Interesting, thanks! I think those points broadly make sense to me.
So I just want to clarify that, even though Iâm predicting a counterfactually worse outcome, Iâm not necessarily predicting a dystopia for most people, or a scenario in which most peopleâs lives are net negative. A dystopian future is conceivable, but doesnât necessarily follow from a lack of democracy.
I think this is a good point, but I also think that:
The use of the term âdystopiaâ without clarification is probably not ideal
A future thatâs basically like the current-day Hanoi everywhere forever is very plausibly an existential catastrophe (given Bostrom/âOrdâs definitions and some plausible moral and empirical views)
(This is a very different claim from âHanoi is supremely awful by present-day standardsâ, or even âIâd hate to live in Hanoi myselfâ)
In my previous comment, I intended for things like âcurrent-day Hanoi everywhere foreverâ to be potentially included as among the failure modes Iâm concerned about
To expand on those claims a bit:
When I use the term âdystopiaâ, I tend to essentially have in mind what Ord (2020) calls âunrecoverable dystopiaâ, which is one of his three types of existential catastrophe, along with extinction and unrecoverable dystopia. And he defines an existential catastrophe in turn as âthe destruction of humanityâs longterm potential.â So I think the simplest description of what I mean by the term âunrecoverable dystopiaâ would be âa scenario in which civilization will continue to exist, but it is now guaranteed that the vast majority of the value that previously was attainable will never be attainedâ.[1]
So this wouldnât require that the average sentient being has a net-negative life, as long as itâs possible that something far better couldâve happened but now is guaranteed to not happen. And it more clearly wouldnât require that the average person has a net-negative life, nor that the average person perceives themselves to be in a âcatastropheâ or âdystopiaâ.
Obviously, a world in which the average person or sentient being has a net-negative life would be even worse than a world thatâs an âunrecoverable dystopiaâ simply due to âunfulfilled potentialâ, and so I think your clarification of what youâre saying is useful. But I already wasnât necessarily thinking of a world with average net-negative lives (though I failed to clarify this).
[1] That said, Ordâs own description of what he means by âunrecoverable dystopiaâ seems misleading: he describes it as a type of existential catastrophe in which âcivilization [is] intact, but locked into a terrible form, with little or no valueâ. I assume he means âterribleâ and âlittle to knowâ when compared against an incredibly excellent future that he considers attainable. But itâd be very easy for someone to interpret his description as meaning the term is only applying to futures that are very net-negative.
I also think âdystopiaâ might not be an ideal term for what Ord and I want to be referring to, both because it invites confusion and might sound silly/âsci-fi/âweird.
Interesting, thanks! I think those points broadly make sense to me.
I think this is a good point, but I also think that:
The use of the term âdystopiaâ without clarification is probably not ideal
A future thatâs basically like the current-day Hanoi everywhere forever is very plausibly an existential catastrophe (given Bostrom/âOrdâs definitions and some plausible moral and empirical views)
(This is a very different claim from âHanoi is supremely awful by present-day standardsâ, or even âIâd hate to live in Hanoi myselfâ)
In my previous comment, I intended for things like âcurrent-day Hanoi everywhere foreverâ to be potentially included as among the failure modes Iâm concerned about
To expand on those claims a bit:
When I use the term âdystopiaâ, I tend to essentially have in mind what Ord (2020) calls âunrecoverable dystopiaâ, which is one of his three types of existential catastrophe, along with extinction and unrecoverable dystopia. And he defines an existential catastrophe in turn as âthe destruction of humanityâs longterm potential.â So I think the simplest description of what I mean by the term âunrecoverable dystopiaâ would be âa scenario in which civilization will continue to exist, but it is now guaranteed that the vast majority of the value that previously was attainable will never be attainedâ.[1]
(See also Venn diagrams of existential, global, and suffering catastrophes and Clarifying existential risks and existential catastrophes.)
So this wouldnât require that the average sentient being has a net-negative life, as long as itâs possible that something far better couldâve happened but now is guaranteed to not happen. And it more clearly wouldnât require that the average person has a net-negative life, nor that the average person perceives themselves to be in a âcatastropheâ or âdystopiaâ.
Obviously, a world in which the average person or sentient being has a net-negative life would be even worse than a world thatâs an âunrecoverable dystopiaâ simply due to âunfulfilled potentialâ, and so I think your clarification of what youâre saying is useful. But I already wasnât necessarily thinking of a world with average net-negative lives (though I failed to clarify this).
[1] That said, Ordâs own description of what he means by âunrecoverable dystopiaâ seems misleading: he describes it as a type of existential catastrophe in which âcivilization [is] intact, but locked into a terrible form, with little or no valueâ. I assume he means âterribleâ and âlittle to knowâ when compared against an incredibly excellent future that he considers attainable. But itâd be very easy for someone to interpret his description as meaning the term is only applying to futures that are very net-negative.
I also think âdystopiaâ might not be an ideal term for what Ord and I want to be referring to, both because it invites confusion and might sound silly/âsci-fi/âweird.