Sorry, I donāt think I have relevant expertise to assess such empirical claims (which is why I focus more on hypotheticals). It would certainly be convenient if helping people turned out to be the best way to also reduce non-human suffering! And it could be true (I donāt take convenience to be an automatic debunker or anything). I just have no idea.
Sorry, I donāt think I have relevant expertise to assess such empirical claims (which is why I focus more on hypotheticals).
Note many do not engage with my empirical claims about effects on soil animals for philosophical reasons (āthat assumes utilitarianism!ā), and assessing these is a comparative advantage you have. Moreover, in the effective altruism community, some people initially concluded that targeting farmed animals increases animal welfare very cost-effectively based on classical utilitarian reasons, and I expect many of those people to depart from classical utilitarianism after realising it plus empirical evidence point towards prioritising soil animals much more than farmed animals. People with a scout mindset, and not invested in any particular way of increasing animal welfare could be in a better place to assess the extent to which such departures from classical utilitarianism are post hoc justifications, eventually in the form of empirical arguments which are seldomly investigated.
As a concrete example of philosophical arguments being important, @Wladimir J. Alonso, the founder and innovation director of the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI), values averting intense suffering more than is justified by its intensity. Some people, not necessarily Wladimir, endorse this so much that they would prefer averting 1 h of excruciating pain over an infinite amount of annoying pain, and would never consider effects on soil animals given other animals can experience much more intense suffering.
As a concrete example of philosophical arguments being important, @Wladimir J. Alonso, the founder and innovation director of the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI), values averting intense suffering more than is justified by its intensity.
2 more notable examples. From the comments under this thread, Bob Fischer, who led Rethink Prioritiesā (RPās) moral weight project, and is the president of the Arthropoda Foundation, and Mal Graham, who is the strategy director of Wild Animal Initiative (WAI), and together with Bob āmake[s] most of the strategic and granting decisions for Arthropodaā, prioritise farmed invertebrates over soil animals āin part because we donāt endorse precise-probabilities approaches to handling uncertaintyā. In addition, at least Bob āalso want[s] robustness in the case for sentienceā, which I am interpreting as a narrower distribution of the probability of sentience.
I suspect you are overestimating the difficulty of checking the empirical claims. I am pretty confident that funding HIPF decreases the suffering of soil animals much more cost-effectively than cage-free corporate campaigns decrease the suffering of chickens. I estimate HIPF decreases 5.07 billion soil-animal-years per $, and that cage-free corporate campaigns improve 10.8 chicken-years per $. For HIPF to decrease the suffering of soil animals less cost-effectively than cage-free corporate campaigns decrease the suffering of chickens, the reduction in suffering due to improving 1 chicken-year would have to be larger than than from decreasing 469 M soil-animal-years (= 5.07*10^9/ā10.8), whereas I calculate chickens only have 921 k (= 221*10^6/ā240) times as many neurons as nematodes, which are the soil animals with the fewest neurons. Moreover, I think the number of neurons underestimates the absolute value of the welfare per animal-year. Rethink Prioritiesā (RP) moral weight project assumes shrimps have 10^-6 as many neurons as humans (see Table 5 here), but the estimate for their welfare range in Table 8.6 of Bob Fischerās book is 8 % that of humans.
For the reasons above, I am also pretty confident that funding HIPF changes the welfare of soil animals much more cost-effectively than cage-free corporate campaigns increase the welfare of chickens. However, I am very uncertain about whether HIPF increases or decreases animal welfare due to being very uncertain about whether soil nematodes have positive or negative lives.
To clarify, I believe researching whether soil nematodes have positive or negative lives would increase animal welfare even more cost-effectively than funding HIPF, but that this still increases animal welfare much more cost-effectively than interventions targeting farmed animals.
I would prefer saving human lives to decrease animal welfare such that soil animals had positive lives. I think saving human lives decreases soil-animal-years, and therefore increases/ādecreases the welfare of soil animals if these have negative/āpositive lives. I guess they have negative lives, although I am very uncertain, and estimate the welfare of soil ants, termites, springtails, mites, and nematodes is ā977 k times that of humans for my preferred way of comparing welfare across species.
