always run in the same direction, and since engineered pandemics seem to be the greatest concern from a longtermist perspective, this could be a significant concern.
(Come to think of it, putting some thought now into how to mobilise those forces to avert the next pandemic is probably warranted, since I think there’s a pretty good chance all that energy dissipates without much to show for it within a few years of this pandemic ending.)
I agree with this. I generally suspect it’s important to give people “things to do” when they’re currently riled up/inspired/motivated about something, and that if the absence of things to do they’ll just gradually revert to their prior sets of interests and focuses (or those of the people they’re around). I suspect it would be very valuable for people to currently think of concrete things that a wide range of people (not just biorisk experts) can productively do in relation to biorisk after this pandemic has been handled, and be ready to spread the word about those things during and right after the pandemic, so we can capitalise on the momentum.
(I have no firm data or expertise to back this view up.)
I think you’re probably right that society is likely to respond by increasing our ability to respond to natural pandemics in various ways. There’s a lot of great people who are now way more interested in pandemics than they were before.
(Come to think of it, putting some thought now into how to mobilise those forces to avert the next pandemic is probably warranted, since I think there’s a pretty good chance all that energy dissipates without much to show for it within a few years of this pandemic ending.)
When it comes to biorisk as a whole, the picture is less clear (though my guess is still probably positive?). There does seem to be some danger that people neglect considerations around engineered pandemics (DURC, info hazards, etc.) in their rush to tackle natural pandemics. I think a lot of work done on the latter is still useful for preventing the former, but they don’t always run in the same direction, and since engineered pandemics seem to be the greatest concern from a longtermist perspective, this could be a significant concern.
I agree with this. I generally suspect it’s important to give people “things to do” when they’re currently riled up/inspired/motivated about something, and that if the absence of things to do they’ll just gradually revert to their prior sets of interests and focuses (or those of the people they’re around). I suspect it would be very valuable for people to currently think of concrete things that a wide range of people (not just biorisk experts) can productively do in relation to biorisk after this pandemic has been handled, and be ready to spread the word about those things during and right after the pandemic, so we can capitalise on the momentum.
(I have no firm data or expertise to back this view up.)