Sorry, I donāt think I have relevant expertise to assess such empirical claims (which is why I focus more on hypotheticals). It would certainly be convenient if helping people turned out to be the best way to also reduce non-human suffering! And it could be true (I donāt take convenience to be an automatic debunker or anything). I just have no idea.
Note many do not engage with my empirical claims about effects on soil animals for philosophical reasons (āthat assumes utilitarianism!ā), and assessing these is a comparative advantage you have. Moreover, in the effective altruism community, some people initially concluded that targeting farmed animals increases animal welfare very cost-effectively based on classical utilitarian reasons, and I expect many of those people to depart from classical utilitarianism after realising it plus empirical evidence point towards prioritising soil animals much more than farmed animals. People with a scout mindset, and not invested in any particular way of increasing animal welfare could be in a better place to assess the extent to which such departures from classical utilitarianism are post hoc justifications, eventually in the form of empirical arguments which are seldomly investigated.
As a concrete example of philosophical arguments being important, @Wladimir J. Alonso, the founder and innovation director of the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI), values averting intense suffering more than is justified by its intensity. Some people, not necessarily Wladimir, endorse this so much that they would prefer averting 1 h of excruciating pain over an infinite amount of annoying pain, and would never consider effects on soil animals given other animals can experience much more intense suffering.
2 more notable examples. From the comments under this thread, Bob Fischer, who led Rethink Prioritiesā (RPās) moral weight project, and is the president of the Arthropoda Foundation, and Mal Graham, who is the strategy director of Wild Animal Initiative (WAI), and together with Bob āmake[s] most of the strategic and granting decisions for Arthropodaā, prioritise farmed invertebrates over soil animals āin part because we donāt endorse precise-probabilities approaches to handling uncertaintyā. In addition, at least Bob āalso want[s] robustness in the case for sentienceā, which I am interpreting as a narrower distribution of the probability of sentience.
I suspect you are overestimating the difficulty of checking the empirical claims. I am pretty confident that funding HIPF decreases the suffering of soil animals much more cost-effectively than cage-free corporate campaigns decrease the suffering of chickens. I estimate HIPF decreases 5.07 billion soil-animal-years per $, and that cage-free corporate campaigns improve 10.8 chicken-years per $. For HIPF to decrease the suffering of soil animals less cost-effectively than cage-free corporate campaigns decrease the suffering of chickens, the reduction in suffering due to improving 1 chicken-year would have to be larger than than from decreasing 469 M soil-animal-years (= 5.07*10^9/ā10.8), whereas I calculate chickens only have 921 k (= 221*10^6/ā240) times as many neurons as nematodes, which are the soil animals with the fewest neurons. Moreover, I think the number of neurons underestimates the absolute value of the welfare per animal-year. Rethink Prioritiesā (RP) moral weight project assumes shrimps have 10^-6 as many neurons as humans (see Table 5 here), but the estimate for their welfare range in Table 8.6 of Bob Fischerās book is 8 % that of humans.
For the reasons above, I am also pretty confident that funding HIPF changes the welfare of soil animals much more cost-effectively than cage-free corporate campaigns increase the welfare of chickens. However, I am very uncertain about whether HIPF increases or decreases animal welfare due to being very uncertain about whether soil nematodes have positive or negative lives.
To clarify, I believe researching whether soil nematodes have positive or negative lives would increase animal welfare even more cost-effectively than funding HIPF, but that this still increases animal welfare much more cost-effectively than interventions targeting farmed animals.
I would prefer saving human lives to decrease animal welfare such that soil animals had positive lives. I think saving human lives decreases soil-animal-years, and therefore increases/ādecreases the welfare of soil animals if these have negative/āpositive lives. I guess they have negative lives, although I am very uncertain, and estimate the welfare of soil ants, termites, springtails, mites, and nematodes is ā977 k times that of humans for my preferred way of comparing welfare across species.
To be clear: Iād be excited for more people to look into these claims! Seems worth investigating. But itās not my comparative advantage.
Good to know! I think highlighting the importance of the topic is one way of getting more people to investigate it ;).